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The powers traditionally vested in a Parliament generally include control over budget 
administration by the  executive~ 
The European Parliament acquired this power in conjunction with the Council when 
the treaties were revised in April 1970 and the Member States made the Community 
financially autonomous. 
Faced with the task of exercising this  new  responsibility,  Parliament's authorities 
very  soon realized  that if the  Community's  revenue  and expenditure  were  to  be 
scrutinized more closely, it was essential to set up a new body- an Audit Office-
for the purpose. 
The Community's accounts, it is true, are already subject to conscientious and com-
petent scrutiny by an Audit Board but the Board lacks the authority and responsibili-
ties usually associated with an Audit Office;  it has no statute formally recognizing 
a special relationship with Parliament as  the representative body of the peoples of 
the European Community. 
The unflagging efforts made by the parliamentary Committee on Budgets, and par-
ticularly by its  Vice-Chairman,  Mr Heinrich  Aigner,  to resolve  the  problems  of 
financial  management conducted in a  proper, legal  manner and with a  due sense 
of thrift,  deserve  the  highest  commendation.  Cases  of fraud  have  too often made 
the headlines,  too patently to the detriment of the European ideal in general and 
the common agricultural policy in particular. 
In authorizing publication of this collection of papers under the heading 'The case 
for a European Audit Office' the Bureau of the European Parliament has taken the 
view  that in the institutional development of Europe, the Communities cannot be 
given financial  autonomy and responsibilities unless they are also given the means 
with which to discharge them. 
This too is  what the Second Chamber of the Netherlands' States  General had in 
mind  when  in a  motion carried  on 20  March 1973,  it called  on the  government 
'to take the necessary steps  at the level  of the European Communities leading to 
the setting up of a European Audit Office along those lines at an early juncture'. 
Cornelis  BERKHOUWER 
President of  the European Parliament 
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Parliamentary Group: PS. PREFACE 
Under the treaty of 22 April 1970,  certain budgetary powers were transferred from 
the Council to the European Parliament and further steps in this  direction are to 
be taken by 1 January 197 5. 
Parliament has  already  published two  reports1  on its  budgetary powers  and how 
they have developed; others will do\lbtless follow, for Parliament's effective influence 
on Community revenue  and  expenditure will  continue  to  rank high  in its  list  of 
priorities as  long as  the institutional balance  of the Communities fails  to include, 
in this field at least, an acceptable measure of parliamentary democracy. 
The Community cannot maintain for much longer its insistence on a parliamentary 
system in applicant countries if it does  not itself adopt such a system for its  own 
institutions. 
This is  the principal political issue but there is a second aspect which may be con-
sidered equally important from the functional point of view - I refer to the means 
of control actually available to Parliament to determine whether the Commission's 
financial management is sound and in keeping with its objectives. 
The power to vote the budget assumes full significance only if it goes hand in hand 
with the authority - and the means - to control its implementation. 
The means at present available to the budget authority seem singularly inadequate 
for the purpose and the European Parliament, through its Committee on Budgets, 
has taken the initiative in arranging a series of discussions with the Audit Offices in 
the  Member  States to  devise  a  structure for  and frame  the  statutes  of the body 
which is  to be responsible for external control of the Communities' budget and to 
determine what facilities should be placed at its disposal. 
This  selection  of documents,  which  has  been  produced  by  Mr Heinrich  Aigner, 
Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Budgets, reflects current progress and thinking 
in the matter. 
In presenting the case  for  a  European Audit Office,  he  argues  both for  stronger, 
effective control of Community finance and for greater authority for Parliament in 
the exercise of its recently acquired right of discharge in respect of the Commission's 
management. 
1  Abridged English edition published in a single volume in October 1972:  'The European Communities' own resources 
and the budgetary powers of the European Parliament'. 
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Parliament's suggestion for  a  European Audit Office  is  thus  an expansion  of its 
efforts to secure full recognition of its budgetary powers. I trust, therefore, that this 
new collection of selected documents will meet with the same response as its prede-
cessors  and help to create  a  greater  awareness  of Parliament's efforts  to achieve 
a more satisfactory balance of institutional power and introduce genuine democracy 
into the life of the Community. 
Georges  SPENALE 
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Parliamentary Group: CDU/CSU. INTRODUCTION 
1.  The European. Community is  there to serve  its  peoples  and citizens  who  have  a  rightful 
claim to assurance that money  paid into European coffers  is  spent wisely  and in  accordance 
with the principle of sound budget management. 
It falls  to  the  representatives  of the  peoples  of Europe-and the  Members  of the  European 
Parliament  consider  themselves  as  such-to be  the  guarantors  of clear-cut  and  responsible 
financial management on the part of the European Community such as  bears comparison with 
the standards obtaining in the Member States. 
2.  This requirement,  however,  is  not adequately met by the Community's present system of 
financial control. 
The auditing of Europe's finances is carried out more or less as a 'sideline occupation', a descrip-
tion which neatly sums up the present bleak situation as regards Community control of budgetary 
and financial affairs. 
As matters stand at present, 
(a)  the European Communities' budget has reached a figure of 4 200m. u.a.
1 
(b)  payments from the European Development Fund amount to 1 000 m. u.a. 
(c)  the enlargement of the European Community to include Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark 
has become reality, 
(d)  with the creation of a monetary union, (European Monetary Fund) a further steep rise must 
be expected in the budget growth rate. 
In this situation, control of the administration, whether external or by Parliament, is  still in its 
infancy.  While parliamentary control over public finance  in the Member States is  founded  on 
national Audit Offices  served by a  professional staff whose activities  cover an extremely wide 
field,  the European Parliament is  served by a body-the Audit Board-whose present statutes 
can hardly make it a satisfactory instrument for effective external, let alone parliamentary control. 
3.  The communications gap both between the Member States and between them and the Euro-
pean Community, the complexity of European legislation, particularly in the agricultural sector, 
poor coordination of the Member States' auditing activities, these are all factors which make it 
imperative to introduce a European system of financial control at an early date. The European 
Parliament's Committee on Budgets and I personally have been calling for this for a good many 
1  Budget  estimates  for  1973  run to 4 300m. u.a. i.e. D.M. 15 300 m., FF 23 300 m., Fl. 15 200m., Lire 2 625 000 m.,  BF 210 000 m., 
£ 1 747 m., Kr. 26 000 m. 
15 years and our efforts have found a keen response in the national parliaments and auditing authori-
ties. 
The need for a  European Audit Office  also  won  broad acceptance  during talks  between the 
European Parliament's Committee for Finance and the Presidents of the national Audit Offices. 
4.  When it is  recalled that cases  of fraud involving the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund are common knowledge and that the Community or the Member States make 
inconsistent and sometimes improper payments in this sector running into hundreds of million 
dollars annually which have done and still  do so  much to impair the Community's standing, 
it will be realized that action can no longer be postponed. 
5.  So far,  the Council of the Communities has not gone beyond the stage of rhetoric; it has 
failed to take any initiative or action or when it has, the required effect has not been achieved. 
Following  three  years'  discussion,  the  new-and long  overdue-financial regulation  is  only 
now to be introduced. 
As from 1975 the Community will  enjoy full financial autonomy. Under the Council's decision 
of 21  April 1970, the Community will be self-financed from the following resources: 
1.  Customs revenue  in its entirety (the figure for  1975  is  estimated at approximately 2 200m. 
u.a.) 
2.  All revenue from agricultural levies  (the estimated figure  for  1975  is  approximately 900 m. 
u.a.l 
3.  If  necessary, up to 1% of VAT from all Member States as from 1975  (estimated at 1 000 m. 
u.a.)2 
This revenue will provide the basis on which the Community will  operate. This in itself makes 
it necessary to ensure that it is brought under a satisfactory system of European financial control. 
6.  In as far as control over the use of these funds will not be exercised by the national parlia-
ments, this responsibility must be assumed by a European Parliament with wider powers. 
Since financial control requires smoothly functioning machinery the driving force behind the idea 
of a European Audit Office was, understandably enough, the Members of the European Parlia-
ment. 
It will be a grave threat to European integration if the financial management and expenditure of 
a European bureaucracy more or less responsible only to itself is not brought under an adequate 
and independent c:ontrol authority. 
7.  The auditors and the chairman of the Audit Board provided for in Article 206 of the EEC 
Treaty, Article 78 of the ECSC Treaty, and Article 180 of the EAEC Treaty do not exercise their 
duties on a full-time basis, hence the observation made at the beginning of this introduction. 
1  Includil_lg the 'sugar' contributions and the financial countervailing charges. 
2  Source:  forecasts covering several years submitted by the Commission, 15 November 1972, Doc. 257/72. The figures are for the 6 original 
Member States. The share of the new Member States should amount to approximately 750 million u.a. in 1975. 
16 Although the auditors are  assisted  by officials  (at present 26  approved posts),  there  are not 
enough of them to ensure continuity and independence as  in the case of the Audit Offices  in 
the Member States, which have often been described as the fourth power in the State. 
8.  Such are the reasons which have prompted me,  on behalf of the Bureau of the European 
Parliament and the Committee on Budgets, to give wide publication to this collection of docu-
ments. Our aim must be to set up a European Audit Office. 
The European Parliament in general and the members of its Committee for Finance and Budgets 
in particular have taken numerous initiatives in this field in response to the recognized needs of 
a Community guided by the principles of parliamentary democracy. 
The avenues of approach to a  European system of financial  control which I  have outlined in 
these introductory remarks are based on an analysis of the present situation; at the same time 
they are designed to serve as a basis of discussion for the ad hoc Working Party set up by the 
European Parliament with representatives from the national Audit Offices and the other Commu-
nity institutions. 
A.  Financial control under Community law 
External and internal financial control 
9.  The three treaties
1  provide for two forms of financial control. The first is external control. 
It  is carried out by an outside body, the Audit Board, set up specially for the purpose and acting 
independently of  the authorities subject to its control. It  is further a retrospective form of control, 
consisting, in accordance with the three Treaties,  2  first in examining the accounts of all revenue 
and expenditure on the basis of records, and, if necessary,  on the spot, to establish that they 
have been received or incurred in a lawful and regular manner and in accordance with the princi-
ples of sound financial management and secondly, in drawing up a report after the close of each 
financial year. 
10.  The three Treaties make provision for but do not further specify the other form of financial 
control. Article 78(f) of the ECSC Treaty, Article 209  of the EEC Treaty and Article  183  of 
the Euratom Treaty simply instruct the Council and Commissiqn to lay down arrangements for 
this form  of financial  control:  the instruction is  contained in the provision that the Council 
shall, acting unanimously  on a proposal from the Commission, lay down rules concerning the 
responsibility of authorizing officers and accounting officers and concerning appropriate arrange-
ments for inspection. 
11.  In pursuance of this instruction, the various financial regulations provide for preliminary 
internal control on the model of the 'advance control prodedure' that is applied to a greater or 
lesser degree in the Member State and has been developed in a number of international organiza-
1  Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Treaty establishing the European  Economic Community (EEC) 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). 
2  Article 78 (e), ECSC Treaty; Article 206, EEC Treaty; Article 180, EAEC Treaty. 
17 tions.  In each of the four Community institutions, this form of control is  the responsibility of 
a financial controller appointed by the institution to perform his duties independently. His ad-
vance endorsement is  required not only for individual payment orders but also for any measure 
which may result in a charge on the budget.  The financial regulations thus ensure that he  can 
query any irregular expenditure far enough in advance. The financial controller queries expendi-
ture by withholding his endorsement and stating his reasons.  In such cases  the  expenditure  is 
not effected unless  by a reasoned decision  the  Commission overrides the financial  controller's 
refusal to endorse it. 
Disadvantages of  external financial control 
12.  Both preliminary internal control and retrospective external control have their weaknesses. 
The disadvantage of any form  of retrospective control is  that expenditure is  queried after the 
event.  The query is  thus pointless save in cases where the item of expenditure is likely to recur 
in  the  same  circumstances,  which  does  not always  happen.  This  disadvantage  increases  with 
the time lapse between the date on which expenditure is  made and that on which it is  queried. 
Experience has shown that it frequently takes a long time for the Audit Board's report to reach 
or be discussed  by  Parliament and the Council.  For example,  the discharge in respect  of the 
1970 financial year will not be given by Parliament until 1973. 
13.  A  further  disadvantage  of retrospective  external control is  that a  separate control body 
cannot be  as  familiar  as  would  be  desirable with the  procedures applied  by  the  departments 
subject to its control.  While the Audit Board has access  to all Commission documents,  there 
are so  many items of expenditure that each transaction cannot possibly be fully scrutinized on 
the basis of records.  The auditor must therefore possess an intuitive sense if he is  to begin his 
inspection at the point where it is likely to be most useful. Intuition of this sort, however, is not 
a matter of sixth sense, meaning that it is more likely to be found in greater measure in an auditor 
familiar with the internal workings of the department to be inspected than in an outsider. 
Disadvantages of  internal control 
14.  The disadvantages of internal control lie in the position of dependence in which the financial 
controller finds  himself to some extent although, following the merger of the executives of the 
three Communities,. the post was graded at the highest level. 
15.  A further weakness of internal financial control is that the Commission can easily override 
the financial  controller's refusal to endorse expenditure.  The requirement on the Commission 
to state its reasons is unlikely to have much of an inhibiting effect.  The Court of Justice has re-
peatedly noted that the reasons given by the Commission for its decisions are generally somewhat 
slender and it would be unreasonable to expect the Commission, which is  faced  with so many 
more important decisions, to take special pains to justify decisions overriding those of  the internal 
financial controller. 
18 The advantages of  a system of  internal and external control 
16.  These weaknesses in external retrospective control and preliminary internal control explain 
why both forms are provided for in Community law.  There is  no justification in the argument 
that this is  making too much of financial control, for it is  only by combining both forms that 
the weaknesses of each when carried out alone can be remedied to any substantial extent. The 
official responsible for internal preliminary control is stronger in the knowledge that expenditure 
open to doubt will be scrutinized by a further authority, for the Audit Board's censure is essentially 
directed against him in cases where he has given his endorsement. Furthermore, the Commission 
would be less tempted to override the financial controller's decision to withhold his endorsement 
knowing that a report by the authority responsible for retrospective control would be submitted 
to  Parliament  and the  Council  stating  that despite  warning from  the  financial  controller,  it 
(the Commission) had effected expenditure that was  not in order.  The external auditing body, 
too, would find it easier to concentrate on critical areas if it could work from the opinions and 
reports drawn up by the internal, preliminary financial control authority. 
17.  To be more effective,  the Audit Board must be given  more extensive and clearly-defined 
rights and powers over the departments subject to its inspection. The Council and the Parliament's 
Committee for Budgets have already developed clear conceptions in this matter and these have 
been incorporated in the new Financial Regulation. 
Under Community law the Audit Board is  primarily responsible for  conducting retrospective 
control. If  the administration provides the Board with too much information, this  might blur 
the  lines  of demarcation of responsibilities ;
1  although this  danger should not be  overlooked, -
information of this nature cannot be dispensed with if rational cooperation between the Audit 
Board and internal financial control is to produce optimum results. 
18.  Finally, in connection with the membership of  the Audit Board, a development has occurred 
which would seem to give  cause for concern.  Formerly, the Board's members were  professors 
and members of  the Audit Offices or similar bodies in the Member States carrying out independent 
financial  control; since  1969,  a  few  Member States have been nominating officials  from  their 
Ministries of  Finance. With all due respect for the personal integrity and independence of Ministry 
of Finance officials,  the danger is that the Communities' Audit Board will  gradually come to 
resemble the committees of the Council of Ministers. This would hardly be in keeping with the 
role assigned to the Audit Board in the Treaties, especially with the requirement for independence. 
19.  One of the provisions in the Financial Regulation which guarantees independent internal 
financial control is that all measures relating to the appointment and promotion of the financial 
controller, to disciplinary action, transfer, interruption of service or termination of appointment 
must be laid down in reasoned decisions forwarded to the Council for information. The financial 
controller may appeal against such decisions to the Court of Justice. In other words the financial 
controller can only be removed from office  by a  reasoned decision of the Commission which 
must be notified to the Council and is subject to full judicial investigation. Since Parliament and 
Council together now constitute the budgetary authority, provision must be made to notify both 
of  decisions concerning the financial controller. The provisions contained in the Financial Regula-
1  In accordance with Article 205 of the EEC Treaty the Commission implements the budget on its own responsibility. 
19 tion on internal financial control are open to improvement in this respect. The budget authority 
should have a say in the selection of the financial controllers. Furthermore, the budget authority 
or even the Audit Board should be empowered to render the financial controller liable to disci-
plinary action, as provided for in the Financial Regulation, when he improperly endorses expen-
diture.  This  would  certainly strengthen the financial  controller's hand for under current staff 
regulations, only the Commission can take disciplinary action against him.  This is hardly likely 
to happen if  the endorsement improperly given is for an item of  expenditure which the Commission 
itself wished to incur. 
Finally, it is essential to extend internal preliminary financial control to all Commission expen-
diture and revenue. As matters stand, there are still a few  important areas left uncovered.  This 
is esp,ecially surprising in the case of the European Development Fund. 
20.  The  reason  advanced  for  excluding  Development  Fund payments  made  by the  relevant 
Directorate-General from  financial  control  is  that the  Directorate-General  for  Development 
Aid  has  built up a  satisfactory financial  control system  of its  own.  This  is  self-contradictory 
since the whole spirit of financial control is impugned if it is carried out by the same department 
whose expenditure is  to be scrutinized. The Directorate-General "for Development Aid has not 
only  assumed  sole  responsibility for  financial  control,  but also  for  accounting.  Furthermore, 
financial  control is  performed on the spot by so-called 'commissioned controllers' who  acting 
as  a sort of 'Jack-of-all-trades' represent the Commission's interests in the implementation  of 
projects financed by the Development Fund in overseas countries. 
It  would thus appear that where the expenditure of  the European Development Fund is concerned, 
the  principle of independent financial  control is  not observed,  nor is  the  principle,  likewise 
written into the Financial Regulation, whereby the duties of  authorizing officer, financial controller 
and accounting officer should be kept separate. 
21.  The biggest improvement which can be made to financial control in future lies in a better 
exchange of information between internal preliminary control and external retrospective control 
by the Audit Office. 
The two forms  of control should not be partitioned off from each other.  Preliminary internal 
control should be required to take account of the observations made by the Audit Board and 
approved by the budget authorities. 
B.  Control of Community revenue 
and expenditure handled by the States' authorities 
Rules for a procedure to control this revenue and expenditure 
22.  It  is essential that all such revenue and expenditure should be controlled by the Communities 
since they are the Communities' own resources and are simply handled by the Member States 
under administrative  delegation-just as  in federal  states  the  provincial  authorities  discharge 
certain responsibilities  on behalf of the central government.  This is a major task for the Com-
munity's future financial control department. 
20 As long as the Member States collect revenue and effect expenditure for the account of the Com-
munities,  there can  obviously  be  no question of applying  a  system  of preliminary control in 
which the financial controller of  the Commission endorses the acts of the Member States' authori-
ties recording and collecting Community claims for payment of customs duties and agricultural 
levies  or concerning,  say,  the  substantiation  and implementation  of commitments  under the 
Agricultural Fund. 
23.  Member  States'  officials  responsible  for  actually  receiVmg  and  disbursing  Community 
funds  do not apply directly the Community's agricultural and customs regulations but follow 
implementing rules which are detailed in the extreme. In these rules, which are drafted by higher 
authority in the Member States, and by the central authorities in particular, Community law-
although basically self-executing in the Member States-is interpreted for the use of the officials 
concerned in the form of readily understandable service instructions. This means that for effective 
control of Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member States, these implemen-
ting rules should be scrutinized; in other words, it is  not enough for the Community's control 
service  or joint committees  consisting of officials  from various  Member States  to proceed to 
the frontier and observe how,  in specific  cases,  the local customs authorities collect duties  or 
agricultural levies on imports and pay refunds on exports.  This would also be more closely in 
line  with the allocation of responsibilities  under Community law between the Member States 
and the Community for th(handling of own revenue and expenditure. 
24.  The implementing rules issued by the Member States can be scrutinized from two angles. 
First it can be ascertained whether they conform to applicable Community law, in other words 
whether they represent a correct and consistent interpretation of this law. 
Secondly they must be checked for their adequacy in the prevention of frauds which have done 
so much to harm, and continue to harm, the Community's reputation. 
Rules  of implementation which resulted in higher export refunds  or lower import levies  than 
under a proper interpretation of Community law would apply to an unlimited number of import 
or export transactions whereas frauds by importers or exporters occur only in individual cases 
or in a limited number of cases. 
25.  The control of Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member States should 
therefore include comprehensive and systematic supervision by Community bodies of Member 
States' rules of  implementation; but it is essential that this should be supplemented by on-the-spot 
controls. In the performance of their duties,  Member States' officials responsible for collecting 
duties or making payments for the account of the Communities are not always guided by detailed 
implementing rules.  Administrations have also adopted certain practices which, though not set 
down in writing, have through constant repetition the same effect as  rules of implementation. 
These  can only  be  brought to light through on-the-spot controls carried out for  this  specific 
purpose and not primarily to check a specified  import or export transaction. Controls of this 
kind should be carried out not only by Community officials but also by joint committees of  experts 
from the various Member States. 
26.  A solution along those lines to this problem of control is foreshadowed in those provisions 
of  Community law which require Member States to notify the Commission of their implementing 
rules. Unfortunately, the only one which is entirely satisfactory is that applicable to Community 
expenditure effected by  th~ Member States.  This is  Article 9,  paragraph 1,  subparagraph 2 of 
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) Council Regulation No 729/70 of 21  Apri11970 on the financing of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, under which Member States are required to notify the Commission of legal and adminis-
trative provisions relating to the Common Agricultural Policy in as  far as  these have financial 
implications for the Agricultural Fund. Oddly enough, there is  no similar provision governing 
Community revenue collected by the Member States. Under Article 4, paragraph l(b) of Council 
Regulation No  2/71  of 2 January  1971  on the replacement  of the financial  contributions of 
Member States by the Community's own resources,  the Member States are required to notify 
the  Commission  of general  legal  and  administrative  accounting  regulations  which  relate  to 
the establishment and making available of own resources. 
27.  The receiver  of a payment in settlement of a claim by  a third party and on the latter's 
behalf is always required to render account. By virtue of this generally recognised legal principle, 
no Member State can refuse to notify the Commission of administrative regulations which affect 
the amount of  the duties collected for the account of the Communities. There is  probably little 
likelihood of such a refusal being given but if it should, the Commission could confidently refer 
the matter to the Court of Justice. 
Appropriate regulations should be issued allowing the Community's external control authority 
to assess the effectiveness  of the control procedures described above. Steps should therefore be 
taken  to  institutionalize  close  cooperation,  the  sharing  of responsibilities  and  coordination 
between the Audit Board, developed into a European Audit Office, and the Audit Offices in the 
Member States. 
Responsibility for the control of  Community revenue and 
expenditure handled by the Member States' authorities 
28.  The following question has still to be answered: which body and which department should 
exercise  control over Community revenue  and expenditure handled by the  Member States by 
what is virtually administrative delegation? Should this fall within the competence of the Audit 
Board (European Audit Office)  or the Commission and if the latter, which department should 
be responsible, internal financial control or another? 
It is  clearly beyond doubt that the role of the Audit Board in this control process cannot be 
conceived  in  complete  separation  from  that  of the  Commission's  internal  financial  control 
department. 
Initial attempts to answer the question of which body and which department in the Community 
should be authorized to control Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member 
States and to check, for this purpose, the latter's implementing rules and administrative practices 
are bedevilled by the large number of Commission departments which would appear suitable. 
In order to obtain any sort of general picture, a subdivision into three categories is essential. 
1.  The first category includes those departments whose task it is  to draft  and  further  develop 
Community customs and agricultural legislation and to institute proceedings when infringe-
ments of this legislation occur. These are 
(a)  the 'Administration of the Customs Union' directly responsible to the Commission, and 
22 (b)  the three Directorates in the General Directorate for Agriculture which are responsible 
for  the  organization  of markets  in  crop  products,  livestock  products  and  specialized 
crops, fishing and forestry. 
2.  The second category includes the departments which authorize Community revenue and ex-
penditure handled by the Member States. 
(a)  For revenue,  i.e.  customs  duties  and agricultural levies,  this is  the Directorate-General 
for the Budget and Administration, 
(b)  For expenditure,  i.e.  under the guarantee section  of the Agricultural Fund, this is  the 
'European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund'  Directorate  in  the  General-
Directorate for Agriculture. 
3.  The third category consists of the General-Directorate for Financial Control. 
29.  What is particularly striking in this inventory is that the Commission has assigned to different 
departments the task of drafting, further developing and ensuring implementation of  Community 
customs  and agricultural legislation  and that of authorizing Community receipts  from  duties 
and agricultural levies as well as expenditure under the Agricultural Fund. Both tasks have thus 
been kept strictly separate up to the highest level. 
This situation attracts attention because at first glance it would seem more natural and expedient 
to leave both tasks in the hands of  a single authority; after all the task of authorizing receipts and 
expenditure is concerned with the proper application of Community law. But while it may seem 
strange at first sight, this separation becomes clearer with reference to actual practice. The depart-
ments  responsible  for  drafting  and further  developing  Community  customs  and  agricultural 
legislation work in extremely close cooperation with the Member States' customs and agricultural 
administrations in framing Commission proposals for regulations and consult with the Council's 
committees once these proposals are forwarded to the Council. 
30.  This is  difficult tb reconcile with the role of financial administration which is  responsible 
for Community revenue and expenditure and the balancing of the European budget. The Com-
munity's customs and agricultural policy is  at once  economic policy,  social policy,  structural 
policy, regional policy, conjunctural policy, as well as commercial and external policy. It  is also 
financial policy but this aspect must not be allowed to occupy the centre of the stage.  There is 
also a further consideration involved; free from the taint attaching to the tax-collector and secure 
in the knowledge that differences of opinion on future Community legislation cannot be exacer-
bated by differences of  opinion on what the Member States owe the Communities or the Communi-
ties  the Member States under existing Community legislation,  the Commission's departments 
responsible for drafting and further developing Community customs and agricultural legislation 
will find it easier to negotiate with the Member States' administrations and the Council's com-
mittees.  Furthermore, proceedings for infringement of Community law are governed by  other 
principles and criteria than measures taken to ensure that revenue is  received in full  and that 
all Community expenditure is  properly effected.  The procedure provided for in the treaties in 
the case of breaches of those treaties is a formal procedure in which a Member State is put in· 
the dock, so to speak, and is liable to censure by the Court of Justice of the Communities. For 
this reason, the treaty provisions governing the referral of breaches thereof to the Court of  Justice 
are not binding and the Commission invokes them only  in cases  of such importance for the 
operation of the Community as  warrants recourse to the procedure involved.  In most cases, 
23 moreover, the Commission is content to ensure that there will be no recurrence of  the infringement 
in question. If a Member State has misapplied Community law and paid out too much in the 
way of export refunds or collected too little in the way of agricultural levies, and then takes steps 
to ensure that this does not recur, the error cannot be quietly overlooked when its accounts of 
receipts and expenditure are settled; this would be tantamount to the Commission paying un-
authorized export subsidies out of the Agricultural Fund or foregoing the full amount of duties 
owing to the Community. 
This explains why the Commission departments whose task it is  to draft and further develop 
Community customs and agricultural legislation and to ensure the enforcement thereof have quite 
rightly not been made responsible for collecting Community revenue and making Community 
expenditure under this legislation. It also explains why those departments are even less suited to 
undertake financial control of this revenue and expenditure. 
31.  The  question  remains  of whether  the  Commission's  'authorizing'  departments  which 
collect Community revenue from customs duties and agricultural levies  and effect  expenditure 
from the Agricultural Fund should not have the additional responsibility of controlling the said 
revenue and expenditure and, as  part of this control, of scrutinizing the Member States' imple-
menting rules and administrative practices. 
It is  a generally recognized financial  principle-which has been written into the Community's 
Financial  Regulation-that the  duties  of authorizing  officer  are  incompatible  with  those  of 
financial  controller.  This principle is  based on the consideration that departments whose task 
it is  to secure adequate revenue  or to prepare and implement projects generating expenditure 
do not possess  the detachment required for impartial financial  control.  This principle can be 
applied with equal justification to relations between the authorizing officers in the Commission 
and those in the Member States since the Commission departments concerned are responsible 
for a balanced Community budget and for the market support and other measures financed out 
of the Agricultural Fund. 
32.  The role  of preliminary internal financial  control should be  to refuse  endorsement of a 
statement of levies collected by a Member State for the account of the Communities if it is found 
from examination of the implementing rules and administrative practices of the Member State 
concerned or from another source that the levies due to the Communities have not been collected 
or not collected in full.  Preliminary financial  control should also refuse to endorse a payment 
order for the reimbursement of a Member State's expenditure, e.g. for the account of the Agri-
cultural Fund, if it is known that part of the expenditure involved covers export refunds which 
are not in accordance with Community law. The Audit Board too must enter an objection if the 
Commission,  with  or without the financial  controller's endorsement,  effects  such expenditure 
from the Agricultural Fund or if the Commission's financial controller does not sufficiently check 
the Member States' implementing rules and administrative practices to ascertain that such ex-
penditure has occurred. 
If the financial controller of the Commission exercises this form of control and if there is close 
cooperation between preliminary internal control and retrospective control by the Audit Board, 
this will be the surest guarantee that Parliament will be able to fulfill its control responsibilities 
and its financial role as budget authority. 
24 33.  As Community financial control is developed, care should be taken to ensure that the de-
partments directly concerned, either with the agricultural sector or the European Development 
Fund or the Social Fund do not control their own finances. 
This would be in contradiction with basic financial principles. Financial control implies that the 
controller and the controlled should not be the same person and this applies at all levels. 
No matter who is made responsible for the control of revenue and expenditure, it is vital that 
a clear decision should be taken at an early date. Control must be vested in a single central de-
partment for if responsibility were shared among several departments, its effectiveness would be 
inhibited and this would be unreasonable from the point of  view of  the Member States. Inasmuch 
as  responsibility for the revenue and expenditure in question lies with a  single administration 
in the Member States, it should have as its counterpart a single control department at Commission 
level. Besides this, sharing responsibility among several departments means doubling staff require-
ments. 
This applies especially to the agricultural sector which still accounts for 80 per cent of the total 
expenditure of the European Communities. 
Permanent cross-fertilization of ideas suggested by experience must therefore be a prime con-
sideration in the framing and further development of agricultural market regulations and the 
legislative authorities must also be quick to react to mispractices. 
C.  The setting up of a European Audit Office 
34.  It will be perfectly clear from what has been said that even assuming a liberal interpretation 
of Article 206 of  the EEC Treaty, the Audit Board is not in a position to ensure adequate external 
control of Community finances.  Many arguments can be advanced for transforming the Audit 
Board into a European Audit Office. One general observation of relevance here is that the Com-
munity budget has now reached a size that requires external control on a different scale. 
Furthermore, the problems caused not only by the division of the Community into Member 
States but also by the different historical development of  financial, budget and control procedures 
make harmonization essential.  For this reason, the basic statutes of a future European Audit 
Office should be developed from Article 206 of the EEC Treaty. 
35.  The ultimate aim should be to set up the European Audit Office as a genuine independent 
Community body separate from the Assembly, the Council, the Commission and the Court of 
Justice since this is the only way to guarantee its full  independence, including organizational 
independence. In the initial stages of development, it will not be possible to take such a broad 
view for it would require changes to the treaties. Such changes could not be made easily and 
would in any case be subject to a time-consuming:ratification procedure. 
36.  However, a European Audit Office on the following outline model could be set up on the 
basis of Article 206 of the EEC Treaty. 
25 (a)  Responsibilities and authority 
The European Audit Office  would be authorized as of right to verify that the budgetary and 
financial management of the Communities is conducted properly and with due regard for econo-
my; this includes all decisions taken in organizational and staffing matters and other measures 
with possible financial implications. It would also be authorized to conduct local investigations 
with the Member States' administrations and would be free to circumscribe its audits as it saw 
fit or leave entire areas unaudited. By joint decision of the European Parliament and the Council 
it could be requested to conduct special inquiries into specific problems. 
The European Audit Office would have the right to be represented by a member at all meetings 
of the Parliament's and Council's budget committees. 
It would be able to take the initiative in Sl;lbmitting proposals to the Council, the Parliament, 
and the Commission on all matters of financial management. In the performance of its duties 
it would be able to call on the services of experts and commission expert reports. 
(b)  Members 
The European Audit Office would consist of nine full-time members-one from each country of 
the Community-possessing judicial independence and free to conduct audit operations as they 
saw fit.  The members of the European Audit Office  would be required to have many years' 
experience in the control of  public accounts and would be nominated by Parliament and appointed 
for six years by the Council. The Parliament would make nominations on the basis of a triple 
list drawn up by the national audit offices.  Members would be eligible for re-appointment for 
one further term of office. In order to ensure work continuity, the first  members would be ap-
pointed in groups of three for three, five or seven years, those various periods of  office to be drawn 
by lot among the nine Member States. 
(c)  President 
The nine members would elect from among their own numbers a  'prim  us inter pares' to be 
President of the European Audit Office for a period of two years. He would represent the Euro-
pean Audit Office in its relations with outside bodies and would supervise the work of its staff. 
(d)  Administrative director 
The Director of  the European Audit Office would be responsible for organization and administra-
tion. He would take decisions, under the authority of and, in personnel matters, where necessary, 
on the instructions of the President. 
(e)  Structure, allocation of  responsibilities 
The European Audit Office  would be divided into audit areas each directed by one member 
assisted by the necessary staff. The nine members acting collectively would decide autonomously 
26 for six-year periods on the allocation of the Audit Office's responsibilities in the various audit 
areas. As far as possible, account should be taken here of the organization of the Commission 
and the focal points of Community expenditure. 
(f)  Decision-making bodies of  the European Audit Office 
(1)  Divisions would be formed, each covering three audit areas. Each division would take deci-
sions in auditing matters by a majority vote on the basis of a report by whichever member is 
responsible.  Decisions by  individual members  would not be permissible  since  they would 
offend the principle of collective responsibility for the decisions of the European Audit Office 
and stand in conflict with the efforts being made to achieve integration. 
(2)  The three divisions with all their members would together form the Senate of the European 
Audit Office.  The Senate would be responsible for the report on the accounts for a  given 
financial year and for coordinating decision-making and auditing practice in the European 
Audit Office. 
(g)  Disciplinary authority of  the European Audit Office 
The European Audit Office would be able to take disciplinary action in respect of infringements 
of financial  regulations  by  accountants  and  officials  in the  Commission's  internal  financial 
control department. It would have full  right to information on all procedures applied within 
the internal financial control department. The opinions of the European Audit Office in budget 
matters would be binding on the Commission's internal financial control department but should 
not be allowed to interfere with the responsibilities of the Commission. 
(h)  Requests for audit made to national auditing authorities 
The Senate of the European Audit Office would be able to request any or all of the auditing 
authorities in the nine Member States to conduct inspections in specific matters. Where national 
auditing authorities are not requested to make inspections or where such requests cannot be met 
within a reasonable time or in a reasonable manner, the European Audit Office must itself assume 
the task. 
Common criteria applicable to all countries should be laid down in advance for auditing projects 
and should also specify how stringent the audits should be. Acting in conformity with these criteria, 
the national auditing authorities would carry out the requested audits on their own responsibility. 
They would submit their findings direct to the European Audit Office but would be free to inform 
their own governments or other departments concerned. 
(i)  Joint Senate 
A joint Senate with an advisory function would be set up within the European Audit Office. 
In addition to the nine members of the European Audit Office it would include a member from 
each of the auditing authorities in the Member States. The joint Senate would be consulted prior 
27 to decisions by the European Audit Office to submit audit requests to the national auditing auth-
orities. Being represented in the joint Senate, the national auditing authorities would be able to 
coordinate their national auditing tasks with those of the European Audit Office. 
In addition to the rules outlined above, there are undoubtedly many other details to be clarified 
and incorporated partly in the statutes of the European Audit Office and partly in its internal 
rules of procedure. 
D.  The creation of a corps of Community auditors 
37.  In order to campaign  effectively  against frauds  in  the  agricultural  sector and to  ensure 
that  the  Community's  own  resources,  particularly  agricultural  levies  and  common  customs 
tariff duties are collected in accordance with uniform procedures in all Member States, it might 
be useful to set up a Community inspection department as a sort of 'flying squad' with the task 
of carrying out random controls unannounced and on the spot, particularly at the Community's 
external frontiers. The creation of  a 'flying squad' on those lines presupposes a special Community 
training centre for customs officials selected for the purpose. The psychological effect of an audi-
tors' corps capable of working at any time and in any place would assuredly make itself felt in 
the Member States' administrations which collect revenue or effect expenditure for the Community 
by administrative delegation and would  certainly  act  as  a  deterrent to potential 'agricultural 
defrauders'. 
This corps should come under the Commission and enjoy a fairly wide measure of  independence. 
The Community Audit Board/European Audit Office would have to be kept constantly informed 
of the results of its activities. 
Dr Heinrich AIGNER 
Vice-Chairman of  the Committee 
on Budgets 
These selected documents were prepared with the assistance of  Mr Duren and Mr Giraud in the Directorate-
General of  Research and Documentation, and of  Mr Reister in the Directorate-Genera/for Committees and 
Parliamentary Delegations. 
28 CHAPTER I 
THE PRESENT SITUATION 
The first chapter of this collection of documents is intended as an introduction, its aim being: 
I  - to indicate the size of the Communities' budgetary resources, and 
II  - to describe the bodies responsible for controlling the use to which these re-
sources are put. 
To complete the overall picture of the present situation, there will be a third section: 
III - an outline of the main financial provisions for the collecting and use of the 
Communities' resources. 
Section I - Size of the Communities' Budget 
When the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Com-
munities (OJ No 152,  13 July 1967) came into effect on 1 July 1967, the separate budgets of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) were merged into a single budget covering all the revenue and expenditure of the Par-
liament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Justice. 
To the figures  appearing in this budget, however, must be added the revenue and operational 
expenditure of the ECSC, since only administrative expenditure is included in the general budget. 
Finally, it should be noted that considerable sums are made available to the Associated African 
States and Madagascar and also to the overseas countries and territories, and that these sums 
are not included in the budget. 
Amounts are expressed in units of account (u.a.). 
One u.a.  =  50 B.fr. or Lux. fr., 3.66 DM, 5.55 F.fr., 625 lira, 3.62 florins. 
29 1.  The budget of  the European Communities 
When this collection of documents was drawn up, the budget for the financial year 1973 had not 
yet been published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
The figures given below are taken from the draft budget drawn up by the Council which made 
only minor changes on the final reading. 
(a)  Revenue 
The Communities' revenue is estimated as follows: 
Nature of  revenue 
European Communities' own resources 
Available surplus 
Portion of ECSC levies paid in accordance with Article 20 of the 
Treaty of 8 April1965 (administrative expenditure) 
Revenue derived from tax on salaries, wages and emoluments of 
Community personnel 
Contributions of Member States 
Various items 
Total 
Revenue for financial year 
u.a. 
1973 
2 571 474 494 
token entry 
18 000 000 
17126120 
1 823 912 675 
8 838 820 
4 439 352109 
1972 
1 851  750,000 
token entry 
18 000 000 
13 664 470 
2 282 487 518 
11  537 730 
4177 439 718 
Chapter IV gives  more detailed information on the sources of revenue for the Communities' 
budget. 
(b)  Expenditure 
The expenditure authorized for the individual institutions in 1973 is as follows: 
Section  I: Assembly 
Section  II: Council 
Section III: Commission 
Section IV: Court of Justice 
30 
u.a. 
23 988 175 
33 175 915 
4 375 514 779 
6 673 240 
Total  4 439 352 109 The number of staff whose  salaries may be paid from the personnel appropriations in  1973  is 
limited to the following: 
Assembly 
Council 
Institution 
Economic &  Social Committee 
Audit Board 
ECSC Auditor 
Commission 
Administration 
Court of Justice 
Maximum No of Staff 
permanent 
1 016 
1212 
252 
26 
50 
6 729 
223 
temporary 
70 
6 
178 
The expenditure of the Commission of the European Communities for  1973  amounts to 4 375 
million u.a. made up as follows: 
u.a. 
Titles  Nature of expenditure 
appropriations  appropriations  expenditure 
1973  1972  1971 
Title 1  Expenditure on staff of institution  113 657 830  95 262 930  73 278 285 
Title 2  Buildings,  equipment  and  miscellaneous 
operating costs  308 677 724  215 564100  155 400 057 
Title 3  Expenditure incurred in the performance of 
specific tasks  26 276 401  79 516 743  66 900 986 
Title 4  Aid, subsidies and contributions  9 379 730  8 632 650  10 414 414 
Title 5  European Social Fund  240 750 000  97 750 000  56 472 770 
Titles 6  European Agricultural Guidance and Guar-
and 7  antee Fund-Guarantee Section  3 147 400 000  2 697 000 000  2 008 273 763 
Title 8  European Agricultural Guidance and Guar-
antee Fund-Guidance Section  310 000 000  839 551  300  203 279 217 
Title 9  Food aid and other expenses  219 373 094  109 304 000  13 177 000 
Total  4 375 514 779  4132 581 723  2 587196 492 
2.  ECSC operational budget 
The Commission published the operational budget for the financial year 1973 in Official Journal 
No L 297 of 30 December 1972. 
31 ECSC operational budget for the financial year 1973 
Requirements 
(in million u.a.) 
A- Operations to be financed from cur-
rent resources (not repayable) 
1.  Administrative expenditure 
2.  Aid for readaptation 
3.  Research aid 
(a) Steel 
(b) Coal 
(c)  Social 
8.-
4.-
4.-
Rate 
0.29 
18.-
40.-
16.-
Total  74.-
B - Operations  financed  by  loans  on 
unborrowed funds 
Resources 
(in million u.a.) 
A - Current resources 
1.  Income  from  levies  (rounded 
off) 
2.  Interest on  investments and loans 
on unborrowed funds 
3.  Miscellaneous 
Total 
B - Source of  unborrowed funds 
4.  Depreciation on low-cost hous-
ing loans 
Rate 
0.29 
63.80 
10.-
0.20 
74.-'-
4.80 
5.  Part of ex-ECSC Pension Fund  5.20 
4.  Loans by mixing funds  under 
Articles 54 and 56 
5.  Special reserve (low-cost hous-
19.20 
ing)  10.-
6.  Contribution  of  new  members 
to ECSC funds  19.20 
This budget gives only a partial view of the financial activities of the ECSC. Its financial balance-
sheet needs to be added. The following table is taken from the auditor's report for the year 1971. 
It gives some idea of the way in which the activities  of the coal  and steel  industry are being 
financed. 
Financial situation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
as of 31  December 1971 (balance-sheet) 
ASSETS 
I - Current loans granted 
II - Cash  on  hand  and  bank 
accounts 
III- Securities 
IV - Buildings 
V - Recoverable issue costs 
VI- Various 
VII - Equalisation accounts, assets 
Total 
32 
u.a. 
836 184 343 
209 040 373 
64 852 757 
228 678 
14 844 317 
20 302 112 
22187 465 
1167 640 045 
I - Loans raised 
II - Reserves 
(a) Guarantee Fund 
(b) Special reserve 
Ill - Allowances (retraining, 
research, bonuses) 
IV - ex-pension-fund 
V- Other 
VI - Equalisation accounts, 
liabilities 
VII - Balance not allocated 
Total 
LIABILITIES 
u.a. 
801  706 707 
100 000 000 
87 000 000 
117 680 264 
25 651  446 
17 004 878 
17 882 855 
713 895 
1167 640 045 3.  European Development Funds 
Since the EEC was established on 1 January 1958, three funds have been set up, the first by the 
Treaty itself,  and the next two under the Yaounde Convention. The following  information is , 
taken from the Report of the Audit Board for the financial year 1971  (Doc. 206/72). 
(a)  Development Fund for the overseas countries and territories 
'The Development Fund for the overseas countries and territories (1st EDF) was set up by the 
implementing convention relating to the association between the overseas countries and territories 
and the Community provided for in Article 136 of the EEC Treaty and annexed to it. 
The implementing convention, drawn up for a period of five years (1958-1962), provided for the 
payment of contributions by Member States amounting to  581 250 000 u.a. for social and econ-
omic investments. Although the five-year period has long since expired, it is clear that the financing 
operations of the Fund will not be completed for some time.' 
At 31  December 1971  the balance-sheet was as follows: 
CREDIT 
DEBIT 
Financing operations 
Financial costs 
Advance to 2nd Fund 
Contributions 1958-1962 
Other yields and interests 
(b)  Second European Development Fund 
u.a. 
535 298 486 
886 490 
45 335 090 
581 520 066 
581 250 000 
270 066 
581  520 066 
The association convention, valid for a period of five  years, was signed at Yaounde on 20 July 
1963  between the EEC and the Associated African States and Madagascar. It came  into force 
on 1 June 1964. 
Under this convention and the internal agreement, the EEC Member States make 730 000 000 
u.a. available to the European Development Fund (2nd EDF); to this is  added a total sum of 
70 000 000 u.a. in loans granted by the European Investment Bank from its own funds. 
The resources of the Fund are used in the form of non-repayable aid and loans to the Associated 
African States and Madagascar, the overseas countries and territories and the overseas depart-
33 ments for economic and social investments, technical aid and cooperation, and aid for production 
and diversification. 
The balance-sheet of the European Development Fund stood as follows  at 31  December 1971: 
CREDIT 
DEBIT 
Financing operations 
Loans on special terms 
Working capital of the Agence Europeenne de Cooperation 
Current and realizable assets 
- available 
- secured advances 
- Member States 
- credits on 3rd Fund 
Financial and administrative costs 
Operations in process of equalization 
Contributions 
-paid up 
- to be called in 
Liabilities to 1st Fund 
Other 
524 322 000 
205 678 000 
(c)  Third European Development Fund 
u.a. 
474 055 187 
27 443 885 
9 154 440 
31  785 046 
3 391198 
205 678 000 
22 603 204 
2 105 279 
2162 298 
778 378 537 
u.a. 
730 000 000 
45 335 090 
3 043 447 
778 378 537 
The convention  relating  to the  Third Development Fund, valid for a period of five  years  up 
to 31  January 1975, was signed at Yaounde on 29 July 1969 between the EEC and the Associated 
African States and Madagascar and came into force, after ratification, on 1 January 1971. 
Under this convention and an internal agreement also signed at Yaounde, the Member States 
of the EEC place at the disposal of the European Development Fund (third EDF) an amount of 
900 000 000  units of account to which is  added a loan of 100 000 000  u.a. from the European 
Investment Bank. 
With this new Yaounde Convention production aid in the form of price maintenance is  discon-
tinued and a reserve fund is  set up to offset a possible future drop in world prices and natural 
disasters. In addition to financing investment projects in the spheres already covered by the first 
Yaounde Convention, it provides for aid to promote trade and marketing and also the industrial 
development of the Associated States. 
The balance sheet and management accounts  were  submitted unofficially  to the Audit Board 
on 23  May 1972. These documents show the following results: 
34 CREDIT 
DEBIT 
Financing operations 
Credits on Member States 
Contributions from Member States 
Debts to 2nd EDF 
u.a. 
22 603 204 
900 000 000 
922 603 204 
900 000 000 
22 603 204 
Total  922 603 204 
No contribution has been called for yet and the third EDF is still being financed by the earlier 
funds. 
Section II  - Supervisory bodies 
In the public finance sector there are generally two kinds of  financial control. The first is organized 
internally by the Institution concerned. It  is carried out at the time that operations are transacted. 
The financial controller must endorse documents not only as and when expenditure is committed 
or an order to collect issued, but later, too, on payment or recovery of debts. 
The second type of control is external. It is generally carried out a posteriori, after the operation 
or even only at the end of the financial year. This control is the responsibility of a separate and 
independent body, which is accountable to the Parliament either directly or through the Executive. 
Chapter .  IV describes  the  activities  of the Audit Office-or the body acting  as such-in each 
Member State. 
This double system of internal and external control has also been adopted in the European Com-
munities. 
1.  Internal Control 
In the Commission, the institution responsible for implementation of the budget, internal control 
is the responsibility of  Mr Cheysson, who is in charge of  the corresponding 'Directorate-General XX 
-financial control.' 
According to the new financial regulation now being prepared (i.e.  the Commission's proposal 
of 28  November 1972-Doc. 247/72) the duties of the financial controller may be described as 
follows. 
35 (a)  Each Institution appoints a financial controller responsible for making sure  that all  expen-
diture is correctly committed and authorized. As the Communities have had their own resources 
since  1 January 1971,  the financial controller is  now also responsible for all revenue (Arti-
cle 19); 
(b)  The  duties  of the  financial  controller  are  incompatible  with  those  of authorizing  officer 
(Article 17); 
(c)  The essential task of the financial controller is to give his endorsement authorizing: 
(i)  entering of credits. The purpose of the endorsement is to certify that the credit has been 
properly allocated to the budget and accords with current regulations as  well  as  with 
the principles of sound financial management (Article 23); 
(ii)  commitment of expenditure and payment thereof.  The purpose of the endorsement is 
to certify that the appropriations are available and that the entries have been properly 
allocated to the budget and accord with current regulations as well as with the principles 
of sound financial management (Articles 41-43, 50-52). 
The draft regulation makes an innovation in that if the financial controller refuses his endorse-
ment and the institution ignores his refusal, decisions to proceed taken by the higher authority 
which  'replace' the controller's endorsement will  be  'periodically'  made known to  the Audit 
Board. At present, the institution may require the financial controller to give his  endorsement 
and the Audit Board is not informed. 
The draft also makes an innovation in regard to the scope of the control which now 'includes 
control of sound financial management. 
(d)  The financial  controller also  intervenes  in  respect  of transfers  (Article  21)  to certify  that 
appropriations are available. He is notified when revenue is  not collected (Article 24), when 
credit documents are not made out (Article 23),  when an advance is  paid (Article 50)  and 
when payment is suspended (Article 55).  He attends the meetings of the 'Consultative Com-
mittee on Purchasing and Contracts' (Articles 62 and 63) as an observer. His endorsement is 
required for transactions concerned with movable assets and real estate (Article 69); 
(e)  The financial controller will in future concern himself with the drawing up of  annual accounts. 
The general monthly balance-sheet is submitted to him, as is the yearly management account 
(Articles 72 and 75); 
(f) The financial  controller commits his  disciplinary and, if necessary,  pecuniary authority in 
the discharge of his duties, notably when authorizing transactions in excess of budget appro-
priations. 
The financial controller supervises the accounts of the Directorates-General under his  responsi-
bility and is answerable to the superior authority of the Institution. 
This financial control is particularly important in the case of the Commission of the European 
Communities whose estimates are the largest because of the activities of the Agricultural, Social 
and Development Funds. 
In this institution, financial control was organized as follows on 1 February 1973: 
36 Directorate-General XX  -financial control 
The Director-General (A/1) is assisted by an adviser (A/2) and two officials (A/5-4 and B). 
The Directorate-General is divided into 5 sections and a special service for the European Agri-
cultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. 
Division ]-personnel expenditure has two grade A and 4 grade B officials; 
Division 2-Administrative expenditure (other  than personnel expenditure) has two grade A and 
5 grade B officials; 
Division 3 - EDF, EEC Social Fund,  retraining of  ECSC workers, promodon of  ECSC research, 
operational expenditure of the research budget administered at headquarters - has four grade A 
and three grade B officials; 
Division 4- Joint Research Centre- h~s three grade A and two grade B officials; 
Division 5 - Publications  Office and administrative expenditure managed at Luxembourg - has 
one grade A and one grade B official; 
Special  Department  6-EAGGF,  revenue  and  assets  management-has  six  grade  A  and  two 
grade B officials. 
The internal control operations described above are additional to other checks for  which the 
authorizing officers and accounting officers are responsible. 
Clearance  of exp~nditure by  the  authorizing  officer  involves  making  sure  that the  creditor's 
claim is proper, and verifying that the amount claimed is correct and the conditions of payment 
respected. After clearance, the authorizing officer gives the accounting officer the order to pay. 
This officer, in turn, before making the payment, must make sure that no material error has been 
made, that the validity of the discharge is not in doubt and that the provisions of the financial 
regulation have been complied with. 
All these checks may sometimes require local visits by the authorizing officers in cases involving 
own resources (customs duties and levies) or expenditure incurred through the agency of national 
bodies and met by the various Funds. 
It should be stressed that, while the Commission of the Communities is  generally responsible 
to Parliament for the management of its affairs,  the Parliament-according to the new general 
financial regulation-will be informed of difficulties arising in administration of  the budget under 
the new provisions for withholding the financial controller's endorsement. 
In view of this arrangement, it must be a matter of concern to the Parliament whether it is the 
authorizing officer or accounting officer who carries out the local checks. 
37 2.  External Control 
Two bodies are responsible for external control. For the accounts as a whole, an Audit Board 
has been set up under Article 206  of the EEC Treaty, Article 180  of the Euratom Treaty and 
Article 78d of the ECSC Treaty. 
For the operational revenue and expenditure of the ECSC, Article 78e stipulates that the accounts 
shall be examined by an auditor. 
The functions of these two bodies are described below and a list is given of the staff available to 
them. 
(a)  Audit Board 
External control of the financial management of the Communities is effected by the Audit Board 
of the European Communities, which-under the terms of Article 206 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Communities, Article 180 of the Treaty establishing Euratom and Arti-
cle 78  (d) of the revised ECSC Treaty-is responsible for establishing 'that all revenue has been 
received  and all  expenditure incurred in a  lawful  and regular manner and that the financial 
management has been sound'. 
The Audit Board's checks are concerned with all  the financial  operations carried out by the 
Communities'  Institutions  (revenue,  administrative  operating expenditure  of the  Institutions, 
Euratom research and investment expenditure, European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund, European Social Fund, European Development Fund, Food aid, etc.) with the exception 
of operations relating to the 'Operational budget of the ECSC' and to that of the European 
Investment Bank, which are controlled by special external auditing bodies. 
Since the enlargement of the Communities, the Audit Board has consisted of nine members, 
appointed by the Council, acting unanimously, for a period of five  years.  The members of the 
Audit Board discharge their duties on a part-time basis: they are selected from among persons 
having,  generally,  the status of officials  or staff of a  corporate body governed by national or 
international public law whose independence is beyond doubt and who hold recognized profes-
sional qualifications and competence in economic and financial accountancy or in the auditing 
of public accounts. 
The Audit Board discharges its duties in the general interest of the Communities, in complete 
independence and on its own responsibility. It has a  budget and staff; it draws up its internal 
regulations and determines the tasks and responsibilities of its staff. 
Every three months, each Institution forwards to the Audit Board the documents supporting its 
accounts. Auditing is based on records and, if necessary, performed locally. 
At the end of each financial year, the Audit Board prepares a  report on the accounts. This is 
examined by the Council and the Parliament with a view to the giving of a discharge in respect 
of implementation of the budget, and is debated by Parliament in public session. 
The work of the Audit Board is shared between teams which on the Board's authority, give every 
possible support to the members. The division of  work is shown below: it is flexible, as is required 
in view of the frequent changes in the Communities' financial activities. 
38 Services Directorate 
Documentation, archives, secretariat 
(a)  Revenue control 
(b)  European Development Fund 
(c)  Research and Investment Expenditure 
(d)  'Guarantee' Section of EAGGF 
(e)  'Guidance' Section of EAGGF 
(f)  Expenditure on Commission Personnel 
1 Director 
1 Head of Division 
1 Assistant 
3 Secretaries 
1 Clerk 
1 Principal Administrator 
1 Principal Administrator 
1 Principal Assistant 
1 Assistant 
1 Principal Administrator 
1 Principal Assistant 
1 Assistant 
1 Principal Administrator 
1 Administrator 
1 Principal Administrator  ~ 
1 Administrator 
1 Principal Administrator 
1 Principal Assistant 
1 Assistant 
(g)  Operating  expenditure  of the  Commission,  European  Schools  1 Principal Administrator 
1 Principal Assistant 
(h)  Parliament,  Council,  Economic  and  Social Committee, Court 
of Justice 
1 Assistant 
1 Principal Administrator 
1 Assistant 
The Audit Board had an establishment of twenty-six posts on 1 January 1973. 
(b)  The ECSC Auditor 
(i)  Legal terms of  reference and responsibilities of  the ECSC Auditor 
Article 21  of the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the Communi-
ties repealed the provisions of Article 78(6)  of the Treaty of Paris concerning the appointment 
and duties of the ECSC Auditor and substituted other provisions under a new Article 78 e. 
The new  provisions  of the Treaty merging  the three Executives  distinguished clearly  between 
two external control bodies and defined their respective functions:  on the one hand, the Auditor 
who controls only those operations of the ECSC which continue to be carried on by the Single 
Commission in the framework laid down by the Treaty of Paris (revenue from levies, administra-
tion and allocation of funds,  expenditure on research,  retraining and conversion,  borrowings 
and loans);  and,  on the  other hand, the Audit Board of the  European Communities,  which 
controls all the administrative revenue and expenditure of the three Executives. 
39 The responsibility of the ECSC Auditor does not, therefore, since the merger of the executives, 
include control of implementation of the administrative budget,  but is  limited to examination 
and endorsement of the balance-sheet and statement of revenue and expenditure of the ECSC, 
i.e.  to the regular and permanent auditing of the Community's own resources  (revenue from 
levies,  from investment of funds,  penalties and interest on late payments),  special expenditure 
charged against own resources (from the financing of technical and social research operations, 
retraining and industrial conversion) as well as all borrowing and lending effected in performance 
of the tasks entrusted to the Institutions by the Treaty of Paris. 
(ii)  Nature of  controls 
The checks are carried on continually and are comprehensive; in some cases they are based on 
random checks. 
They relate to banking, budgetary and special operations: 
(a)  banking  operations:  revenue  and expenditure  of the  loans  (raised  and  granted)  service, 
loan-raising operations (about 800 million u.a. altogether), loans granted for industrial and 
social projects (about 750  million u.a. altogether), administration and investment of funds 
(about 275 million u.a.); 
(b)  budgetary operations:  ECSC levies,  operational expenditure  (research, retraining and con-
version, aid for coke), allocation to funds and reserves (about 370 million u.a.); 
(c)  special operations: liquidation of the ferrous scrap equalization fund. 
(iii) Establishment plan for the financial year 1973 
(a)  The independent Auditor (not an official)  appointed by a renewable 3-year contract, paid 
on yearly basis; 
(b)  1 Director grade A/2; 
(c)  1 Principal Assistant grade B/1; 
(d)  2 Assistants grade B/3; 
(e)  1 Secretary grade C/1; 
(Total, 5 statutory staff members). 
Section III - Outline of the main provisions governing the financing and 
control of the Communities' budget 
Until 1970, in so far as revenue was  c~ncerned, the Communities did not have their own budget, 
but depended on the Member States' contributions. At the Community level, financial control, 
which related only to expenditure (not revenue, which consisted of  contributions from the Member 
States), was in the last resort vested in the Council. But the conferring of own resources on the 
Communities and of budgetary powers-however modest-on the European Parliament, while 
affirming the existence of the Communities, led to a new distribution of responsibilities not only 
in budgetary matters but also as regards control. 
40 The Community's identity has been furtlfer strengthened by the plan for economic and monetary 
union and by the establishment, alongside the agricultural policy, of new common policies-social 
and regional  policies-involving the Community's own financial  responsibility.  The intention 
of the Heads of State gradually to create a 'European union' gives reason to hope that the Com-
munity may assume further responsibilities. 
All these factors have introduced significant changes in the Communities' financing arrangements 
and, therefore, in the supervision of their revenue and expenditure. 
New provisions have been made in the following areas: 
Collection of the Communities' own resources 
(i)  Regulation 2/71  of 2 January 1971  implementing the decision of 21  April  1970,  replacing 
financial contributions from Member States by the Communities' own resources ( 0 J L 3 of 
5 January 1971). 
EAGGF Expenditure 
(i)  Council Regulation 729/70 of 21  April  1970 on the financing  of the common agricultural 
policy (OJ L 94 of 28 April 1970). 
(ii)  Council Regulation 283/72 of 7 February 1972 on irregularities and recovery of sums wrongly 
paid in connection. with the financing of the common agricultural policy and on the organiz-
ation of an information system in this area (OJ L 36 of 10 February 1972). 
These arrangements govern both sections of  the EAGGF, i.e. the guarantee and guidance sections. 
For the guarantee section, the Commission has adopted three further implementing regulations: 
(i)  Regulation 2697/70 of the Commission of 29 December 1970 relating to the allocation to 
Member States of Community resources from the guarantee section of the Fund (  0 J L 285 
of 31  December 1970); 
(ii)  Regulation 1723/72 of the Commission of 26 July 1972 on the auditing of accounts for the 
EAGGF guarantee section (OJ L 186 of 16 August 1972); 
(iii)  Financial regulation of 7 November 1972, laying down special provisions for the EAGGF, 
guarantee section (OJ L 257 of 15 November 1972). 
In addition, the Commission has submitted to the Council a proposal for a regulation on general 
rules for the financing of operations of the EAGGF guara,ntee section (COM (72)  902 fin.  of 
26 July 1972). 
Expenditure of the European Social Fund 
(i)  Council decision of 1 February 1971  on reform of the European Social Fund (OJ L 28 of 
4 February 1971). 
(ii)  Council Regulation 2396/71  of 8  November  1971  implementing the reform  of the  Fund 
(OJ L 249 of 10 November 1971). 
(iii)  Council Regulation 2397/71  of 8 November 1971  on aid which may be granted from the 
Fund (OJ L 249 of 10 November 1971). 
41 (iv)  Council  Regulation 858/72  of 24  April  1972  on certain financial  and administrative pro-
cedures (OJ L 101  of 28 April1972). 
(v)  Financial  regulation  of 24  April  1972,  embodying  special  provisions  for  the  European 
Social Fund (OJ L  101  of 28 April1972). 
Research and investment expenditure 
(i)  Financial regulation of 20  September 1971  laying down special provisions for research and 
investment appropriations (OJ L 218 28 September 1971). 
This  set  of financial  provisions  representing  a  more  precise  commitment by the  Community 
institutions has still to be completed in several areas. The Council still has to act on a proposed 
new financial regulation submitted to it by the Commission on 15 December 1970 and in particular 
on the rules governing the Audit Board which have not been revised since Article 206 was amended 
by the Treaty of 22 April 1970.
1 
Expenditure  of the European Development Fund (EDF) in favour  of the Associated African 
States and Madagascar 
Relevant here is the financial regulation of the EDF (1969) established by the internal agreement 
on the financing and administration of the Community's aid programmes (OJ L 31, 8 February 
1971).  This  regulation relates to the third fund.  Although the accounts of the first  two funds 
have not yet been finally settled, the outline given below will be limited to the regulation cited, 
since it differs very little from the financial regulations applicable to the other funds. Some rules 
were  set out in Commission Regulation 229/72 of 28  January 1972 on working procedures for 
the EDF (OJ L 29, 2 February 1972). 
Financial Activity of  the ECSC is controlled by an auditor. His duties are defined in Article 78 (e) 
of the ECSC Treaty amended when the three Executives were merged.  No financial regulations 
have been drawn up in implementation of this Article. 
1.  General rules governing finance 
To replace the separate financial regulations governing the expenditure of the EEC and Euratom, 
their revenue, and the preparation and rendering of their accounts, the Commission submitted 
the draft of a new regulation aimed at unifying and revising the provisions in accordance with 
the decisions of 21  and 22  April 1970  on the Communities' own resources  and the budgetary 
powers of the European Parliament. 
The main provisions of this proposal as amended by the Commission are set out overleaf. 
1  The Commission drew up an amended proposal for a financial regulation on 28 November 1972 (Doc. 247/72) which takes into account 
certain observations of the Parliament (Rossi  Report, Doc. 230,  1970-1971  and Resolution of 19 January 1971; OJ C 11,5 February 
1971).  See also Miss Flesch's report, Doc. 298/72. 
42 (a)  General Provisions 
The budget is the instrument which sets down and authorizes in advance the revenue and expen-
diture for each year. There are several exceptions to this rule: 
(a)  current administrative expenditure may be committed as from 15 November of the previous 
financial year. 
(b)  if the budget has not been adopted at the beginning of the financial year, research and invest-
ment expenditure may be paid under the special conditions described in item 5 below. 
(c)  for other expenditure, payment operations are''covered monthly, in respect of each chapter, 
in an amount of up to one twelfth of the budget appropriations of the previous year and 
not exceeding one twelfth of the appropriations of the budget in preparation; commitment 
operations are covered in an amount of not more than one quarter of the appropriations 
of the previous budgetary year (plus one twelfth for each month which has elapsed of the 
current year) within the limit of the total appropriations stipulated in the budget in prepara-
tion. 
Expenditure may only be authorized for one financial year except: 
(i)  if special arrangements are made in the budget; 
(ii)  in the case of contracts. 
There is a 'single' budget covering all revenue and all expenditure. The total revenue and total 
expenditure are in balance. However, 
- expenditure  relating  to  supplementary  research  and  investment  programmes  (Euratom) 
may be covered by financial contributions from the States according to a special scale; 
- special conditions may sometimes apply to approved projects and subsidies. 
The Commission may draw up supplementary preliminary draft budgets: 
- the same procedure applies to these as to the budget which they amend; 
- they must, generally speaking be submitted at the latest by the date required for the preliminary 
draft budget of the following year. 
Revenue and expenditure are accounted for in a  financial year corresponding to the calendar 
year. 
On the revenue side, claims which are confirmed but not recovered by 31  December are shown 
individually by article in the accounts for the following financial year. 
Expenditure is chargeable to the accounts of the period for which the appropriations were autho-
rized only if it is regularly incurred and paid during that year. Exceptions to_ this rule are made 
in the following cases: 
- entries carried forward; 
- research and investment appropriations; 
- debts incurred in previous years for which no appropriation had been carried forward; 
- EAGGF expenditure (guarantee section); 
- expenditure of the Social Fund. 
43 Appropriations may only be carried forward to the next financial year: 
- appropriations corresponding to payments  outstanding on commitments incurred between 
1 January and 31  December shall automatically be carried forward; 
- the request for permission to carry forward shall be  submitted to the budgetary authority 
before 1 July for appropriations corresponding to the payments outstanding at 31  December 
in connection with commitments incurred after 15 December and with purchases of supplies, 
services  and equipment as  well  as  for the portion of the appropriations not committed as 
at 31  December.  If no decision to the contrary is  taken within one month, these amounts 
may be carried forward; the application for permission to carry forward shall be submitted 
by the Commission to the Council and to Parliament before 1 May. 
- the appropriations of the EAGGF, guidance section, may be carried forward automatically 
for up to 5 years with a possibility of further extension; 
- the appropriations corresponding to expenditure by recognition  of the  rights  of Member 
States or by approval from the Commission for conversion projects of the Social Fund shall 
automatically be carried forward to the next financial year. 
Appropriations relating to personnel cannot be carried forward. 
(b)  Presentation and structure of  the budget 
1 July 
Time limits 
: the  Parliament,  Council  and Court  of Justice  prepare  their  estimates  with  an 
introduction, and forward them to the Commission. 
1 September:  the  Commission  forwards  the  preliminary  draft  budget  to  the  Council  with  a 
general introduction. 
5 October  : the Council forwards the draft budget to Parliament with an explanatory statement, 
showing  the  main  trends  and  explaining  any  departures  from  the  preliminary 
draft budget. 
Composition of  the preliminary draft budget 
- Estimates of revenue and expenditure of each Institution. 
- Introduction by each Institution. 
- General introduction by the Commission, defining its policy  and explaining the variations 
in appropriations as between one year and the next. 
- Where  appropriate, the  opinion of the Commission which  may set  out estimates  differing 
from the preliminary estimates of the other Institutions. 
- The establishment plan of  posts shown in the budget and staff with a justification of  new posts. 
- a monthly forecast of payments and receipts. 
- for the guidance section of the EAGGF, a chart must show the commitments and payments 
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position at 31 December of  the previous year and at 1 September of  the current year, a schedule 
of payments due and payment forecasts for subsequent financial years. Should one of the Institutions so request, the Commission may submit amendments before the 
budget is adopted, on receipt of additional information. 
Structure of  the Budget 
The budget consists  of four sections covering the revenue  and expenditure of the Parliament, 
Council, Commission and Court of Justice. 
The revenue and expenditure of the Economic and Social Committee and the ECSC Auditor 
come under the 'Council' section. This also applied to the Audit Board until 1971.  Since that 
time, at the request of Parliament, half of the Audit Board's appropriations have been included 
in Parliament's estimates and the other half in the Council's estimates. This is in keeping with 
the new Article 206 of the EEC Treaty under which both Parliament and Council are required 
and entitled to give a discharge in respect of the accounts. 
The subdivisions of  the budget are the titles, chapters, articles and headings; they follow a decimal 
classification. 
The budgetary nomenclature is  obligatory, but not limiting; it includes a chapter for provisional 
appropriations not allocated and a chapter for expenditure not otherwise foreseen  which may 
only be used by transfer operations. 
The budget shows: 
on the left-hand page:  the  appropriations  opened  for  the  budgetary  year  concerned  and for 
the current year, as well as the expenditure of the previous year; 
on the right-hand page: the comments, which may if so stated be binding; 
annexed:  an establishment chart for each institution imposing a compulsory limit. 
Appropriations are classified by chapter and article; they cannot be assigned to other expenditure. 
However, transfers may be requested: 
- from one chapter to another: they are approved if the Council has not acted within six weeks; 
- from one article to another: they are approved if the Commission has not acted within six 
weeks. 
In the absence of a contrary decision taken in accordance with budgetary procedure, only those 
budget lines for which an appropriation is  shown or which are marked as  'token entries' may 
be the subject of a transfer. 
Transfers of appropriations shall be endorsed by the financial controller. 
(c)  Pluriannual forecasts 
Parallel with its decision to replace Member States' financial contributions by the Communities' 
own  resources,  the Council adopted a  further  decision  requiring  the Commission to prepare 
pluriannual forecasts once a year. 
Their purpose is  to place the Communities' budget in a three-year perspective and to indicate 
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submitted by the Commission to the Council. 
These forecasts  are drawn up by the Commission on the advice of the Committee on Budget 
Policy and are referred to Parliament for an opinion. They are submitted to the Council for con-
sideration and assessment. 
At the end of the financial  year,  the Council can compare forecasts  and actual developments 
for consistency on the basis of a report drafted by the Commission. If  expenditure is well above 
the forecast level, the Commission must report to the Council proposing suitable measures. 
(d)  Implementation of  the budget 
For implementation of the budget, the principle of separation between authorizing officers and 
accounting officers shall be observed. 
The Commission implements the budget. Implementation of the Parliament, Council and Court 
of Justice Sections shall be supervised by the authorizing officer of each Institution and his assist-
ants.  Each Institution  appoints  a  financial  controller  and an  accounting  officer  responsible 
for paying items of expenditure and collecting revenue. 
The Financial Regulation then describes the method of  committing, settling, authorizing and paying 
expenditure. It authorizes the determination of conditions for the grant of advances. It lays 
down the conditions for awarding contracts, keeping inventories and entering items of revenue 
and expenditure. 
In regard to budgetary revenue, the Commission has included in its new proposal provisions on 
the coverage of the Communities' cash requirements in the context of budgetary expenditure. 
(e)  Rendering and auditing accounts 
Management account and Financial balance sheel 
By  1 May at the latest,  each Institution shall forward to the Commission the information it 
needs in order to prepare the management account and Financial balance sheet. 
By 1 June at the latest, the Commission shall draw up: 
- a management account covering all revenue and expenditure operations relating to the previous 
financial year for each of  t~e Institutions; 
- a Financial balance sheet showing the assets and liabilities of the Communities on 31 December 
of the previous financial year; 
- a statement of the movement and balances of the accounts. 
The Role of  the Audit Board 
The Board receives every quarter, from each Institution, vouchers in support of the entries. 
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sheet. 
The Audit Board makes its examinations on the basis of documents and, if necessary, locally. 
It verifies the legality and regularity of items of revenue and expenditure having regard to the 
provisions  of the treaties,  budget, financial  regulations  and all  acts  adopted pursuant to the 
treaties. It ascertains whether the financial management has been sound. 
For this purpose, each Institution gives the Board access to all information it requires. 
The Audit Board makes its observations known to the Commission and Institutions concerned. 
Their replies are forwarded to it and to the Commission. 
By  15 July at the latest, it draws up its report on the accounts and makes observations on the 
balance sheet. 
On 31  October the Commission forwards to the Council and Parliament: 
- the management account, the financial balance, and 
- the report of the Audit Board. 
By 30 April of the following year, the Council and Parliament give a discharge to the Commission 
on the implementation of the budget. If this date cannot be met, the Council or Parliament in-
forms the Commission of the reasons for postponing the decision. 
Other provisions concerning the Audit Board 
It  is informed of all decisions taken by the Council, Parliament and Commission concerning: 
- initial appropriations; 
- carrying forward of appropriations; 
- the provisional twelfths; 
- the final adoption of the budget; 
- the transfer of appropriations; 
- the appointment of authorizing officers, financial controllers, accounting officer, paying out 
agents and delegates. 
- the procedure for implementing the financial regulation laid down by the Commission after 
consulting the Council and Parliament. 
2.  Collection and auditing of  own resources 
The Communities' own resources are recorded by the Member States and placed at the Commis-
sion's disposal under the terms of Council Regulation 2/71  of 2 January 1971  implementing the 
decision of 21  April1970 on the replacement of financial contributions from the Member States 
by the Communities' own resources. 
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The 'own resources'  are recorded and collected  by the Member States who  then make them 
available to the Commission which implements the budget. Therefore: 
- they keep account at their treasuries of the recorded entitlements. Payments to this account 
are compulsory, except for reasons  of force  majeure,  and must correspond to the amount 
actually recorded by the Member State for the particular item of resources where appropriate 
within the limits laid down in the budget; 
- they are required to pay interest if there is a delay in entering amounts in the accounts; the 
time limit for entry in the accounts is 60 days from the end of the month in which the entitle-
ment was recorded ;
1 
- they must implement as  quickly as possible orders and instructions given by the Commission 
in the light of its real needs. The Member States' obligation to carry out these orders may go 
beyond the amounts entered in the account and involve an advance from them corresponding 
to the estimated revenue for one month and a half, or even more in the case of a mandatory 
or supplementary budget. 
The Member States have wide  responsibilities in regard to 'own resources',  being required by 
the Commission to take the following action: 
- they must preserve for a period of three years the supporting documents recording entitlement 
to and payment of own resources; 
- they must inform the Commission on request of the name and status of the bodies responsible 
for recording entitlement to and payment of own resources and of the provisions laid down 
by law and regulation for recording such entitlement and payment; 
- they must draw up an annual summary of accounts together with a report on the recording 
and control of own resources and forward both to the Commission by 1 June of the following 
year; 
- they report every six months on the overall position and the points of principle raised by the 
main problems encountered with regard to own resources. 
(b)  Financial control of  own resources 
In matters of financial control, on the other hand, responsibility is shared-The Member States, 
it is true, carry out checks and enquiries into the recording and payment of own resources but 
the Commission can: 
(i)  invite Member States to carry out additional checks and even-
(ii)  designate officials to take part in such checks. A proposal for a regulation submitted to the 
Council (Doc.  112/72)2  lays  down the conditions with which  Commission officials  should 
comply. 
1  In order to make adequate provision for the Communities' foreseeable cash requirements, the Commission has proposed that  this time 
limit be reduced from 60 to 45 days (Docs. 248/72 and 288/72). 
2  See also Mr Aigner's report on behalf of  the Committee for Finance and Budgets (Doc. 139/72). Document No 112 is given on page 113. 
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by the Audit Board, or checking of the work done by the authorizing officers  and accounting 
officers. 
A consultative committee has been appointed to deal with the many varied problems to which 
own resources may give rise.  Its members will  be representatives of the Member States with as 
Chairman a member of the Commission. The Committee's task will be to consider these problems 
and in particular, to handle the financial control and checks carried out in cooperation with the 
Commission. 
Until1975 the Communities' budget will continue to be partially financed by contributions from 
Member  States.  Furthermore,  such  contributions  may  always  be  allocated  to supplementary 
projects pursuant to the decision of 21  April1970. 
Contributions are entered in the Commission's special 'Contribution' accounts with the individual 
Member States' Treasuries as follows: 
- seven twelfths by 20 January if the budget has been voted in the normal time (by 20 December) 
or within thirty days after the final adoption of the budget; 
- the remaining five twelfths on 1 July. 
In the case of a parity change in a currency, the Commission can submit preliminary draft budget 
adjusting the appropriations. This adjustment is made by a payment by or in favour of the Mem-
ber State(s) concerned. 
(c)  Valuation of  goods for customs purposes 
The agricultural levies are laid down by the Commission on a flat-rate basis as required by current 
regulations. There is therefore no need to fix  the basis of assessment in each instance. Customs 
duties  on industrial products  entering the Community are  generally  based  on rates  applying 
to the 'value for Customs purposes'. 
On 27 June 1968 the Council adopted Regulation No. 803/68 on the valuation of goods for Cus-
toms purposes (OJ No. L 148 28 June 1968). This fixes: 
- the normal price; 
- the time for valuation; 
- the place of introduction; 
- the value of the currency; 
- the costs borne by the seller and included in the normal price. 
Rules  on valuation for Customs purposes must be harmonized to prevent deflections  of both 
trade and Customs revenue. 
In  July  1972  the  Commission  suggested  amending  certain  provisions  of Regulation  803/68. 
The following points should be noted: 
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parity of the  currency has  not been  declared  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund or where 
fluctuations exceed the limits specified by the I.M.F. 
2.  The Commission would be granted certain rights for the purpose of checking the Customs 
value: 
- it could ask the competent authorities in the Member States  or the declarent to furnish the 
information and documents needed to establish the Customs value; 
- it could initiate  checks  by national  authorities  (in  conjunction with  representatives  of the 
Commission if necessary); 
- it could impose penalties for failure to provide the information requested; 
- it could even specify the customs value itself if the information requested was  not provided. 
3.  Financial rules of  the EAGGF
1 
(a)  The paying bodies 
Paying bodies are appointed by the Member States for the payment of intervention on the internal 
market and of  export rebates; the Member States provide the Commission with various particulars 
on the identity and statutes of these bodies and the conditions of payment. 
The Member States are responsible for 
- the selection of paying bodies; 
- the information given to the Commission about them; 
- the use made of the appropriations allocated by the Commission, and the payments by these 
bodies.  The  Member  States  satisfy  themselves  of the  sound  management  of Community 
resources and arrange for their allocation among the paying bodies in such a way that similar 
payment schedules  are  observed for all expenditure financed  by the EAGGF. They ensure 
that appropriations are used promptly and strictly for their intended purpose. Each paying 
body keeps  separate accounts showing funds made available and the use to which they are 
put; 
- forwarding to the Commission at least once  a year the reports and summaries of accounts 
kept by the paying bodies; 
- forwarding each month to the Commission the paying bodies' financial requirements, together 
with statements from each body of their cash position and of revenue and expenditure for 
the previous month, the current month and the two following months; 
- forwarding to the Commission a weekly summary of transactions on their Treasury account; 
- forwarding to the Commission the reports drawn up by the national auditing or supervisory 
services. 
1  A list of the financial regulations concerning the EAGGF is given on page 41. 
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from an account opened by each Member State with the Treasury or another financial  body, 
namely: 
- at the beginning of the year, an advance not exceeding one third of  the budget appropriations; 
- in the course of the year, additional monthly payments intended to cover at least one month's 
cash requirements; 
- in the course of the year a special advance  on request,  to be deducted from the following 
monthly advance. 
The accounts are audited by the Commission before the end of the following year. 
(b)  Auditing of  accounts 
The  Member  States  are  responsible for forwarding  to the  Commission  a  certain  number  of 
accounts and reports to enable the Commission to audit the EAGGF accounts. 
- The deadline for this is 13 March of  the following year (except for 1971, when it was 15 October 
1972). 
- These accounts concern the operations for which payments were  made during the calendar 
year. 
- The following documents must be forwarded: 
(i)  summaries of accounts for each paying body extracted from the accounts kept by these 
bodies, together with the reports they are required to submit in accordance with a given 
pattern; 
(ii)  the reports, even incomplete, made by the national supervisory services; 
(iii)  a summary of the expenditure of all the bodies plus a summary cash statement at 31 
December; 
(iv)  a statement relating to irregularities not included in the quarterly statements (Reg. 283/72) 
and for which the recovery procedure was completed during the previous year. Submission 
deadline for 1971-15 October 1972. 
(c)  Operations entailing intervention 
These are described in the regulations setting up the various agricultural markets.  To preclude 
any  misunderstanding the Commission has drawn up a list of expenditure that corresponds to 
the concept of intervention designed  to stabilize  agricultural  markets.  But in many  cases  the 
amounts that may be included in the paying bodies' accounts have still to be specified. 
The Council is to adopt a regulation specifying certain general financial conditions or rules-and 
the Commission suggested a number ofprovisions1 in a document dated 26 July 1972. This proposal 
contains a few general rules and assigns to the managing committees (Fund Committee) the task 
of laying down implementing arrangements. 
1  Doc. No 127/72. 
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1.  Intervention operations are classified according to the method of financing: 
- those for which a limit has been fixed are entirely financed by the EAGGF 
- those for which no such amount has been fixed are sub-divided as follows:-
(i)  those where the allocation is equal to expenditure following deduction of any revenue 
resulting from the operation and 
(ii)  those involving  purchase  and storage  of goods:  here,  the amount allocated from  the 
EAGGF is  dictated by the size  of the balance in the annual accounts  showing certain 
credit and debit entries. 
2.  The Commission proposes financing in full in place of refunds on a flat rate basis. As a result, 
Member States will be required to inform the Commission how the different phases of operations 
are financed (this varies considerably from State to State) and of any modifications made.  The 
detailed arrangements for meeting costs phase by phase  will  then be laid down in accordance 
with the management committee procedure-following an attempt to align the financing proce-
dures of the Member States. 
However, the Commission hopes to retain the option of  refusing to finance part of  the costs where 
they are too high compared with the level in other Member States. 
When this proposal was considered by the Committee for Finance and Budgets, a minority of 
its members objected that 'if Member States are required to refund part of the costs, they will 
tend to apply intervention measures more sparingly.' The system of flat-rate refunds has thus 
involved  the Community in less  expenditure than the prepared system  would have  done.  A 
federative structure for the Communities-which is the ultimate  objective-also implies  mobil-
ization of the Member States' interests in the discharge of  management tasks. 
3.  The costs of purchasing goods will be met by the Member States for the time being, with 
the Community meeting only the cost of  the appropriation. If the Community were to meet the 
full costs, the Commission would be compelled to request appropriations on a large scale whereas 
at the end of the period it only has to pay interest. The interest rate for each year is two points 
above the discount rate at· the beginning of the financial year.  Should it prove unsatisfactory 
this system will be reviewed by the end of 197 5.1 
(d)  The rules applicable to the Guidance Section 
Subsidies provided by the Guidance Section are governed by Regulation No. 729/70 on the finan-
cing of the common agricultural policy although a  number of previous regulations from 1964 
still apply. 
As a rule the Guidance Section finances joint projects decided by the Council, agricultural reform 
in particular (Mansholt Plan). 
1  By Regulation of28 December 1972 (OJ No L 298, 31 December 1972) the Council decided on full  financing, the necessary arrangements 
to be introduced on 1 January 1974 for all products. 
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of previous provisions from Regulation No. 17/64,1 which deals with individual projects, to the 
extent that the Section's appropriations are not  fully used on joint projects. The ceiling on these 
appropriations was 285 million u.a. until the end of 1972 and 325 million u.a. as from 1973. 
Article 22 of Regulation No. 17/64, which -is still in force, provides for a number of control mea-
sures 'Throughout the period of intervention by the Fund the authority or body appointed for 
the purpose by the Member State concerned shall provide the Commission on request with any 
supporting documents or other evidence establishing that the financial or other conditions specified 
for each project have  been  fulfilled.  The Commission may conduct on-the-spot checks  where 
necessary. Should these conditions not be fulfilled, aid from the Fund may be suspended, reduced 
or discontinued.' 
Joint projects-as well as expenditure incurred by way of guarantee-are subject to verification 
as described below. 
(e)  Control of  EAGGF expenditure 
Initial control is effected by the Member States in accordance with national laws and regulations. 
In addition, the Commission may request that checks and enquiries into EAGGF activities be 
carried out by the competent bodies of the State concerned, with the latter's agreement. Commis-
sion representatives may take part. 
The national system of control does not obviate the need for the Member States to submit to 
the Commission the full particulars required for the proper operation of the Fund and to provide 
every assistance with the checks, including local checks, which the Commission considers desirable. 
The Member State concerned receives prior notification of these checks which are carried out 
by officials  appointed by the Commission; the latter have  access  to the ledgers  and all  other 
relevant documents. 
(f) Checking for irregularities and th~ recovery of  sums paid in error 
It  is the duty of the Member States as the authorities responsible for payments under the common 
agricultural  policy  to combat irregularities  and to record  sums  lost through negiigence;  this 
does not mean, however, that the Commission cannot be contacted for this purpose. 
Member States are in fact required to provide the Commission with the following information: 
- the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action to ascertain that trans-
actions financed by the Fund are actually carried out and are executed correctly, to prevent 
and deal with irregularities and to recover sums lost as a result thereof; 
- list of authorities and bodies responsible for implementing these measures; 
- a quarterly statement listing irregularities, and quarterly reports on judicial or administrative 
procedures initiated. 
1  OJ No 34, 27 February 1964. 
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- It  can inform the States of  irregularities brought to its notice and have them initiate an adminis-
trative enquiry; 
- it must maintain appropriate contacts with the States in order to supplement the information 
in its possession; 
- it must organize  meetings  at Community level  with the Member States  concerned for the 
purpose of  providing information and of closing any gaps in national legislation or Community 
regulations. 
If  the sums cannot be recovered,  or only in part, the financial  consequences are borne by the 
Community unless  the irregularities  or negligence  are  the fault  of Member States.  However, 
when the Guidance Section has only been partly involved in the financing,  the financial  losses 
which cannot be charged to the Member States are shared between the Fund and the Member 
State concerned in proportion to their respective contributions. 
Similar measures have been provided for in special regulations issued prior to the general provi-
sions described above, namely: 
(i)  Fruit production 
- Regulation No. 2093/70  of the Council of 20  October 1970,  laying down the general rules 
for implementing Articles 6 and 7 (1) of Regulation No. 2517/69, specifying certain measures 
for rationalizing fruit production in the Community (OJ No. L 232, 21  October 1970). 
(ii)  Bonuses for slaughter of  cattle and non-marketing of  milk 
- Regulation No 1094/70 of 8 June 1970 of the Council laying down general rules for imple-
menting Articles  11  and 12  (1)  of Regulation No 1975/69 establishing a system of bonuses 
for slaughter of cattle and non-marketing of milk and milk products (OJ No L 128, 12 June 
1970). 
The  Commission  ensures  implementation  of Regulation  No 283/72  on  irregularities  and the 
recovery of sums paid in error through a group of  four Grade A officials assigned to the 'Guaran-
tee' Division of the directorate responsible for the EAGGF. 
Owing to its  many other tasks-management of the 'pigmeat,  eggs  and poultrymeat'  sectors, 
products not listed in Annex II of  the Treaty, implementation of  Article 9 of Regulation No 729/70 
on verifications  and control,  own resources  of agricultural origin-the Group can spend only 
a limited time on the implementation  of Regulation  No 283/72,  although the introduction of 
the information system in this field  should be followed with close attention-if only to ensure 
that proper use is made of the data sent in by the Member States. 
(g)  Other special provisions of  the EAGGF Guarantee Section 
On 7 November 1972 the Council adopted a financial system providing for measures covering 
- the commitment of expenditure, 
- payments and carry-overs, 
- transfers. 
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The Commission makes a provisional  overall  commitment  in respect of each advance payable 
to Member States whenever the amount of the advance is fixed by the Commission itself. 
Funds are subsequently committed by budget chapter, article and item, and charged to payments 
two months following receipt of the statement of expenditure from the Member States. 
2.  Expenditure is entered in the accounts for a given financial year if payment has been made 
at 31  December and the accounting officer informed of commitment and authorization no later 
than 31  March of the following year. Appropriations for which an overall commitment has been 
made but which have not been charged to payments by 31  March are carried forward to the 
following financial year. 
However, payments effected up to 31  January 1973 are entered in the accounts for 1972 (see 1972 
Supplementary Budget No 2 relating to expenditure for the benefit of the founding  Member 
States only). 
3.  Transfers are authorized from chapter to chapter if requested by the Commission no later 
than one month before 31  March unless  otherwise decided by the Council within a period of 
three weeks. 
Transfers within a chapter are effected before 31  March by decision of the Commission. 
4.  Financial rules of  the new Social Fund 
The Social Fund acquired new responsibilities following the decision taken by the Council on 
1 February 1971. Intervention by the Fund was seen to be necessary in situations 
(a)  brought about by Community decisions or requiring Community action, and 
(b)  caused indirectly by the operation of the Common Market or impeding the smooth develop-
ment of the Community. 
The Member States have sole competence to submit projects to the Commission to deal with 
the situations under (a)  and to file  advance applications for intervention to deal  with those 
under (b). 
These projects and applications are examined by the Fund Committee and subsequently approved 
by the Commission within the limits of available funds, provided they comply with the rules for 
implementation of the decision of 1 February 1971. 
(a)  Approval of  the Commission 
In approving applications for aid from the Fund as conforming to existing regulations, the Com-
mission  undertakes  to  commit the  necessary  funds;  Commission  approval  thus  signifies  the 
55 commitment of  funds. Except in urgent cases, the Commission decides four times a year on appli-
cations for aid.  The decision giving approval  specifies the total amount of the appropriations 
involved, divided into annual instalments. 
(b)  Aid  from the Fund 
(i)  rate of  participation 
Aid from the Fund is granted in respect of 50% of the eligible costs of projects carried out by 
public administrations or authorities. Aid to projects undertaken by a private body is  granted 
on a scale equal to that provided by the public authorities, on condition that the latter guarantee 
proper project completion. 
(ii)  basis of  assessment 
Aid is granted 'on the basis of the actual cost of the operations'. In certain cases, the Commission 
can specify the maximum amount of aid from the Fund or decide on a method of assessing the 
costs eligible for intervention. This basis may be reviewed at the end of the first year with the 
object of narrowing any disparities between the aid granted and actual costs. 
(iii)  method of  payment 
The aid is paid over as the project advances. With each application, the Member State concerned 
gives the Commission the information it requires to effect payment of  the approved aid. Successive 
instalments may be paid as the project proceeds up to a maximum of 85%. 
(iv)  auditing of  accounts for a project 
The balance is  paid over after the Commission has received a general statement of expenditure 
drawn up upon completion of the project, with supporting documents. 
(c)  Financial control measures 
The Commission,  acting in close  cooperation with the competent authorities  of the Member 
States, must satisfy itself that allocated funds are properly used. 
(i)  It  may suspend payment of  aid if  any irregularities come to light or any significant alterations 
are made to the nature or conditions of the project. 
(ii)  The Member States provide the Commission with all the necessary information and assist 
with any checks, including local checks, which it considers desirable. The officials appointed 
by the Commission have access to the ledgers and documents relating to the expenditure 
financed by the Fund. 
(iii)  The Commission may, with the agreement of the Member State concerned, request the com-
petent authorities in that State to carry out checks and enquiries. 
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done by the authorizing officers and accounting officers responsible for the Community budget. 
5.  The financial rules of  Euratom 
At present, research and investment expenditure by Euratom is subject to the following financial 
rules: 
(i)  The regulation of 23  October 1961  on the establishment and implementation of the EAEC 
research and investment budget and on the responsibility  of authorizing officers  and ac-
counting officers ( 0 J No 7  4,  16 November 1961); 
(ii)  The regulation of  20 September 1971laying down the detailed rules of application for research 
and investment appropriations (OJ No L 218, 28  September 1971). 
The latter regulation contained provisions which had to be adopted as  a  matter of urgency, 
until the regulation of October 1961  could be replaced in its entirety by the provisions which 
the Commission proposed in its draft 'unified' financial regulation, which will rescind the regula-
tion of 23 October 1961. 
The main rules of  the September 1971 regulation on the Euratom research and investment budget 
which became applicable with the 1971  budget, will be found below. 
The budgetary nomenclature is  classified in two ways, with the functional purpose of bringing 
out the cost of each measure at both the estimate and implementation stages. It includes: 
1.  Schedule based on the earmarked purpose of expenditure and reflecting the achievement of 
research and investment objectives. 
It contains titles, chapters and articles which are briefly summarized below: 
(a)  Revenue 
- Deductions from staff renumerations; 
- Contributions by Member States; 
- Miscellaneous. 
(b)  Expenditure 
- Joint programmes and supplementary programmes-direct and indirect projects; 
- Completion of earlier programmes; 
- Other activities; 
'-- Balances of allocation accounts: 
- staff, 
57 - general infrastructures, 
- scientific and technical support, 
- major installations (computing centre, reactors, etc.), 
- services provided on behalf of third parties. 
2.  Schedule of expenditure according to type, giving particulars of each of the accounts listed 
above. This schedule is divided into categories and items. 
It  lists the following expenditure: 
- staff, 
- administrative operations, 
- technical operations, 
- contracts, 
- other. 
The balances on these accounts are: 
- either a surplus of disbursements over resources which is allocated to the accounts under 1 (b) 
(balances), 
- or a surplus of resources, which is entered in the accounts under 1 (a). 
Total payment appropriations are entered in a special chapter in the budget section of the Com-
mission; details are given in the annex. 
Each project receives an overall allocation extending over several years and divided into instal-
ments. 
Each instalment comprises annual commitment and payment appropriations.  Commitment ap-
propriations remain authorized until cancelled.  Payment appropriations may  only be  used  in 
settlement of commitments contracted during the current or previous financial year. 
Expenditure  charged  to  the  allocation  accounts  must  remain  within  the  authorized  ceilings 
except in the case of 
- transfers within chapters, 
- opening of additional appropriations for third parties, 
- entry of additional amounts in the allocation accounts for services provided to third parties 
to cover additional expenditure arising specifically from the provision of such services. 
Transfers-within the annex to the budget-are subject to endorsement by the financial controller. 
A schedule of commitments and payments forms an integral part of the budget. 
If the budget is  not approved at the  beginning of the financial  year the following  practice is 
observed. 
- as regards the allocation accounts: 
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payments may be made monthly by chapter up to one twelfth of the total appropriations 
from the previous financial year, but may not exceed one twelfth of the budget; commitments may be made within the limit of one quarter of total appropriations for the 
previous financial year but may not exceed the total of the budget in preparation; 
- as regards budget chapters that correspond to projects: 
payments may be made monthly by chapter up to one twelfth of the annual estimates in the 
payments schedule for  that financial  year;  commitments may  be made within the limit of 
one quarter of each appropriation entered in the commitments schedule but may not exceed 
the ceiling on appropriations provided for in the preliminary draft budget for that financial 
year. 
6.  Control of  the European Development Fund 
On 1 January 1971  the new Convention of Association between the European Economic Com-
munity and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community came into force 
for a period of five years (OJ No L 282, 28 becember 1970). 
The new Fund has 918  million units of account, made up of 748  million u.a. of non-refundable 
aid, 80 million u.a. for loans on special terms and contributions towards the formation of risk 
capital plus 90  millions u.a. from the European Investment Bank for loans eligible for interest 
rebates. To this should be added the 82 million u.a. made available to the Fund for the overseas 
countries and territories. 
For the administration of these extra-budgetary funds, the Community has laid down the follow-
ing rules on financial control: 
1.  The financial administration of Fund shall follow the principle of the separation of the duties 
of authorizing officer and accounting officer; 
2.  The authorizing officers  shall be responsible for the administration of appropriations.  They 
are  solely  responsible  for  incurring  expenditure,  establishing  recovery  rights  and  issuing 
receipt and payment orders. The chief authorizing officer shall be a Director-General at the 
Commission  who  may  appoint  assisting  authorizing  officers.  When  projects  submitted  by 
governments are implemented under their own responsibility, implementation shall be ensured 
by the local authorizing officer designated by the financing agreement; 
3.  The accountants shall effect recovery and payment; 
4.  The financial controller shall be responsible for verifying the commitment and authorization 
of expenditure and for verifying revenue. He may withhold endorsement at the commitment 
or payment  stage.  Endorsement  may  not be  withheld  when  the  Commission 'confirms  its 
decision. The assistant financial controller shall carry out his inspection on the basis of records 
and on the spot; 
5.  The Commission shall, working on the basis of records and on the spot, ensure directly or 
through the assistant financial controller that facilities set up with the help of the Fund are 
properly administered and maintained; 
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close  of each financial  year.  They shall  be  submitted complete with supporting documents 
no later than 31  March of the following financial  year to the Audit Board provided for in 
Article 206 of the Treaty. 
Each year the Commission forwards to the Council and the Assembly the accounts and balance 
sheet of  the preceding year, accompanied by a report drawn up by the Audit Board on  the accounts 
of the Fund. 
The Council gives a discharge to the Commission in respect of the financial management of the 
Fund. 
The Council notifies the Assembly of the decision to discharge. the Commission, supported by 
any documents it considers relevant to the financial  administration of the Fund. The Council 
has sole authority to give the discharge, contrary to accepted practice after the Treaty of 21  April 
1970 which gave this power jointly to the Council and the Parliament. 
Mention should be made of  the financial regulation of 27 July 1970 on the Fund for implementing 
special  provisions  applicable  to  oil  products  originating in the  African  and Malagasy  States 
associated with the Community or in overseas countries and territories (OJ No L 173, 6 August 
1970 and OJ No 173, 29 July 1967). 
7.  The financial accounts of  the ECSC 
The submission of the ECSC's accounts is governed by Article 78  (e)  of the Treaty. The Article 
reads as follows: 
'The  Council  shall appoint an auditor to serve for 
three  years.  He  shall  draw  up  an  annual  report 
stating  whether  the  accounting  and  the  financial 
management of  the High Authority have been effected 
in a regular manner; this report shall not cover entries 
relating to the administrative expenditure referred to 
in  Article  78 (2),  to  administrative  revenue  or  to 
revenue  derived from the tax for  the benefit of the 
Community levied on the salaries, wages and emolu-
ments  of its  officials  and other servants.  He shall 
draw up this report within six months of the close of 
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the  financial  year  to  which  the  accounts  refer  and 
shall submit it to the High Authority and the Council. 
The High Authority shall forward it to the Assembly. 
The auditor shall be completely independent in the 
performance of his duties. The office of auditor shall 
be incompatible with any other office in an institution 
or department of the  Communities  other than that 
of  member  of  the  Audit  Board  provided  for  in 
Article 78d.  His term of office  shall  be renewable'. CHAPTER II 
PROBLEMS  RAISED  BY  SHORTCOMINGS IN THE CONTROL 
OF COMMUNITY FINANCE 
The description of the present situation in regard to financial control may give the impression 
that everything has always been for the best and no major problems have ever arisen. 
Unfortunately, such is not the case. 
The purpose of this brief chapter is to review the various statements of position which gradually 
created an atmosphere in which the authorities responsible became aware of the serious short-
comings of the control procedure. 
I  -Shortcomings in  the  control  of Community  finance-the  Audit  Board's 
opinion. 
II  - The European Parliament's reactions: 
1.  Permanent control 
2.  Establishment of a Commission programme of action 
3.  Use of modern data-processing techniques 
4.  Control over the recovery of the Community's own resources 
5.  Rules governing the Audit Board 
III - Discharges given by the Council of Ministers 
Section I - Shortcomings in the control of Community finance-
the Audit Board's opinion 
Since 1969 Parliament and the other Community institutions have paid more continuous attention 
to examination of the accounts for several fundamental reasons: 
- the increase in the Community budget; 
- the budgetary powers which Parliament should enjoy; 
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credit; 
the Audit Board's alarming report. 
The Audit Board's reasons for emphasizing the shortcomings in-the internal control exercised 
by the Commission, which is responsible for implementing the budget, were set out in its report 
on the accounts for 1968, particularly paragraph 151  on the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF.
1 
The passage in question deals with EAGGF operations prior to the April1970 reforms concerning 
the  financing  of the  agricultural  policy,  the  Community's  own  resources  and  the  budgetary 
powers of the European Parliament. It explains a number of subsequent amendments described 
in Chapter I. 
~According  to the regulations in force, the expenditure 
of the EAGGF Guarantee Section arises out of other 
expenditure incurred by each Member State under its 
public accounting system. 
The  expenditure  in  question  comprises  refunds  on 
exports  to  third countries  and interventions  on the 
home  market.  In  the  case  of export  refunds,  the 
ultimate cause of this expenditure which is  borne by 
the Community within the limits of the Community 
rules,  is  the  export  of a  specific  product  to  third 
countries.  In the case  of interventions  on the home 
market,  designed  to  stabilize  the  market  situation, 
intervention by the Fund originates in expenditure on 
storage  or  processing  operations  carried  out  in 
Member States. 
According to current regulations procedures, as well 
as  the  summary provisions  dealing specifically  with 
this matter, the national bodies are primarily respon-
sible for verifying the details and actual occurrence of 
operations giving rise to applications for intervention 
by  the  Fund  (export,  import,  storage,  processing) 
and for paying refunds or carrying out other opera-
tions  which  the  EAGGF  subsequently  reimburses. 
The passage  of goods  across  frontiers  is  under  the 
control of  national customs administrations which can 
check the quality and quantity of goods exported and 
the  country of destination.  In the  same way,  inter-
vention on the home market is carried out by national 
bodies  governed  by  public  or  private  law  whose 
operations are supervised by the appropriate author-
ities in the Member States. 
As  emphasized  in  our  previous  report,  control  of 
exports or other material operations which give  rise 
to expenditure reimbursed by the Fund can, moreover, 
be achieved  only by carrying out checks  during the 
operations  themselves  or,  possibly,  by  checking  as 
soon as  possible afterwards with the beneficiaries of 
refunds or interventions. EAGGF regulations do not 
provide at least at the present time, for such control to 
be exercised by the Community. 
Only after the appropriate national bodies have paid 
refunds  or interventions  to  the various  beneficiaries 
do Member States submit to the Commission, before 
1 October, their annual applications for the preceding 
marketing year from 1 July to 30 June for reimburse-
ment of the sums to be met by the Fund (Article 9, 
Regulation No 17/64, OJ No 34/64). 
These applications, in the form of  statistics relating to 
refunds  and  interventions,  cover  the  whole  of the 
period under consideration  for  each  specified  basic 
product.' 
On the subject of internal control, the Audit Board concludes as follows: 
'When  account is  also  taken of the very  summary 
provisions  governing control by the  Guarantee Sec-
tion, it is obvious that the checks which can be carried 
out at· the present time  are very limited in number 
and scope.  The Community's responsibilities in this 
area  should  not  be  made  disproportionate  to  the 
means of control actually applied. 
Not only  does  the  actual  occurrence  of exports  or 
other operations giving rise to applications for refunds 
fall outside the checking procedure of the Community 
authorities,  but the accounting justification  of pay-
ments which the Fund is asked to reimburse can only 
be  controlled in practice even  through spot checks, 
1  Doc. 236/III A, 1969-1970. 
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if such payments are fully reflected in the accounts of 
national  bodies  in  a  manner  complying  with  the 
requirements of  the Fund. In this connection, EAGGF 
staff informed us that the length of time between the 
accounting  period  on  which  checks  were  carried 
out  and  the  performance  of the  checks  themselves 
had  sometimes  made  it  difficult  or  impossible  to 
inspect  certain supporting documents  transferred to 
central  archives  or  destroyed.  In  other  instances, 
decentralization had meant that documents forming 
the basis  for  applications were  not be  found at the 
central administrative office of the competent author-
ity.' It further noted:
1 
'In 1969 we were able for the first time to take part in 
an  on-the-spot  check  by  the  Fund's  staff  at  the 
offices  of various  national  bodies  responsible  for 
dealing with operations under the Guarantee Section. 
The check covered payment vouchers, the calculation 
of refunds,  and  a  number  of matters  concerning 
processing and storage operations. The Audit Board 
would like more frequent on-the-spot checks of this 
kind in future. 
Given the provisions currently in force,  such checks 
are  practically  the  only  means  of supplementing, 
documenting and analyzing the global figures quoted 
in  applications  for  reimbursement  and  explanatory 
documents.  They  should  also  make  for  a  more 
specific and practical acquaintance with the adminis-
trative  procedures  and  operating  methods  of  the 
- national bodies concerned, which can then be studied, 
compared and useful suggestions made. '
2 
Section II-The European Parliament's reactions 
The European Parliament consider~d that the situation called for special measures on its part. 
Its action concerned the following points: 
- permanent control; 
- establishment of a Commission programme of action; 
- use of modern data-processing techniques; 
- control over the recovery of the Community's own resources; 
- rules governing the Audit Board. 
1.  Permanent control 
In its resolution of 6 October 1969 Parliament 'instructs the Committee for Finance and Budgets 
to keep a constant check on the financial management of the Communities, with special reference 
to the European Social Fund, the EAGGF, and the European Development Fund.'3 
2.  Establishment of  a Commission programme of  action 
The report drawn up by Mr Leemans (Christian Democrat, Belgium) on the accounts for the 
1967 financial year
4  points to a series of measures for achieving greater control. 
'The achievement of greater control along the lines already indicated in the Commission's new 
proposals requires the following measures: 
- greater  emphasis  on cooperation between  Member States'  administrative  bodies  and the 
Commission; 
1  Doc. 117/III A  1970/1971, Section 123. 
2  Doc. 236/III A  1969-1970, par. 153. 
3  OJ No C 139, 28 October 1969. 
4  Doc. 107/1969-70, Section 47. 
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larity or fraud; 
- entitlement of the Community authorities to carry out on-the-spot direct checks of operations 
giving rise to expenditure; such checks to be performed at suffici~ntly close intervals for them 
to be meaningful; 
- provision of direct access for Commission staff to all documentation concerning operations 
:financed; 
- establishment of a system for bringing to the Commission's notice any loopholes in legislation 
or regulations liable to give rise to fraudulent practices; 
- stipulation that Member States must regularly notify the Commission of national administra-
tive and judiciary measures taken; 
- a numerical increase in the Commission's staff; 
- creation  of a  team  of Community  customs  controllers  who  would  also  work  at frontier 
crossing points and therefore provide the public with psychological and practical assurance 
of the existence and meaningfulness of direct Community control. 
This  increased  control  should  be  accompanied  by  substantially  closer  cooperation  between 
Commission staff and the Audit Board, as  well  as  by fuller information from the institutions 
responsible for the budget, particularly the European Parliament and the Committee for Finance 
and Budgets. 
The Committee for Finance and Budgets should continue to encourage all the measures required 
for meaningful control at the European level.  At the time of revision of the treaties, it should 
accordingly propose an institutional strengthening of supervisory powers in both the accounting 
and political spheres.' 
In the resolution adopted following its consideration of Mr Leemans' report, Parliament stressed 
that: 
'valid control requires cooperation between Member 
States'  administrative  bodies  and the  Commission, 
and, for the latter,  the right to carry out direct on-
the-spot checks of operations giving rise to expendi-
ture; 1  rapid  direct  checking  of such operations  is 
considered necessary  by the Audit Board as  a  pre-
condition for the effective exercise of its own control 
functions;  new  methods  of control should be intro-
duced  and a  department of Community controllers 
set  up  in  permanent  contact  with  Member  States' 
administrations.' 
A year later (November 1970) Mr Aigner (Christian Democrat Germany), noted in his working 
document on the EAGGF's accounts for 1968:2 
'The Committee for Finance and Budgets invited the 
Commission, as has been stressed, to draw up a real 
plan of action for the strict application of the Com-
munity  provisions.  The  committee  insists  on  this 
course of action because it is  the only way in which 
the  Community  institutions  can  discharge  their 
supervisory responsibilities. It is obvious that control 
1  OJ No C 139, 28  October 1969. 
2  Doc. 162,  1970-71, page 23. 
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can be meaningful only if  it is carried out with sufficient 
frequency,  if it  provides  a  practical  possibility  of 
dealing with shortcomings which encourage 'system-
atic fraud', and if the means of verification available 
to the bodies and institutions responsible really allow 
them  to  carry  out  thorough  and  effective  investi-
gations.  To fulfil  its supervisory responsibilities,  the Commission  must  not  only  lay  down  meaningful 
legal and administrative rules, but, above all, under-
take  genuinely  effective  action.  It is  particularly in 
this last respect that the situation has hitherto been 
unsatisfactory, and it is  at this level that the efficacy 
· of current measures should be judged.' 
Following the advice of the Committee for Finance and Budgets, Parliament invited the Com-
mission to submit to it a programme of action as soon as possible. 
Parliament has called for action by the Commission on many occasions including the following: 
- Mr Aigner's report on the draft budget for  1970,1  in which he notes a lack of responsibility 
by the Commission in supervisory matters and repeats his request for a 'flying squad' of at 
least 50 Community officials to check the operations of the EAGGF; 
- Mr Aigner's report on Draft Supplementary Budget No 2.2 The resolution adopted following 
this report read as follows: 3 
'The European Parliament, 
1.  Considers  that the  presentation  of the  EAGGF 
Guarantee  Section's  operations  for  1967,  1968, 
1969 and 1970 lacks clarity; 
2.  Affirms  that the  Council  and Commission  must 
bear sole responsibility for a system under which 
funds are managed according to no clearly defined 
criterion,  Parliament  receives  no  detailed  infor-
mation, and doubts arise as to whether funds are 
used  with  the  necessary  efficiency,  because  of 
inadequate control due to lack of staff and funds 
in the relevant Commission departments; 
3.  Accordingly takes note of the draft budget having 
regard  to  certain  imperatives,  but  refuses  to 
endorse it at this stage; 
4.  Declares its intention to maintain this attitude so 
long as budgetary information lacks the necessary 
clarity and control is inefficient.' 
In response to repeated requests Mr Coppe, Member of the Commission, presented a four-point 
plan to Parliament on 10 June 1971: 
'First step: We have just submitted to the Council a 
draft supplementary budget for staff increases in the 
Directorate-General for  Agriculture.  We  are  asking 
for 40  officials for the EAGGF, first  to expedite the 
closure of operations-as requested in  the  report-
and secondly to undertake systematic control of the 
operations of the Guarantee and Guidance Sections. 
Second  step:  We  have  completely  reorganized  our 
internal financial control, assigning a special division 
to  EAGGF  operations  and  another  to  operations 
of  the European Development Fund and the European 
Social Fund. 
1  Doc. 160, 1969-1970. 
2  Doc. 179, 1969-1970. 
3  OJ No C 143, 3 December 1970. 
Third step: This is at least being studied in the Com-
mission-a special  inspectorate with special  respon-
sibility for the different funds. 
Fourth  step:  I  am  proposing  to  my  colleague  Mr 
Mansholt  that  an  information  network  should  be 
set  up  for  the  detection  of frauds  in  the  EAGGF 
Guarantee Section. 
The Audit Board is  an organ of Parliament, and this 
will  be  even  more  true  when  Parliament  gives  the 
discharge. I must tell you, however, that I never forget 
that it is also an organ of the Council of Ministers.' 
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In its resolution of 10 June 1971,1  Parliament: 
'Requests  the  Commission  to  examine  with  the 
Member  States  the  possibility  of setting  up  in  the 
near  future  an  electronic  processing  system  for 
general  accounting  and  especially  for  control  of 
EAGGF operations.' 
The justification for this request is given in the report by Mr Aigner (Christian Democrat, Ger-
many) on the accounts for 1969:
2 
... Given  the  complexity  of  EAGGF  operations, 
the  question  arises  of whether  it is  not absolutely 
necessary  to  introduce  data-processing  techniques 
at Community level in order to: 
- be able to deal properly with the flood of figures; 
- be  able  to  assess  the  financial  position  of the 
agricultural fund at any time; 
- be  able  to  draw  up  a  systematic  list  of Fund 
operations  and  thus  to  ensure  greater  clarity; 
- set  up  efficient  control  arrangements  allowing 
systematic spot checks; 
- facilitate the prevention and repression of fraud-
ulent practices; 
- exert  a  healthy  pressure  towards  harmonization 
of administrative procedures. 
The system of direct financing  of the  common  ag-
ricultural  policy laid down in Regulation No 729/70 
places no explicit restrictions on expenditure by the 
Fund, but such restrictions are implicit in the creation 
of the Community's own resources. 
The  Community's  financial  autonomy  requires  the 
adoption  of  regulations  implementing  Regulation 
No 729/70, especially with regard to the status of the 
various departments and bodies,  at the present time 
of a  national  character,  entitled  to make payments 
relating to the implementation of Community rules, 
and with  regard  to relations  between  those  depart-
ments  and bodies  and  the  Community institutions, 
particularly the Commission. 
The institutional conditions  for  applying  data-pro-
cessing  techniques  are  basically  the  following: 
- adaptation and simplification of rules and proce-
dures; 3 
- strengthening and coordination of the activities of 
national  administrations,  especially  within  the 
framework of provisions on direct financing of the 
common agricultural policy. 
The technical conditions for the introduction of such 
techniques are as follows: 
1.  Collection  of the  same  data  in  all  Community 
countries,  i.e.  standardization of the information 
base; 
2.  Introduction of special control forms  (or amend-
ment of existing forms)  for recording operations 
resulting from trade flows. 
Studies should be made of the following: 
- use of available data already harmonized; 
- use of available data not yet harmonized; 
- additional data for collection. 
Countries  with  several  payment  departments  (the 
number of these departments varies from one country 
to another: France has 4,  Italy 3,  the Netherlands 8, 
Belgium 2 and the Federal Republic of Germany 23) 
should set up departments to centralize the relevant 
data. 
The large number of payment departments obviously 
complicates computer processing. 
In particular,  the  usefulness of data currently avail-
able  and  the  need  for  other  data should  be con-
sidered  and  procedures  defined  for  recording  and 
presenting  them.  An  estimation  of  the  costs  of 
applying. data-processing techniques is  also required. 
Frauds  committed  so  far  under  the  EAGG  F  are 
estimated as having already reached 1 000 million u.a. 
Cost  is  not  an  overriding  consideration,  however, 
since  there  is  no  question  but that data-processing 
techniques will eventually be required to deal with the 
enormous  mass  of statistics  if administrative  work 
is  to be  standardized and the collection of data on 
EAGG  F  operations  in  all  Member  States  is  to  be 
harmonized. 
What  must  be  avoided  above  all  is  that  Member 
States make their own provisions and set up different 
systems.' 
1  OJ No C 66, 1 July 1971. 
2  Doc. 61/71. 
3  It is  worth recalling here the steps taken by the Commission to set up a data bank of Community legislation, which at the present time 
consists mainly of regulations adopted under the common agricultural policy. 
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On 20  May  1970,  pursuant to the decision  of 21  April  1970  creating the Community's own 
resources, the Commission submitted a proposed regulation which was examined by Parliament 
and approved by it on 8 October 1970. The Council adopted the regulation on 2 January 1971.
1 
In his  report on behalf of the Committee for Finance and Budgets,  Mr Westerterp (Christian 
Democrat, Netherlands) stressed the Community's responsibility in regard to its own resources 
and envisaged the possibility of direct control by Community authorities over the collection of 
those resources. 
As  specified 'in the comments  on these  articles,  the 
provisions  relating  to  control  are  similar  to  those 
which  deal  with  the financing  of the common agri-
cultural policy.  Although the rules laid down in this 
implementing regulation are of a  general nature and 
will therefore require closer definition where necessary 
in future,  they nevertheless form an essential part of 
the  regulation  as  a  whole,  since  they  impose  on 
Member  States  the obligation  to  make available  to 
the Commission all information required for recording 
amounts  which  have  been  and are  to be recovered 
as  the Community's own resources,  and to take all 
necessary steps to facilitate such checks as  the Com-
mission  may  consider  desirable,  including  the veri-
fication on the basis of records or on-the-spot control. 
As  already  emphasized,  these  provisions  therefore 
allow for the control of  Community revenue according 
to rules which are at least similar to those governing 
the control of expenditure. 
Although  it is  of course  necessary  that,  materially 
speaking, the whole range of operations creating an 
entitlement to Community revenue and the recovery 
of such  revenue  should be carried out by adminis-
trations  as  well-organized  as  the  national  adminis-
trations, it is  also true that the Community's respon-
sibility in this matter-and therefore in regard to the 
control of such operations-is fully  direct,  and that 
the  need  for  control  follows  from  the  entitlements 
attaching to the Community's own resources. 
In  regard  to  the  first  paragraph  of  Article  15 
(Member  States  'shall  adopt  or  amend  provisions 
concerning  the  recovery  of the  Community's  own 
resources only after consulting the Commission. The 
latter shall deliver an opinion which it shall forward 
to the Member State concerned and to the Council'), 
it should also be pointed out that while a standstill is 
opportune,  harmonization  or  genuine  Community 
legislation in  this  field  is  desirable  in  the  future.  2 
In  its  present  form  the  second  paragraph  of  Ar-
ticle  15  deals  with  direct  control operations  which 
may  be  performed  by  Commission  staff.  These 
operations rightly include: 
(a) compliance of administrative practices with Com-
munity rules; 
(b) existence of the necessary supporting documents 
and  their  accordance  with  operations  creating 
entitlement to Community revenue; 
(c)  the conditions under which the operations referred 
to under (b)  above are carried out and checked. 
It is  normal  that  the  Commission  should  be  able 
to carry out a number of direct checks at any time. 
This  will  make  the  rules  laid  down  in  Article  6 
genuinely  effective.  This  article  specifies  the  steps 
which  the  Commission  can  take  against  Member 
States if it considers that there has been a failure to 
record or recover  the  Community's own resources. 
The need to provide for the possibility of  direct checks 
arises  from  the  fact  that such  checks  will  form the 
basis ofthe Commission'sjudgment of any negligence 
by bodies in Member States responsible for recording 
and collecting  own resources.  The Commission  has 
pointed out that 'the means by which it can conclude 
that an entitlement due as  part of the Community's 
own resources has not been recorded are not restricted 
and  may  include  any  information  from  private 
persons,  the  press  or other  Member  States.  This  is 
one more reason why the proposed regulation should 
provide for direct Community control over operations 
relating to its own resources.' 
The text adopted by the Council stipulates that Member States shall take all necessary measures 
to ensure that the sums corresponding to the entitlements recorded are placed at the Commission's 
disposal,  that they  shall carry out checks  and inquiries  relating to the recording  and making 
available  of the Community's  own  resources,  and that the Commission,  at its  own  request, 
1  Docs. 63 and 121, 1970-1971; OJ No C 129, 26 October 1970; OJ No L 3,  5 January 1971. 
2  Article 15 of the Commission's proposal was only partially incorporated in the text adopted by the Council (see Articles  13  and 14 of 
Regulation No 2/71, quoted in Chapter IV below). 
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direct right of control. The Council regulation does not contain the Commission text concerning 
the financial  consequences  of failure  to recover in full  revenue  corresponding to recorded or 
unrecorded entitlements. Nor does it incorporate the requirement for Member States to consult 
the Commission before amending provisions laid down by law,  regulation,  or administrative 
action relating to the recovery of the Community,s own resources.
1 
5.  Rules governing the Audit Board 
(a)  A European Audit Office 
The idea of an Audit Office for Community finance was put forward as early as 1964 when the 
first attempt was made to give the Communities their own resources.  2  · 
During examiqation  of the accounts for' 1967,  Mr Boertien  (Netherlands),  on  behalf of the 
Christian Democratic  Group, dealt at length with the shortcomings in internal control of the 
EAGGF. He concluded as follows: 3 
'I think it inevitable in the long run that all control 
over the Fund will be of a  Community nature, with 
control  by  Member  States  entirely  subordinate.  If 
this were not to happen, we would find ourselves back 
in the situation which I have already described, where 
a  Member State can evade serious criticism from the 
Audit Board on grounds of national security. • 
Mr Vredeling (Socialist,  Netherlands) called for the setting up of an independent Community 
audit office, since internal control was not enough. 
Mr Leemans (Christian Democrat, Belgium) devoted a full  chapter to the rules  governing the 
Audit Board in his report on the accounts for 1968.
4  He writes: 
'It is,  however,  necessary  that  the  Audit  Board 
should henceforth be able to play an effective  part, 
within the framework of its  own responsibilities,  in 
the tasks now entrusted to the Community institutions 
in regard to the control of Community revenue and 
expenditure. 
In  this  respect  your  committee  recognizes  that the 
decisions  of  21  April  1970  largely  confirmed  the 
powers granted to the Audit Board under Article 206 
of the EEC Treaty and the corresponding articles of 
the  other treaties.  It will,  however,  ensure that the 
Audit Board becomes an organic and effective part of 
the new machinery for Community control of  revenue 
and expenditure to be set up on the basis of the deci-
sions of 21  Apri11970. 
In  regard  to  the  long-term  increase  in  the  Audit 
Board's  responsibilities,  your  committee  can  only 
repeat  the  desire  expressed  in  its  resolution  of 6 
October 1969 for the creation at the time of  the merger 
of the Community treaties of a real Community audit 
office enjoying the independence and powers essential 
for the performance of its duties. 
In its resolution following the debate on 6 October 1969,
5  Parliament expressed the wish that: 
'at the time of the merger of the Community treaties 
a Community audit office  should be set up enjoying 
the independence  and powers  essential  for  the per-
formance of its duties  •. 
1  For text of this regulation see Chapter IV, Section II. 
2  Resolution of 24 September 1964, OJ No 153, 6 October 1964, Section 15. 
3  OJ Annex No 117, Proceedings of the European Parliament, October 1969, pages 12 and 19. 
4  Doc. 162, 1970-1971. 
5  OJ No C 139, 28 October 1969. 
68 It should be emphasized that this text goes further than the Council declaration referred to in 
the explanatory statement accompanying the 1970 draft budget:
1 
'In regard to the Audit Board it should  be  stressed 
that the Council has agreed to review the current rules 
with  a  particular  view  to  facilitating  the  Board's 
performance of the tasks assigned to it by the treaties 
and regulations.  The means  available  to  the Audit 
Board will be adapted where necessary after revision 
of these rules. • 
In his report on the accounts for 1969  Mr Gerlach (Socialist, Germany) defines responsibilities 
in this respect: 
2 
78.  ... 'Parliament has  also requested, further to a 
Commission proposa1, that the Commission and other 
Community  institutions  should  provide  the  Audit 
Board with the facilities  which .the  Board considers 
it needs  to fulfil  its  task,  with  special  reference  to 
checks carried out in  departments  concerned with  the 
management of Community finance  and with making 
payments on behalf of the Communities. 
Exercise of this power raises the need for even more 
precise definitions in order to strengthen the instru-
ment of Community control and clarify the respon-
sibilities of each Community institution with respect 
to such control and to management of the budget. 
79.  The Committee for  Finance and Budgets  con-
siders  that  definition  of the  manner  in  which  the 
Commission  shall  exercise  this  power  of control  is 
up  to  Parliament  and  the  other  institutions  and 
organizations concerned. • 
Further to these obse;vations, Parliament considered that:3 
'The  exercise  of the Audit Board's powers calls for 
closer  definitions  which  should  be  laid  down  in 
cooperation  with  all  the  institutions  and  bodies 
concerned,  the purpose being to clarify the respon-
sibilities of  each Community institution in the exercise 
of such  control  and  management  of  the  budget.' 
In the autumn of 1972,  during the debate on the draft budget for the 1973  financial year, the 
problems of control were referred to in similar terms.4 
Mr Offroy (European Democratic Union), rapporteur on the budget, listed the gaps in financial 
and budgetary control: 
'In our opinion, the powers of the Audit Board are 
not sufficiently well-defined.  We  are not sure that it 
always  has  access  to  the relevant  accounting docu-
ments,  which  is  absolutely  necessary.  We  are  not 
adequately informed of its conclusions, which ought 
to be dealt with regularly in reports discussed by the 
European Parliament.  Generally speaking,  we  think 
that the present control system should be improved. 
At our meeting with the chairmen of the audit offices 
of the  various  Member  States,  the  general  feeling 
was  that,  sooner or later,  it would be necessary  to 
set  up  a  real  Community  audit  office  in  order  to 
achieve satisfactory control.' 
On behalf of the Christian Democratic Group, Mr Schuijt (Netherlands) declared that 
'the Summit Conference made a  considerable  effort 
to  ensure  that  Parliament  would  in  future  enjoy 
increased powers  of control. It could do  no  more. 
This itself is not without importance. If these powers 
are to be given a real content, i.e. if Parliament is  to 
be  granted  real  powers  of budgetary  control,  the 
1  Doc. 141, 1969-70. 
2  Doc. 61, 1971. 
Summit Conference decision could be termed impor-
tant.  Consequently,  contacts  with  the  Audit Board 
should be increased and better organized. Parliament 
should  support  the  view  of  the  Commission  for 
Finance and Budgets on the creation of an audit office 
for the European Parliament. As in national parlia-
3  Resolution of 10 June 1971,  OJ No C 66, 7 July 1971. 
4  OJ Annex 'Proceedings of the European Parliament' No 154, October 1972 and No 155, November 1972. 
69 ments, experts should subsequently examine in detail 
whether  the  money  of the  European  taxpayer  has 
been well spent. 
This  would  constitute  a  considerable  strengthening 
of the  European  Parliament's  powers  of control.' 
Mr Koch (Germany) spoke on behalf of the Socialist Group on the role of audit offices: 
'As far  as I  am concerned, with my background in 
public  administration,  I  tend  to  think  that  audit 
offices  should  have  very  wide  powers.  I  cannot 
understand  why  there  is  opposition  to  control  by 
audit  offices,  for  a  clear  conscience  need  not  fear 
investigation.  A  taxpayer  who  makes  an  honest 
return is  not afraid to show his accounts.  Why then 
this  aversion  to  the creation  of what I  would  can, 
using an old Prussian concept, a  higher audit office, 
i.e. one enjoying all the facilities required by an audit 
(b)  Supplementary controls 
office  worthy of the  name? Its  role,  indeed,  would 
not be to give opinions or instructions, but simply to 
check.  It would  record  the  use  made  of  credits 
granted  and  note  whether  the  underlying  principle 
had been  respected.  It would investigate  what had 
been  done in such  and such  an office  or factory.  I 
think this  could also  be  of interest, indeed, of con-
siderable interest, to Parliament. Here again, Parlia-
ment would like a right of inspection.' 
The budgetary debate of 16 November 19711 showed that two problems had to be solved before 
the rules governing the Audit Board could be defined: 
(i)  the relation between internal and external control at Community level, 
(ii)  the relation between national and Community control. 
According to Mr Aigner, rapporteur on Parliament's estimates (1972): 
'We do not happen to share the ideas on which the 
Council has hitherto based its action on the control 
of European funds.  This is  an important point. The 
Community  has  a  great  financial  responsibility. 
Customs  duties  and levies  now  revert  to  the  Com-
munity and are Community resources par excellence. 
The Community will be able to fulfil its responsibility 
only when it has an efficient, well-tried control system. 
In this respect, however, as you all know, things could 
be better. 
It is  true that the Audit Board is endeavouring, with 
To this Mr. Coppe replied that 
'the Commission has not opposed on-the-spot control 
of all  necessary  documents.  On the contrary,  it has 
taken  steps  to  harmonize  relations  between  the 
Audit Board  and  the various  Directorates-General. 
some success,  to extend its  own financial control to 
Member States, whose powers it shares. But what the 
budgetary authorities, i.e. the Council and Parliament, 
must particularly aim for is  a financial control body 
with the necessary powers and means, independent of 
the Commission. This is the role of the Audit Board. 
However,  Mr Coppe, I have been told that since the 
spring  the  Audit  Board  has  been  encountering  in-
creasing difficulties raised by the Commission, whose 
staff are  said to be  refusing  free  access  to  the full 
records.' 
We are attempting to channel these relations in such 
a way as to facilitate the Audit Board's dealings with 
our 22 or 23  directorates.' 
In his reply Mr Aigner attempted to define the point at issue: 
'A situation of conflict  has  arisen between the Audit 
Board and the internal administrative control which 
you  envisage.  This  is  a  perfectly  natural  conflict 
such as may happen anywhere. 
The view of  the Committee for Finance and Budgets is 
as follows: what is needed is an Audit Board which is 
an  effective  coordinating  organ  working  in  close 
contact with national audit offices  and which while 
· 1  OJ Annex No 143, Proceedings of the European Parliament, November 1971. 
70 avoiding any duplication of work, is  able to perform 
a real control function. 
The Federal  Republic  offers  a  classical  example  of 
this  kind  of organization:  the  audit  offices  of the 
Lander and the  Federal  Audit  Office.  The  Federal 
Audit  Office  assigns  tasks  to  the  various  Lander 
offices:  you take care of this, so that I don't have to 
deal  with  it  myself.  Cooperation  is  smooth.  This 
arrangement  could  be  transposed  to  the  European 
level. This is the whole problem of the Audit Board  . ., 
On behalf of  the Commission, Mr Coppe repeated what the had said at the sitting of 17 November 
1970: 
'We  shall never  be  able  to carry out such  control 
alone from a  Community administrative centre. The 
task  of controlling  these  funds,  which  amount  to 
between 3 and 4 thousand million units of account, 
will  always  fall  to  the  national  administrations, 
under  the  supervision  of the  Community  adminis-
tration.'  On  12  October  1972  Mr  Coppe  further 
stated: 'The Commission of the European Communi-
ties  intends  to  strengthen  internal  control  to  the 
maximum,  in cooperation with  the  Member  States, 
so as  to avoid as  far as possible any form of fraud. 
I  would therefore ask all members of this Assembly 
to  stress  once  again  in  their  national  parliaments 
that proper control is  impossible unless the national 
administrations realise that the expenditure of Com-
munity resources  is  a  process as  rational as  that of 
national  resources.  It goes  without saying  that we 
shall never  achieve  efficient  control in  the  Member 
States if they themselves are negligent in this respect. 
The  problem  would  simply  remain  unsolved.' 
Section III- The Council's discharge 
In giving a discharge, the Council always states its position on the Audit Board's observations. 
The  most interesting point in connection with the  discharge  is  the  non-compulsory nature of 
the Council's observations on any defects noted. In general, the Council, which prior to 1970 
was the only authority giving a discharge 1, does no more than invite the Commission and the other 
institutions to take certain budgetary administration measures: 
- it notes that the Commission has undertaken to do certain things; 
- it invites the Commission to comply with certain rules; 
- it expresses certain wishes; 
- it recalls its previous invitations. 
More rarely,  it notes  with  satisfaction that the institutions  have  taken account  of the  Audit 
Board's observations. In regard to the financial regulation, whenever some difficulty of  application 
arises  e.g.  'extra-budgetary'  payments  or  receipts  not covered  by  the  regulation-it reserves 
the right to review the matter when the financial regulations are subsequently revised. 
The Council's decisions  giving  a  discharge  show  a  number of other features  which  have  an 
essential bearing on this report. 
1.  The decisions are taken after considerable delay.  For the 1965 financial  year, the Council's 
decision was taken on 20 July 1968 (OJ No L 186, 30 July 1968). 
1  See Article 206 of the EEC Treaty, given on page 118. The revised Article 206 will apply to the accounts for the 1970 financial  year. 
71 The decisions for 1966, 1967 and 1968 were taken on 29 June 1970 (OJ No L 152, 13 July 1970). 
The decision for 1969 was taken on 7 November 1972 (OJ No L 304, 31  December 1972). 
The average  length of time  between  the end of the  financial  year and the corresponding 
discharge is thus about 30 months. 
Under the terms  of the financial  regulations  the discharge  should  be  given  not later than 
31  December of the year following the financial year, i.e. within 12 months.1 
2.  On several occasions the Commission has been invited either to associate  the Audit Board 
more closely with checks in one or the other sector, to forward it certain documents, or to 
supply it with information on the factors involved in calculating fixed  costs, so  as to ensure 
effective control. 
3.  In the agricultural expenditure sector, the Council felt it necessary to specify the position of 
the  Community in  regard to  control.  With respect to the participation of Community institu-
tions in control over the Guarantee Section, the Council stated: 
'As regards Community responsibilities in matters 
of  control, the Council notes that there is a degree 
of joint responsibility prior to the filing of appli-
cations for reimbursement and that Articles 8 and 
9  of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  729/70  of 
21  April 1970  on financing  the common agricul-
tural  policy  define  the  extent  of  Community 
responsibility for the control of expenditure from 
the  entry  into  force  of the  definitive  arrange-
ments.' 2 
In giving a  discharge for the 1969  financial year, 
the  Council  stressed  'the  need  to  strengthen 
control over expenditure by the  Guarantee Sec-
tion, which constitutes the greater part of Com-
munity expenditure.' 
4.  The Council largely  supports  the  Audit Board's action.  As  far  as  the EAGGF Guidance 
Section is concerned, the Council decision of 29 June 1970 states that 
'the Council has noted that, in  accordance  with 
the Audit Board's wishes, a member of  the Board 
now has  the  opportunity  of taking  part in on-
the-spot control.' 
1  Discharge in respect of the 1970 accounts was given by the Council on 6 February 1973. 
2  Council decision of 29  June 1970 on the accounts for 1966,  1967  and 1968,  OJ No L 152,  13  July 1970.  See  Regulation No 729/70, 
Chapter III. 
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THE PREVENTION OF FRAUDS IN AGRICULTURE 
The statement made by  Mr Aigner before the European Parliament on 20  October  1971  will 
serve to introduce and emphasize the importance of  this chapter. 
'Our budget amounts to 4 000 million units of  account, 
i.e.,  about $ 4 000 million. This is  an enormous sum. 
And since we  have 7 500  officials  at European level, 
these  questions  are  worth  discussing.  Most  of this 
money  goes  into  the  agricultural fund.  Yet  control 
over this fund is  quite inadequate. I shall now state 
very plainly what I have repeated often enough:  the 
unauthorized  benefits  derived  from  this  fund  have 
not decreased,  as  expected, but are increasing.  So  it 
was  not a  case  of teething  problems.  Uncontrolled 
expenditure is believed to reach a very high figure but 
is  naturally impossible to pinpoint.  But the  officials 
themselves  estimate that unauthorized benefits-and 
I do not mean only fraudulent benefits but all kinds 
of unauthorized benefits  that are not genuine in the 
sense that they were not intended by the legislator-
amount  to  between  100  and  130  million  units  of 
account.' 
This chapter contains information on: 
I  - The  expenditure  of the  European Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee 
Fund 
II  - The scale of frauds 
1.  Press commentaries 
2.  Written questions to the European Parliament on the problem of  financial 
frauds to the detriment of EAGGF 
III - Initial reactions of the Commission of the Communities 
1.  Oral question No 3, with debate, of 14 March 1967 
2.  Commission recommendation 
3.  Commission report to the Council 
IV - Current rules on the financing of the common agricultural policy 
1.  Council Regulation 729/70 
2.  Regulation concerning irregularities and the recovery of  sums paid in error 
3.  Mutual assistance in respect of levies  and the recovery of sums paid in 
error. 
73 Section I - Expenditure of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
Titles 6-8 of the Communities' budget refer to the European Agricultural  Guidance and Guar-
antee Fund. The following figures are drawn from the draft budget for 1973. 
Units of Account 
Nature of expenditure 
Appropriations  Appropriations  Expenditure 
1973  1972  1971 
European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund 
Guarantee Section 
Cereals  879 600 000  891  500 000  517 443 965.91 
Rice  55 600 000  55 000 000  50 618 934.17 
Milk and milk products  848 700 000  634 500 000  610 693 017.92 
Fats  318 600 000  285 500 000  136 613 670.71 
Sugar  161 000 000  221  500 000  115 670 030.03 
Beef and veal  6 000 000  30 000 000  19 088 106.64 
Pigmeat  61100 000  50 000 000  56 297 010.31 
Eggs and poultry  17 200 000  15 000 000  12 621  159.91 
Fruit and vegetables  91  000 000  70 000 000  55 556 340.31 
Wines  56 600 000  53 000 000  28 251 047.85 
Tobacco  129 000 000  123 000 000  73 764 141.62 
Fishing  3 000 000  10 000 000  173 673.31 
Flax and hemp  11 000 000  9 000 000  698 568.20 
Seeds  5 000 000  3 000 000 
Hops  6 000 000  6 000 000  -
Other common organizations of markets  1 000 000  token entry  -
Credits for auditing the accounting periods prior 
to 1 January 1971  170 000 000  145 000 000  -
Agricultural products processed into goods not in 
Annex II of the EEC Treaty  27 000 000  25 000 000  18 464 897.55 
Other expenditure  300 000 000  60 000 000  90 000 000.00 
- - 222 319 199.07 
Total  3 147 400 000  2 687 000 000  2 008 273 763.51 
Guidance Section 
Projects to improve agricultural structures referred 
to in Article 13  of Regulation No 17/64  162 000 000  200 000  000 
Joint measures in the structural field  pursuant to 
Council Resolution of 25 March 1972  27 000 000  token entry 
Other joint measures  14 700 000  token entry 
Groupings of hop producers  300 000  300 000 
Development  operations  in  priority  agricultural 
regions  75 000 000  token entry 
Credits to cover the expenditure of  Chapters 81 to 8  6 
and Chapter 80, item 8001  1  no figures  254 700 000 
Credits reserved during the previous financial years 
to finance expenditure under Chapters 81-84  token entry  351  631  300 
Special measures  31  000 000  32 920 000 
Total  310 000 000  839 551  300  203 279 217 
1  Earmarked for  the  implementation of the Mansholt plan for the reform of agricultural structures. They  are shown as  a token entry 
for 1973 pending their effective utilization. 
74 Section II  - The scale of frauds 
Under Regulation No 283/72  on irregularities  and the recovery  of sums  paid in error in the 
framework of the common agricultural policy, the Commission should have submitted to Par-
liament on 1 July  1972 a report on the administration of the EAGGF, with a special chapter 
on frauds. In reply to a written question on the subject, 
1  the Commission. stated that it would 
try to submit this report to Parliament before the end of 1972.
2  Since Parliament still does not 
have the report (February 1973)  two indirect methods have been employed to assess  the scale 
of frauds: press comments and written questions to Parliament. 
(1)  Press comments 
In each of the Member States the press has reported a number of cases of fraud. A few extracts 
are quoted below. These should be considered as reflecting the views of their authors. 
(a)  Der Spiegel No 9/1971 
Beyond the Border Line 
For  years  Berthold  C.  Keller  from  the  Swabian 
Weissenhorn exported  'finest  quality wheaten  flour' 
to Switzerland.  But what the Swiss  got was  animal 
feedingstuffs,  bran  and  waste  from  barley  husks-
fodder  for  contented cows.  But not even  the  cows 
would  eat what  Keller  exported  to  Switzerland  as 
'concentrated feed'-so the chaff was burned. 
Last week the case of Keller exports came before the 
First  Criminal  Division  of the  Augsburg  Superior 
Court. With a charge sheet 125 pages long, and over a 
hundred files,  the court attempted to throw light on a 
shady business which according to the indictment, had 
been worth 14.6 million Deutschmarks to Keller and 
his partners. 
Keller  and  company  had  made  the  most  of  the 
unlimited  opportunities which  Europe's agricultural 
market holds out to resourceful traders. In order to 
prevent  Europe's  expensive  agricultural  surpluses 
from  going  to  waste,  the  authorities  make  up  the 
difference between world and EEC prices for exports 
to third countries.  The reverse procedure applies  to 
cheap  imports  from  third  countries,  such  as  meat 
from Argentina,  butter from  Denmark and chicken 
from the USA, whose prices are upped to Community 
level  through levies  similar to customs duties at the 
EEC borders. 
When he exported husks, bran and chaff to Switzer-
land,  Keller  declared  the  goods  as  high-quality 
processed produce-flour, barley or feedingstuffs.  He 
then  presented  the  'doctored'  customs  documents 
to the Frankfurt Import and Storage Office for cereals 
and  feedingstuffs  which  granted  the  EEC  export 
premium-authorizing  levy-free  imports.  Duty-free 
imports  proved  to  be  a  particularly  worthwhile 
proposition in that the  quantity imported was  con-
siderably higher than the exported weight-to make up 
for  the processing losses  that normally occur when 
very  fine  wheaten  flour  is  extracted.  In  this  way, 
Keller was  able to import duty free  75 000  tons of 
high-quality  wheat  for  41  000  tons  of  low-grade 
exports.  According to the public prosecutor's office 
the net cash benefit was 14.6 million Marks. 
The  Augsburg judges  who  now  had  to  investigate 
this matter of EEC subsidies could not take evidence 
from  the  main  defendant,  for  Keller  had  died, 
leaving no estate and burdened with debt, before the 
main hearing opened. 'What we don't know', said the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Dr. Alfred Peischer, 
'is where the money has gone'. 
The Keller affair is the most recent scandal in a sector 
which is making increasing capital of the dream of a 
united  Europe.  Experts  say  that  defrauders  are 
making over 100 million marks a year from the EEC 
fund  for  harmonizing  agricultural  markets.  The 
steadily  expanding  Euro-market,  now  subject  to 
2700 Brussels regulations, is a natural jungle impene-
trable  to  outsiders.  'The  EEC  market  regulations 
are a maze of confusion' fumed the SPD Member of 
the Bundestag Ludwig  Gellermaier from  Neu-Ulm. 
1  Written question No 241/72 by Mr Berkhouwer, OJ No 128 of 9 December 1972. 
2  See also written question No 134/72 by Mr Vredeling, OJ No C 78 of 19 July 1972. 
75 (b)  La Derniere Heure, 9 January 1973. 'Two years for Frenchmen who owe 6,500millionBelgian 
francs to the French customs' 
Two industrialists from Tourcoing, Guy and Stephane 
Dumortier,  prosecuted  before  a  court  at  Lille  for 
infringement  of customs  and  exchange  legislation, 
were  sentenced  to  two  years'  prison  and a  fine  of 
180 000 Belgian francs on Monday. 
The  two  men  have  ten  days  in  which  to  appeal. 
The case was brought before the Lille County Court 
on 4 December 1972. Charged with the same offences 
were  twenty-six  other  persons,  of Belgian,  British, 
French, Dutch and Danish nationality. 
The 'Dumortier' Mills and Oil-works were accused of 
fraudulently  exporting  more  than  40 000  tons  of 
maize  semolina  to England  and  Denmark between 
1963 and 1966. According to the charge, these goods-
worth  some  90  million  francs-were  in  fact  never 
exported to England and Denmark but fraudulently 
diverted to Germany as cattle feed, a product which at 
that time was not covered by Community regulations. 
A  Belgian company, Agimex,  acted  as  intermediary 
for the transactions. 
These 'exports' were eligible for heavy subsidies as an 
incentive  to  cereals  manufacturers  to  expand  their 
sales to third countries. 
According to  the customs  authorities,  Agimex  paid 
the profits into a Swiss bank under cover of fictitious 
companies and accommodating agents. 
Besides  the verdict against the two  Frenchmen,  the 
court also sentenced a German, Mr Gunter Henchk, 
aged  46,  residing  in  Hamburg-Altona  (FGR)  by 
default,  to  three  years'  prison and a  fine  of 50 000 
French Francs (c. 450 000 Belgian francs). 
All the others-except for the customs officers,  who 
were  all  released-were .  given  a  suspended  prison 
sentence. 
In addition  to the  prison  sentences,  they  will  have 
to  pay  6 500  million  Belgian  francs  to  the  French 
customs authorities.-B. 
(c)  Die Zeit, 2 June 1972 'Cereals and Cheese Swindle' 
Accomplices in the East 
The EEC Official Journal appears in Luxembourg a 
few  days  earlier  than  in  the  other  capitals.  And 
corrections  to regulations  are  often  only  published 
months later. The customs authorities of the Member 
States have confirmed to the EEC Commission that a 
considerable number of  defrauders do business simply 
by adhering to the wording of the texts. 
This is  how three-way deals  with Eastern European 
countries-including  the  GDR  under  the  'one 
Germany'  concept-have  made  the  news.  Taking 
advantage  of the  generous  subsidies  on exports  to 
third  countries,  dealers  began  years  ago  exporting 
cereals to Czechoslovakia which were next shipped to 
the  GDR and then  back  to  the  Federal  Republic 
under  levy-free  inter-German  trade  arrangements. 
There, the cycle began anew. 
Last year, with the aid of indications from Poland, a 
butter  scandal  was  legalized  after  the  event;  the 
'Frankfurter Allgemeine' looked on this as a remark-
able precedent 'tantamount to an invitation to pilfer 
from the EEC till'. 
In return for  an export subsidy of some 28  million 
Marks,  the  Hamburg  Milk,  Fat  and  Eggs  Bureau 
exported 17 200 tons of butter to a Lebanese trading 
company. The deal had been arranged through East 
German  export-import  agencies.  The  consignment 
was landed in the port of Rostock, where it had no 
business  to  be  since  the  ship's  papers  indicated 
Beirut as the destination. 
When the West German customs authorities made a 
fuss,  the  affair  threatened  to  become  political,  for 
the relevant GDR Bureau had agreed to stand surety 
for  the export subsidy  and the East Germans were 
not willing to throw away 28  million West German 
Marks.  On their side,  the West  German authorities 
did not want to reclaim the money from the Hamburg 
Bureau, which would have meant bankruptcy, or to 
hold  it  responsible  for  failure  to  understand  the 
complicated  EEC  regulations.  So  Bonn put mercy 
before justice and agreed with the G DR offices  that 
the butter should be sent on to a Polish port. 
(d)  Jeunes Agriculteurs, October 1972,  'The common fraud market' 
'Eight people, including three foreigners, had set  up 
a  vast  organization  composed  of six  fictitious  im-
port-export companies. Butter from Bulgaria, Roma-
nia or Poland was  shipped in  40-50  lb  containers. 
Sprinkled  over  with  various substances and accom-
panied by false  certificates,  it was declared a  'flour 
and cocoa preparation' intended for ice-cream makers 
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or as a  'mayonnaise sauce for  industrial  use',  both 
products for which the customs duty is  much lower 
than butter. 
This disguised butter only stayed in Italy for the time 
it took to change  trains,  and then  left for  another 
Member State of  the EEC. Meanwhile it was no longer Polish  or  Romanian  but  had  become  an  Italian 
product. On arrival in France, Germany or Belgium 
it was cleared of all foreign matter and, once refined, 
re-exported to Italy, this time, of course, at the price 
of  top-quality  butter.  The  trick  had  succeeded. 
For a period of two years this organization defied the 
customs  barriers  and  carried  5 000  tons  of butter 
halfway across Europe. These conjuring tricks brought 
in the tidy sum of 40 300 000  francs,  a  sum which 
should have reverted in part to the Italian customs 
and in part to the EEC  ... 
In  April  1972,  after  a  year  of investigations,  the 
Italian customs succeeded in tracing a band of  Sicilians 
who  were  importing butter into Italy and avoiding 
customs controls. This butter mafia operated with a 
fleet of small ships. They used an Italian port, usually 
Genoa, to take aboard detergents or dietary products 
destined for another Italian town. But in the open sea 
the cargo was jettisoned and the ships diverted to a 
Mediterranean port outside Italy. At the rendezvous 
point,  another  cargo  was  waiting  consisting  of 
barrels  and  boxes  that  looked  exactly  similar  and 
bore the  same  labels  as  those  thrown  overboard. 
The only difference  was  that they contained butter. 
The nature of the consignment was declared correctly. 
It was the destination for a non-Member State of the 
EEC that was false. 
The butter actually  unloaded in Italy,  in the  same 
port which-according to the papers submitted to the 
Italian customs when the goods were loaded-should 
have  received  the  soap  or  dietary  products.  The 
smugglers always used a small port in southern Italy, 
since the distance from Genoa made it easier for them 
to justify the two or three days' delay, the time needed 
to go  abroad. In a  small town,  too,  the mafia  was 
more  likely  to  secure  the  connivance  of  certain 
officials. 
The butter returned from the south to the north. The 
traders took great pains to avoid controls: there was 
no written agreement with the purchasers, the goods 
were unloaded in warehouses in open country, there 
were  constant  changes  of direction,  and the  goods 
were transferred to other trucks en route. The smug-
glers had simply followed in every detail the system 
used  by their American  counterparts  to  carry  nar-
cotics. 
However, there was one weak link in the chain: the 
customs  found  that these  'packets  of soap'  were  a 
little  long  in  transport  for  instead  of taking  the 
motorway from  Genoa to  Milan  they  travelled via 
the Southern tip  of Italy.  By  the time  the customs 
managed to clear up this affair entirely, the mafia had 
made ten trips  and 'imported'  3 500 kilos of butter; 
purchased at roughly 2.58 francs per kilo in the coun-
try of origin, it had been resold in Italy at about 10.32 
francs per kilo, besides which, the EAGGF had paid 
out  more  than  4 300 000  francs  to  the exporters!' 
(e)  Daily Telegraph,  17 April1972. 'Italians accused of Six butter black market' 
A Rome prosecutor has charged nine people, including 
the  heads  of two  Roman  Catholic  Institutions,  of 
running a  black market in Common Market butter. 
Official  sources  estimated  that  the  fraud  involved 
550 tons of  surplus butter from West Germany, France 
and Luxembourg, sold at big profits in Italy for about 
£392 000. 
They  said  customs  police  had  discovered  that  the 
butter was bought in the EEC countries at lOp per lb 
and sold in Italy for 32p per lb. 
The butter was  alleged to have been bought on the 
pretext of supplying Italian Roman Catholic institu-
tions,  under  a  Common  Market  regulation  which 
allows  surplus  butter to be sold cheaply to charity 
organizations, but bars its resale for profit. 
Publishing manager 
The nine accused, who include Signor Luigi Micconi, 
manager  of a  religious  publishing  house  in  Rome 
called  Opus  Dei  Publishers,  and  Signor  Benito 
Puccinelli, director of an institute called Opus Christi, 
are alleged to have sold the butter in several cities at 
triple the cost price. 
Justice  sources  said  that  about  30  Rome-based 
religious organizations were being investigated. 
Among these was the provincial headquarters of the 
Discalced  (barefoot)  Carmelite  monks,  which  is 
alleged  to  have  imported  400  tons  of the  butter. 
Another  consignment  under  investigation  involves 
14  tons  imported  by  the  Rome-based  Franciscan 
Missionary Sisters  of the Sacred Heart,  the sources 
said.-Reuter 
(f)  La Libre Belgique, 27 Janvier 1972.  'Will European fraud increase with the enlarged EEC ?' 
One of  the reasons for the increase in frauds is clearly 
the lack of cooperation between the customs author-
ities in the six countries. 
According to the letter and spirit of the agreement of 
13  June 1969, which itself derives from the Treaty of 
Rome,  the  customs  authorities  of the  Six  are  in 
theory required to work in cooperation. They are no 
longer allowed to restrict their enquiries  and invest-
igations  to  their  own  country.  Admittedly,  inter-
national meetings take place at more or less  regular 
intervals. And, while 'European'  cooperation in this 
field is  theoretically satisfactory, it is still in fact at a 
very early stage. In addition there is  a staff problem. 
All in all, the Common Market has about fifteen men 
sufficiently  well-trained  and  mentally  equipped  to 
combat  the  trickery  of countless  international  de-
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These  few  officials  belong  to  the  customs  adminis-
tration  at Antwerp,  Hanover  and  Paris,  and  to  a 
lesser extent, Paris and Rome. 
Even allowing for the small staff available, the agree-
ment does not always produce the expected results ... 
The EEC authorities all realize that Switzerland has 
become a  hub for  the vast majority of very cleverly 
organized  schemes  to  defraud  the  European  Agri-
cultural  Fund.  The  beneficiaries  of  these  highly 
lucrative transactions are greatly aided by the fact that 
the  Swiss  customs  and financial  authorities  simply 
refuse  to  answer  all  queries-even  official-from 
European administrations. 
The stage  has now been reached where  it is  feared 
that the entry of Great Britain, Ireland, Norway and 
Denmark into the Common Market will enable these 
clever  defrauders  to  further  expand  their  activities. 
Great  Britain  was  already  concerned  about  this 
unappealing  prospect  in  1970  and  sent  a  written 
request asking what counter-measures were being con-
templated.  The answer  to  this  legitimate  request  is 
still pending. 
2.  Written questions to  the European Parliament on  the problem 
of  financial frauds involving the EA GGF 
Since  1965,  some thirty written questions have been put to the Commission and the Council 
on the problem of frauds involving the EAGGF. They are listed below. It should be pointed 
out that only one written question on frauds refers to the Social Fund. Several refer to the Euro-
pean Development Fund, but by far the largest number concerns the EAGGF. 
The main points raised in the written  questions  are  discussed here.  While they  do not cover 
every aspect of the frauds, these questions do bring out the political aspects involved. The com-
ments made have been arranged under the following headings: 
- the agricultural sectors concerned; 
- fraudulent practices; 
- interventions by Community authorities. 
(a)  The agricultural sectors concerned 
Confirmed or assumed frauds relate to wheat, groats, cattle feed,  maize, skimmed milk powder 
for animal feed,  butter, eggs and meat. At times fraudulent practices can be directly related to 
a certain agricultural sector. In one written question for instance, four prices, varying in the ratio 
1:3 according to destination, were noted for powdered skimmed milk in 1969. After stating that 
appropriate measures  had been  planned to ensure  compliance with the conditions  governing 
these  prices,  the  Commission  admitted  that when  high  subsidies  were  granted  to a  product 
earmarked for a particular destination this always raised control problems.
1 
(b)  Fraudulent practices 
More often than not frauds  involved fictitious  exports to third countries,  the goods  actually 
being used or consumed in another Member State in order to obtain export refunds. 
Further cases of fraud involve alleged deliveries to charitable institutions, the use of a product 
as cattle feed when it is in fact used for human consumption, back-dating beyond the introduction 
1  Written Questions Nos 291/69 and 142/71. 
78 of  compensatory amounts, presentation of  frozen meat as fresh meat, consideration of  the Vatican 
as  a foreign  country,  or exploitation of certain ambiguities in nomenclature, as  in the case of 
groats and semolina. Five written questions in 1970 and 1971
1 referred to exports to the Vatican. 
The Commission's answers did not mention frauds, simply noting that the foreign trade statistics 
for Italy and the Vatican were identical and that it was not possible to single out the figures for 
the Vatican. The Commission further stated that the Community regulations (May 1971) do not 
provide for a separate valuation by country of destination of refunds paid.  Finally it declared 
that the Lateran Treaties 'did not only refer to goods consumed within the Vatican City but to 
all goods destined for institutions or services of  the Holy See, including those outside the Vatican. 
(c)  Interventions by Community authorities 
The Commission's answers to the first questions put to it on frauds (1967-1968) show that it is 
not in a position to give  accurate information. What information it does possess is  'unofficial'. 
It  takes the view that 'it is for the Member States to check whether transactions eligible for export 
refunds have actually taken place; consequently, cases of fraud do not fall within the Commis-
sion's  sphere  of responsibility'.  It adds that 'cooperation  among  Member  States  on judicial 
instructions seems desirable' and is considering measures to achieve this purpose.2• 
In 1967 the Commission adopted measures
3  to control trade in agricultural products subject to 
a single price system: 
- first,  for exports eligible for refund, the production of documents certifying that the goods 
came from the geographical territory of the Community and arrived in the third country of 
destination ;4 
- simplification of the nomenclature of agricultural products; 
- the provision of sureties by the exporter; 
- finally,  an invitation to the authorities within a given country to cooperate  closely  and, if 
possible, to restrict the number of departments responsible. 5 
On 7 September 1967 the six Member States signed an agreement of mutual assistance between 
customs authorities. 
Meanwhile a group of experts has been set up with the Council to look into the problem of  fraud 
prevention.  6  This group drew up a report which led to the adoption of Community legislation 
in 1969. In that year the Council finalized Community arrangements for goods in transit between 
two points in the Community.  7 A special form was introduced to verify the intended use andjor 
destination of the goods. The same form, which requires cooperation between the authorities in 
the different Member States8,  was  first used late in 1969  to prove that the goods had left the 
geographical territory of the Community.  9 
1  Written questions Nos 31/70, 390/70, 421/70, 18/71 and 467/70. 
2  Written questions Nos 129 and 132/1967. 
3  Written question No 5/68. 
4  Regulation No 1041/67 OJ No 314, 23 December 1967. 
5  Recommendation of 17 October 1967, OJ No 259, 26 October 1967. 
6  Question No 487/69. 
7  R. No 542/69 of the Council OJ No L 77, 29 March 1969. 
8  Commission R. No 2315/69 OJ No L 295, 24 November 1969. 
9  Commission R. No 2586/69 OJ No L 322, 24 December 1969. 
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tion for the financing of the common agricultural policy, including measures for the Member 
States to provide regular information on the progress of administrative or judicial procedures 
relating to negligence or irregularities. 
Council Regulation No 729/70  (Articles  8 and 9),  provides for  measures  relating to control, 
the recovery of sums paid in error and cooperation between the  Member States and the Com-
mission to combat frauds. 
In 1972, pursuant to Regulation No 729/70, the Council adopted Regulation No 283/72 on irregu-
larities and the recovery of sums paid in error.
1  This regulation did not take up the idea put 
forward in several written questions of setting up a 'central enquiry office in Brussels', to which 
the Council had no objection on principle in May 1970.2  However, the Commission proposal 
(Doc. 151/70) did not take up this idea, first put forward in March 1968.3 At the time the Com-
mission did not consider taking steps to set up a 'central supervision service'. 
The final written questions cover the implementation of Regulation No 283/72 mentioned earlier 
and Regulation No 773/72  on applications  for refunds  under  the  Guarantee Section  of the 
EAGGF for the accounting periods 1967/1968 to 1970. 
This latter Commission regulation provides  that Member States must supply information on 
irregularities and negligence during the period in question. 
In reply to these questions the Commission stated that Regulation No 283/72 assumes gradual 
progress and th~t it was waiting for the first quarterly reports which the States were required to 
submit pursuant to this regulation. 
(d)  List of  written questions 
Questioner  No and date  Addressee  Subject  OJ 
Vredeling  31  1965-1966  Commission  Manipulations  of EEC  levies  and  158 24 Sep-
refunds  on  imports  of wheat  and  tember 1965 
maize (frauds) 
Baas and  129  1966-1967  Commission  Fictitious exports of  cattle feed involv- 18  March 1967 
C. Berkhouwer  17 January 1967  ing Community funds 
Pedini  132  1966-1967  Commission  Possible frauds involving the EAGG  F  18  March 1967 
20 January 1967 
Fellermaier  5 1968-1969  Commission  Prevention of fraudulent practices in  C46 
13  March 1968  imports and exports  of agricultural  11  May 1968 
products (refunds) 
Vredeling  157  1968-1969  Commission  Fraud relating to export refunds on  C 112 28 October 
13 August 1968  agricultural products  1968 
Fellermaier  229 1968-1969  Commission  Prevention of fraudulent practices in  C 6 22 January 
31  October 1968  imports  and exports of agricultural  1969 
products 
Rich  arts  173  1969-1970  Commission  Irregularities  in  refunds  on  maize  C 128  6 October 
27 June 1969  flour  1969 
Vredeling  291  1969-1970  Commission  Prevention  of frauds  and fixing  of  C 11  29 January 
1 October 1969  skimmed milk powder prices  1970 
1  OJ L 36 of 10 February 72. 
2  Questions 5/68, 229/68, 487/69, 1/70, 358/70. 
3  This was the Commission proposal which led to the adoption of Regulation No 283/72. 
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Ric  harts 
Vredeling 
Vredelirtg 
Mrs Orth 
Messrs Fellermaier, 
Behrendt, 
Broscher, Gerlach, 
Seefeld, 
Lautenschlager, 
Faller 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Berkhouwer and 
Baas 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Vredeling 
Berkhouwer and 
Baas 
Vredeling 
No and date  Addressee 
329  1969-1970  Commission 
23  October 1969 
311  1969-1970  Commission 
9 October 1969 
461  1969-1970  Commission 
12 February 1970 
487/69  Council 
27  February 1970 
1/70  Council 
11  March 1970 
31/70  Commission 
7 Apri11970 
358/70  Commission 
357/70  Commission 
19 November 1970 
390/70  Commission 
l1  December 1970 
421/70  Commission 
6 January 1971 
411/70  Commission 
22 December 1970 
18/71  Commission 
22 March 1971 
467/70  Commission 
25 January 1971 
571/70  Commission 
15 March 1971 
108/71  Council 
5 May 1971 
142/71  Commission 
26  May 1971 
280/71  Commission 
9 September 1971 
345/71  Commission 
12 October 1971 
385/71  Commission 
28  October 1971 
79/72  Commission 
28 April 1972 
94/72  Commission 
4 May 1972 
Subject 
Irregularities  in  refunds  on  maize 
flour 
Community exports and frauds 
Prevention  of frauds  and fixing  of 
skimmed milk powder prices 
Prevention of fraudulent practices in 
the import and export of agricultural 
products on Community territory 
Prevention of fraudulent practices in 
the import and export of agricultural 
products on Community territory 
Exports of  agricultural products from 
the Community to the Vatican (fur-
ther to Question No 311/69) 
Frauds involving the EAGGF 
Butter frauds in Belgium 
Exports of  agricultural products from 
the Community to the Vatican (fur-
ther to Question 31/70) 
Exports  of agricultural  products to 
the Vatican (further to Questions 390 
and 31/70) 
Prevention of frauds when prices are 
fixed for skimmed milk powder (fur-
ther to Questions 291/69 and 461/69) 
Export  of agricultural  products  to 
and  from  the  Vatican  (further  to 
Questions 390 and 421/70) 
Export of  agricultural products from 
the Community to the Vatican (fur-
ther to Question 31/70) 
Exports  from  the  Community  and 
frauds  (further to Question  311/69) 
Frauds committed under Community 
provisions  on the  common agricul-
tural policy 
Trade in skimmed  milk powder in 
Italy (cf. Question 411/70) 
Advance fixing  certificates  for  agri-
cultural products 
Prevention  of  frauds  within  the 
Community  (cf.  answers  to  Ques-
tions  487/79,  1/70,  357/70,  358/70, 
52/71  and 108/71) 
Frauds in the sphere of compensa-
tions in the maize trade at the differ-
ent frontiers 
Misuse  of EAGGF  funds  in  Italy 
under  cover  of  butter  financing 
transactions 
Available means of  checking counter-
vailing charges at frontiers in trade in 
agricultural  products  following 
exchange rate fluctuations 
OJ 
C 14 4 February 
1970 
C 38 1 April1970 
C 5611 May 1970 
C 62 28 May 1970 
C6228 May 1970 
C 86  10 July 
1970 and C 138 
18November 
1970 
C20 3 March 
1971 
C 22 9 March 
1971 
C2416 March 
1971 
C 24  16 March 
1971 
C29 29  March 
1971 
C 47 13 May 1971 
C 5022May1971 
C 59 11.June 1971 
C 6529June 1971 
C 97 2 October 
1971 
C 321 April1972 
C 25  14 March 
1971 
C 42 28 April 
1972 
c 72 5 July 1972 
C 68 28 June 1972 
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Vredeling  134/72  Commission  Applications  for  refunds  under  the  C 78 19 July 1972 
19  May 1972  EAGGF for the accounting periods 
1967/68 to 1970 
Vredeling  104/72  Commission  Frauds in the sale of butter in Italy  c 78 19 July 1972 
4 May 1972 
Vredeling  274/72  Commission  Frauds in the butter trade committed  C 132 22  Decem-
23  August 1972  in the port of Hamburg  ber 1972 
Section III - First reactions of the Commission of the Communities 
The Communities' first reactions to the problem of frauds came in 1967. The reply of Mr Mans-
holt, Vice-President of  the Commission, to an oral question by Mr Leemans (Christian Democrat, 
Belgium) on behalf of the Committee for Budgets and Finance is  quoted below, together with 
a Commission recommendation addressed to the Member States and a Commission report to 
the Council. 
1.  Oral Question No 3, with debate, of  14 March 1967 
The question was as follows: 
'1. How high  is  the  sum known  to  have  been  lost 
through  fraud?  Is  this  figure  likely  to  increase 
further? 
2.  How  did  the  defrauders  go  about  infringing 
existing  regulations?  How  did  they  manage  to 
evade both the rules of the Fund and control by the 
national  customs authorities for so many years,  and 
on a  scale  which  a  comparison  of statistics  ought 
to  have  revealed  had  there  been  sufficient  coordi-
nation between the economic affairs departments and 
those administering the fund?' 
The following extracts are from Mr Mansholt's reply: 
'The first point which requires clarification is how the 
regulations  could  be  circumvented,  i.e.  how  the 
defrauders succeeded in evading the provisions they 
contain. 
The  answer  depends  on  the  products  themselves. 
Clearly there are different types of fraud.  Assuming, 
for example,  that wheat is  exported from the Com-
munity at a price higher than the world market price 
and thus qualifies for a refund, and that the customs 
authorities  of the  country concerned do  not satisfy 
themselves before granting the refund that the wheat 
has  reached  its  destination,  but simply  that it has 
left the port, then fraud will' be extremely easy.  We 
have established in several cases that this is,  in fact, 
the  way  frauds  were  committed.  My tentative  con-
clusion  is  that  the  customs  were  negligent  in  this 
case. If a refund is  to be paid, they must first make 
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sure that the full  range of provisions has been  ob-
served. 
Another type of  fraud consists in exporting or import-
ing two different products eligible for separate refunds. 
This method can also be used in the case of  industrial 
products. Suppose this time that a product is loaded 
on a  ship,  railway car or lorry. Again fraud will be 
very  easy.  I  think  that  here  too  we  can  conclude 
negligence  on the part of the  chief customs  officer 
who  did  not make  sure,  either  by  spot  checks  or 
permanent supervision,  that a  certain article was  in 
fact covered bythe accompanying documents. 
Finally  it  can  happen-our knowledge  here  is  not 
based on information from government sources, so I 
speak with some reservations-that goods are exported 
abroad  and  then  immediately  diverted  to  another country. For instance we have learned that butter has 
been  exported  to  Switzerland  and  then  shipped 
directly to Italy, accompanied by forged documents. 
It is  known  that  butter  can  be  exported  in  Italy 
accompanied  by  a  so-called  DD4  form  covering 
internal traffic.  The export of butter abroad entitles 
the exporter to a  substantial refund.  But importing 
butter into Italy with forged documents is  obviously 
a  fraudulent practice,  causing losses  to the national 
Treasury which pays all refunds ... 
One  question  immediately  comes  to  mind-who  is 
responsible for this control at the present time. The 
Commission is  looking into the problem and it will 
continue  its  investigation  in  cooperation  with  the 
Member States. I cannot say anything definite on the 
subject at this stage, however. I shall simply say that 
we  can find  no article in the Treaty that makes us 
legally  responsible  for  checking  the  content  of the 
documents,  in  other words  we  cannot,  as  a  Com-
munity,  go  as  far  as  to  check  whether  the  goods 
correspond to the information on the documents-! 
am of  course leaving aside the question of which body 
should do so, supposing for a moment that it is the 
Commission and its administration. 
So far, i.e. during 1962-63 and 1963-64, the two years 
for  which  we  have  drawn  up  a  balance  sheet  of 
Member  States'  revenue  and  expenditure  and  the 
amount of contributions  to be  paid to or collected 
from the EAGGF, we have worked on the assumption 
that the documents  corresponded to the goods  and 
had not been  falsified.  I  must  add that,  owing  to 
shortage of staff, only very summary checks are made 
by random sampling-at a guess, probably one in ten 
thousand-by no more than three officials. We would 
need a fairly large administrative staff to increase the 
number of such checks. 
So far, then, we have assumed that responsibility for 
ensuring  that  import  and  export  operations  are 
properly conducted lies with the national governments. 
I  think we  must keep  to this  system in future  too, 
although-and this  is  a  second  problem  the  Com-
mission is  studying at the moment-it requires very 
close  coordination  between  the  various  customs 
authorities. The external frontier of  our Community is 
a  Community  frontier,  and  certain  operations  are 
controlled  by  six  national  customs  authorities  and 
not by a  single  Community customs authority. It is 
therefore necessary to ensure very close  cooperation 
between these services and to set up a control system 
to  make  these  relatively  simple  frauds  impossible. 
This still  does  not exhaust the responsibility  of the 
Community. I  cannot yet say how things should be 
organized. The Commission is looking into the matter 
and perhaps we should make proposals to the Council. 
This applies not only to agricultural products but in 
principle to all industrial products too ... 
My  own  feeling-!  would  not like  to  say  this  on 
behalf of the Commission-is that in  the matter of 
control we will have to go much further in a Commu-
nity direction than we have done so far for otherwise 
our Community will  be unable to assume  responsi-
bility for this expenditure.' 
2.  The Commission's recommendations 
On 17  October 1967  the Commission recommended that the Member States take measures to 
prevent and repress frauds in agriculture.1 
'The discovery of serious cases  of fraud in trade in 
agricultural  products  makes  the  implementation  of 
the agricultural regulations in each Member State a 
particularly acute problem. 
The investigations made by the Member States after 
these  frauds  had been discovered  showed that in  a 
number  of cases  they  could  have  been  partly  or 
wholly  prevented  by  more  stringent  application  of 
the regulations and stricter and more frequent checks 
when the goods cleared customs. 
It was also found that where, for reasons of internal 
organization, responsibility for implementing the agri-
cultural  regulations  was  shared  between  various 
authorities  in  a  given  Member  State,  it  was  very 
important  to  establish  close  coordination  between 
them. 
1  OJ No 259 of 26 October 1967. 
A more general point in this latter connection is that 
administrative cooperation between Member States-
a necessary corollary to the administrative measures 
taken  on  a  national  scale-can  only  be  genuinely 
smooth  and  effective  if the  number  of authorities 
responsible for implementing the regulations in each 
Member  State  is  reduced  to a  minimum  whenever 
possible. 
Having  regard  to the  above  considerations  and by 
virtue of the provisions of Article 155 of the Treaty, 
the Commission recommends that the Member States: 
I.  give  appropriate  instructions  to  the  national 
administrations to ensure strict application of  the 
agricultural regulations during customs clearance 
regardless of  whether the goods are for consump-
tion or export in transit or subject to any other 
83 customs arrangements; this means that the goods 
must  be  thoroughly  checked-if  necessary  by 
random sampling for  analysis-and the accom-
panying papers scrutinized. 
II.  ensure that where responsibility for implementing 
the  agricultural  regulations  is  shared  between 
several authorities in a given Member State, there 
is close cooperation between them. 
III.  reduce  to  a  minimum,  wherever  possible,  the 
number  of authorities  responsible,  at  national 
level,  for  implementing  the  agricultural  regu-
lations.' 
3.  Commission Report to the Council 
The Commission of the Communities has not simply relegated responsibility for investigating 
and dealing with cases of fraud to the Member States. 
At its  own initiative it has undertaken the task of recasting Community legislation, ridding it 
of imprecisions to which the customs authorities responsible for its implementation had drawn 
attention. 
This long and patient work deserves special mention. Several extracts from the report the Com-
mission presented to the Council on 12 February 1971 on the prevention and repression of  frauds 
in agricultural imports and exports1 are given below. 
'A. AMENDMENT AND SIMPLIFICATION 
OF RULES AND PROCEDURES 
I.  Simplification of rules 
Given  the  complexity  of the  agricultural  rules  it is 
not  surprising  that  certain  provisions  should  have 
been found wanting in the implementation stage and 
have  been  exploited  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the 
spirit in which they were framed and,  hence to the 
detriment of the Community. 
A number of  measures have been taken at Community 
level  to make good these  deficiencies,  in particular: 
- Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/68 of 28  June 
1968 (OJ No L 151, 30 June 1968) simplifying the 
CCT  schedule  by  amending  Regulations  Nos 
120/67, 121/67, 122/67 and 359/67, on the common 
organization of markets in cereals,  pigmeat, eggs 
and rice. 
- Measures  to improve  and harmonize  the  classi-
fication  of certain  agricultural  products  within 
the  framework  of  the  CCT  (Regulations  Nos 
495/69 and 496/69, OJ No L 67,  19  March 1969), 
Regulation  No  663/69,  (OJ No L 68,  10  April 
1969),  Regulation  No  1107/70,  (OJ  No  L 16, 
22 January 1970). 
- As regards the interpretation of  the CCT, progress 
has been made in compiling explanatory notes on 
the 24 chapters of the agricultural sector. 
II.  Simplification of procedures 
Although it seems essential for the proper operation 
of the  common  agricultural  policy  that regulations 
should not be legally exploitable to the detriment of 
the  Community,  it  is  equally  important  that  the 
procedures adopted should be as simple and uniform 
as possible. Over the past four years, however, a good 
many  procedures  have  been  introduced  under  the 
common  agricultural  policy  involving  the  use  of 
various  administrative  documents  that  complicate 
the  task  of the  customs  control  offices  and  hence 
indirectly encourage malpractices. 
After several years of preparatory work, a  Commu-
nity system2  was set up with the object both of facili-
tating the movement of all goods within the six states 
and  of  strengthening  the  means  of control  over 
financial  measures,  p·articularly  those  applied  to 
agricultural products.  Existing procedures were  also 
simplified by replacing them as  far as  possible by a 
system  of Community transit for  which  a  standard 
document was devised. 
These Community transit declaration forms are now 
used  for  checking  purposes  in  a  good many cases. 
1  Commission SEC (71) final.  See also the Commission's communication to the Council of 19 December 1967 on action taken or to be 
taken to prevent and suppress frauds in the import and export of agricultural products (SEC (67) 4967 final). 
2  Regulation No 542/69 of 18.3.1969 (OJ No L 77 29 March 1969). 
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COOPERATION 
I. Through the Community transit system in general 
It had become clear that fraudulent practices might 
not  be  discovered  because  of inadequate  adminis-
trative  cooperation.  In  order  to  improve direct 
relations  between  the  customs  authorities  of  the 
various  states,  the  Commission  took  a  decision  in 
1967  making it compulsory to return an additional 
copy  of the  D D4  certificate  to  the  customs  office 
from  which  the  agricultural  products  had  been 
despatched if the transport between two points in the 
Community involved crossing the territory of a third 
country.
1 
On  17  October  1967,  the  Commission  also  recom-
mended2 that Member States should reduce as far as 
possible  the number of authorities  responsible  at a 
national  level  for  implementing  agricultural  regu-
lations. 
The introduction of the  Community  transit  system 
further  consolidated  the  procedures  for  adminis-
trative cooperation.  Since the system only came into 
effect  on  1 January  1970,  it  is  not yet  possible  to 
assess its advantages in this respect, but initial reports 
confirm  that contacts  between  the customs  author-
ities of the Six have increased. 
II.  Through the control certificate procedure 
Of the many implementing regulations  adopted fol-
lowing  the  introduction  of the  Community  transit 
system,  special  mention  should  be  made  of Regu-
lation No 2315/69 of 19  November 19693  on the use 
of Community  transit  documents,  for the  purpose 
of applying  Community measures  for  verifying  the 
use  and/or  destination  of goods.  This  regulation 
introduces  a  Community  control  procedure  and  a 
control  document  for  use  whenever  the  import  or 
export of a product or its movement within the Com-
munity is subject to control as to use or destination, 
and to a corresponding financial measure. The Com-
mission has thus adopted this method of  homogeneous 
control involving  a  standard Community document 
in place  of the  various  procedures  and  documents 
previously used in the agricultural sphere. 
1  Decision of 17 October 1967 (OJ No 258, 25 October 1967). 
2  Recommendation No 67/651/EEC (OJ No 259, 26 October 1967). 
3  OJ No L 295 of 24 November 1969. 
4  OJ No L 322, 24 December 1969. 
5  OJ No L 26, 3 February 1970. 
6  OJ No L 35, 13 February 1970. 
7  OJ No L 41, 21  February 1970. 
8  OJ No L 44, 25 February 1970. 
9  OJ No L 68, 25 March 1970. 
lO  OJ No L 134, 19 June 1970. 
Following  the  introduction  of  this  regulation  on 
1  January  1970,  the  Commission  adopted  the  fol-
lowing seven regulations adjusting to 19  agricultural 
regulations: 
- Regulation  (EEC)  No 2586/69  of 22  December 
1969  amending  Regulation  No  1041/67/EEC, 
containing  detailed  rules  for  the  application  of 
export  refunds  on  products  subject  to  a  single 
price  system.  4  This  regulation  substitutes  the 
procedure of  the Community control certificate for 
that of the  exit  certificate  introduced  by  Regu-
lation No 1041/67/EEC mentioned above; 
- Regulation (EEC) No 193/70 of 2 February 1970 
establishing  the  procedure  for  giving  effect  to 
measures  to  promote  the  marketing  of oranges 
and mandarines in the Community.5 
- Regulation (EEC) No 267/70 of 12 February 1970 
amending  Regulations  (EEC)  No  1669/69  and 
(EEC) No 2061/69 on the document accompanying 
sugar  which  is  to  be  or has  been  denatured  in 
intra-Community trade.6 
- Regulation (EEC) No 316/70 of 20 February 1970 
amending  Regulations  (EEC)  No  559j69,  No 
2085/69  and  No  446/69  as  regards  the  use  of 
document  Tl/T2  No  5  in  Community  trade  in 
certain  cereals  and  products  processed  from 
cereals and rice.  7 
- Regulation (EEC) No 332/70 of 23  February 1970 
amending  11  regulations  on milk and milk pro-
ducts  as  regards  the  use  of Community  transit 
documents. 
8 
- Regulation  (EEC)  No 546/70 of 24  March  1970 
on the  sale at a  reduced price of butter for  the 
export of certain fat mixtures.  9 
- Regulation  (EEC)  No  1152/70  of 18  June  1970 
authorizing the sale to the processing industry of 
apples  which  have  been  subject  to intervention, 
and laying down the conditions of sale.10 
These rationalization measures should help to make 
controls in this field much more effective. 
Implementing Regulation (EEC)  No 1373/70, applic-
able  to all  sectors  covered by the common organiz-
ation of agricultural markets,  contains two types of 
special  provisions  to  prevent  and  combat  fraud: 
- it  introduces  standard  Community  certificates 
which  are  designed,  produced,  patterned  and 
presented  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent  frauds. 
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trative  cooperation  between the various adminis-
trations  of  the  Member  States  and  includes 
provisions  to  ensure  that the necessary  controls 
are  carried  out.  For  instance,  a  procedure  for 
retrospective  control  of  documents  has  been 
introduced;  the  competent  authorities  in  the 
Member  States  are  to  supply  each  other  with 
information on the  certificates  and irregularities 
in  their  use;  information  procedures  are  estab-
lished whereby the Member States forward to the 
Commission a  quarterly statement indicating the 
number  and  kind  of irregularities  and  infringe-
ments which have come to their notice, as well as 
all  specimens  of the  official  stamps  used  by  the 
issuing  authorities  concerned;  both  items  of 
information  are  then  passed  on  to  the  other 
Member States. 
The Commission further adopted a second regulation 
on 23 December 1970 (Regulation (EEC) No 2637/70), 
supplementing  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1373/70  by 
codifying in a single text all of the provisions relating 
to certificates applicable in each sector of the common 
organization of  agricultural markets. The Commission 
also  took  this  opportunity  to  harmonize  the  texts 
and  to  simplify  the  procedures  under  the  relevant 
rules. The rules on the new system of certificates are 
thus  contained  in  only  two  texts  for  covering  all 
agricultural  products,  which  facilitates  the  work of 
both· operators and administrators. 
Finally,  the  Commission  had  the  relevant  texts 
published in the Official Journal. 
III.  Through the introduction 
of the Community system of certificates 
for imports and exports and advance fixing 
The efforts made to improve administrative cooper-
ation through a Community system of certificates of 
import, export and advance fixing have been success-
ful.  These  certificates,  introduced  under  Council 
regulations on the common organization of markets 
for  agricultural  products,  have  a  dual  purpose: 
first,  they  are  forward-planning  trade  documents 
which will make it easier to administer the agricultural 
markets and where necessary, to apply the safeguard 
clauses;  secondly,  in  certain  cases  they  provide  a 
means  of fixing  in  advance  the  rate  of levies  and 
refunds. 
The  regulations  on  the  common  organization  of 
agricultural markets made it clear that at first  these 
would be national documents applicable only in the 
territory  of the  issuing  Member  State;  but from  1 
August 1969 at the latest, they would be valid through-
out the  Community.  This  principle  is  obviously of 
great practical importance; it means that the rate of 
levy  or refund in  a  given  Member State is  fixed  in 
advance,  and is  binding  on each  Member  State  in 
which an operation is effected. It is thus a significant 
1  OJ No L 158, 20 July 1970. 
2  The agreement took effect in Italy on 1 January 1.972. 
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contribution  to  economic  integration  in  the  sense 
that, for the first  time,  documents with  a  genuinely 
legal status will be valid throughout the Community. 
The  Commission  had  to  adopt  implementing  pro-
visions to give  effect to this principle.  Work on this 
began in 1967 but was held up because of the various 
problems  involved  and  understaffing  at  the  Com-
mission. Following three reports in succession, it was 
decided  to  introduce  the  system  of  Community 
certificates on 1 January 1971.  On 10  July 1970  the 
Commission  adopted  the  implementing  regulation 
(Regulation  (EEC)  No  1373/70).1  Allowing  for  the 
substantial  procedural  changes  involved,  not  to 
mention  possible  alterations  in  the  administrative 
organization of the Member States, a delay of several 
months was  considered necessary  before the  system 
could be put into effect. 
Finally the Commission also published a notice in the 
Official  Journal (OJ No  C 152,  31  December  1970) 
on the use of the certificates and notified the Member 
States  of the  rules  of completion  and  assignment, 
which  will  make  them  easier  to  use  and  handle. 
Once  these  measures  have  been introduced and the 
initial  difficulties  overcome,  they  will  no  doubt 
produce the expected benefits. 
IV.  Through the agreement on mutual assistance 
by customs authorities 
By adopting the agreement on mutual assistance on 7 
September 1967,  the Member States gave an earnest 
of their intention to apply the principle of adminis-
trative  cooperation  on  an  even  wider  scale. The 
purpose of the  agreement is  to prevent and repress 
fraudulent  practices  at  Community  level;  covering 
both  levies  and  actual  customs  duties,  it  contains 
the following essential provisions: 
- exchange of  lists of goods known to be involved in 
import, export or transit traffic in infringement of 
customs regulations (Article 5); 
- communication of all information likely to be of 
use to Member States on infringements of  customs 
regulations  particularly  on  new  methods  of 
detection; 
- forwarding  of copies  or  extracts  from  reports 
compiled by the research departments on special 
procedures employed (Article 9). 
Although this  agreement was  not sponsored by the 
Commission,  it  was  agreed  that  the  Commission 
department  responsible  for  customs  matters  would 
receive  any information likely  to  be of interest.  At 
this  juncture  this  information  will  clearly  make  it 
easier  to  remedy  deficiencies  in  Community  regu-
lations  and take the necessary  measures  to  prevent 
certain  fraudulent  transactions.  The  agreement  has 
been implemented by five  of the six  Member States 
since  1 June  1970  but has  not yet been  ratified  by 
Italy.2 Section IV - Current rules on the financing of the common agricultural policy 
On 29  July 1969  the Council referred to Parliament a  proposal on the final  arrangements for 
the financing of the common agricultural policy  .1 Articles 8 and 9 of this proposal, dealing with 
frauds and Community control, were incorporated in a  regulation adopted by the Council on 
21  Aprill970.2 
Pursuant to these articles, the Council adopted, in February 1972, a special regulation to imple-
ment Article 8 on frauds. 
More recently still,  the Commission submitted a proposal for a  directive on mutual assistance 
for the recovery of sums paid in error. 
1.  Council Regulation No 729/70 
New  arrangements  for  the  financing  of the common agricultural policy  came  into  force  on 
1 January 1971. Instead of accounts for each Member State, in which book entries of completed 
operations were offset-in other words a clearing system in which only the debit or credit balance 
had to be settled-the Community itself was now assigned own resources with which it could not 
only intervene at the time the transactions took place but even advance funds to bodies acting 
on its behalf. 
Since this meant greater responsibility for the Community, the means of supervision at its disposal 
had to be augmented.  · 
These were specified in Articles 8 and 9 of Regulation No 729/70, which reads as follows: 
Article 8 
'1.  The Member States, in accordance with national 
provisions laid down by law, regulation and adminis-
trative action,  shall take the measures necessary to: 
- satisfy  themselves  that  transactions  financed  by 
the Fund are actually carried out and are executed 
correctly; 
- prevent and deal with irregularities; 
- recover sums  lost as  a  result of irregularities  or 
negligence. 
The  Member  States  shall  inform  the  Commission 
of the  measures  taken  for  those  purposes  and  in 
particular  of  the  state  of the  administrative  and 
judicial procedures. 
2.  In  the  absence  of total  recovery,  the  financial 
consequences of irregularities or negligence shall be 
borne by the Community, with the exception of the 
1  Doc. 98, 1969-1970. 
2  OJ No L 94, 28 April 1970. 
consequences  of irregularities  or  negligence  attrib-
utable to  administrative  authorities or other bodies 
of the Member States. 
The  sums  recovered  shall  be  paid  to  the  paying 
authorities or bodies and deducted by them from the 
expenditure financed by the Fund. 
3.  The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall lay down general 
rules for the application of this Article. 
Article 9 
1.  Member  States  shall  make  available  to  the 
Commission all information required for the proper 
working  of the  Fund  and  shall  take  all  suitable 
measures  to  facilitate  the  supervision  which  the 
Commission may consider it necessary to undertake 
within  the framework of the management of Com-
munity financing,  including inspections on the spot. 
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provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action which they have adopted for the appli-
cation of legal acts of the Community relating to the 
common agricultural policy insofar as those acts have 
financial consequences for the Fund. 
2.  Without prejudice to the supervision effected by 
Member States in accordance with national provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 
or to the provisions of  Article 206 of  the Treaty, or to 
any  inspection  organized  on  the  basis  of Article 
209  (c)  of the  Treaty,  officials  appointed  by  the 
Commission to carry out inspections on the spot shall 
have  access  to the  books  and all  other documents 
relating to expenditure financed  by the  Fund. They 
may in particular check: 
(a) whether administrative practices are in accordance 
with Community rules; 
(b) whether the requisite supporting documents exist 
and  tally  with  the  transactions  financed  by  the 
Fund; 
(c)  the conditions under which transactions financed 
by the Fund are carried out and checked. 
The  Commission  shall  give  due  notice  before  the 
inspection is  carried out to the  Member State con-
cerned or to the Member State on whose territory it is 
to take place. Officials of the Member State concerned 
may take part in the inspection. 
At  the  request  of the  Commission  and  with  the 
agreement  of  the  Member  State,  inspections  or 
inquiries  concerning  the  transactions  referred  to  in 
this Regulation shall be carried out by the competent 
authorities  of that  Member  State.  Officials  of the 
Commission may also participate. 
To make verification more effective the Commission 
may,  with  the  agreement  of  the  Member  States 
concerned,  arrange for administrative  authorities of 
those States to participate in certain inspections and 
inquiries. 
3.  The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal  from  the  Commission,  shall  as  far  as  is 
necessary lay down general rules for the application 
of this Article.' 
2.  Regulation concerning irregularities and the recovery of  sums wrongly paid 
Article 9 of Regulation No 729/70 can be applied without the need for implementing measures. 
On the other hand, Article 8 of this regulation states-in paragraph 3-that the Council shall 
lay down general rules for the application thereof. On 15 October 1970 the Commission submitted 
a proposal that was  examined by Parliament on 2 December 1972.  The Council decision was 
taken on 7 February 1972.
1 The text reads as follows: 
'THE COUNCIL 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community; 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
729/70
2  of 21  April  1970  on  the  financing  of the 
common agricultural policy, and in particular Article 
8 (3) thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Par-
liament; 
Whereas  Article  8  of Regulation  (EEC)  No 729/70 
lays  down  the  principles  according  to  which  the 
Community intends to intensify the campaign against 
irregularities and recover the sums lost and whereas, 
in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article,  the 
1  OJ No L 36, 10 February 1972. 
2  OJ No L 94, 28 April 1970, p. 13. 
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Council must adopt general rules for the application 
thereof; 
Whereas in order that the Community may be better 
informed of the measures taken by Member States to 
combat irregularities,  the  national provisions  to  be 
communicated to the Commission should be specified; 
Whereas with a view to learning the nature of fraud-
ulent practices and the financial effects or irregularities 
and to recovering sums wrongly paid, provision should 
be made for irregularities to be communicated to the 
Commission  every  quarter;  whereas  such  commu-
nication must be supplemented by information on the 
progress  of judicial  or  administrative  procedures 
undertaken with a view to recovery; 
Whereas Member States and the Commission should 
cooperate  more  closely in order to prevent irregular-
ities, although great discretion should be exercised in 
this respect; Whereas the overall results should be communicated 
to  the  Committee  of  the  European  Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund every quarter and to 
the Council and the European Parliament annually; 
Whereas  in  this  connection  it is  necessary,  mainly 
by reason of the  particular criteria used  for  calcu-
lating Community financing, to waive transfer to the 
Community of any sums recovered by Member States 
in respect of expenditure eligible for refund under the 
Guarantee Section and relating to accounting periods 
prior to 1 July 1967; 
Whereas  aid granted by the  Commission under the 
Guidance Section of the Fund for projects within the 
meaning  of Article  13  of Council  Regulation  No 
17/64/EEC1  of 5 February 1964 on .. he conditions for 
obtaining aid from the European Agricultural Guid-
ance  and  Guarantee  Fund,  as  last  amended  by 
Regulations (EEC) No 728/702 and (EEC) No 729/70,3 
is  not covered by this  Regulation  by reason of the 
different nature of that expenditure; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
The measures referred to in this Regulation relate to 
all  expenditure by the European Agricultural Guid-
ance  and  Guarantee  Fund,  hereinafter  called  the 
'Fund'. 
However, this Regulation does not cover expenditure 
connected with projects within the meaning of Article 
13  of Regulation  No  17/64/EEC  or with  common 
measures  provided  for  in  Article  6  of Regulation 
(EEC) No 729/70, where the Council has adopted for 
such  measures  specific  procedural provisions  which 
differ from the provisions of Article 8 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 729/70. 
Article 2 
1.  Member States shall communicate to the Com-
mission within three months of the entry into force 
of this Regulation: 
- the  provisions  laid down  by law,  regulation  or 
administrative  action  for  the  application  of the 
measures  provided for  in Article 8 (1)  of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 729/70, and 
- the  list  of  authorities  and  bodies  responsible 
for  the  application  of those  measures  and  the 
main provisions relating to the role and functioning 
of those  authorities  and  bodies  and  the  pro-
cedures which  they are responsible for applying. 
2.  Member States shall communicate to the Commis-
sion without delay any amendments to the informa-
1  OJ No 34, 27 February 1964, p. 586. 
2  OJ No L 94, 28 April 1970, p. 9. 
3  OJ No L 94, 28 April 1970, p. 13. 
tion  supplied  in pursuance of the  preceeding  para-
graph. 
3.  The  Commission  shall  study  Member  States' 
communications and shall inform the Fund Commit-
tee of the  conclusions  which it draws  therefrom. It 
shall keep in contact with the Member States, where 
appropriate  within  the  Fund  Committee,  to  the 
extent necessary for  the application of this  Article. 
Article 3 
During the month following the end of each quarter, 
Member States shall communicate to the Commission 
a list of irregularities which have been the subject of 
- the primary administrative or judicial findings of fact. 
To this end they shall as far as possible give detailed 
information concerning: 
- the provision which has been infringed; 
- the nature and amount of the expenditure; 
- the common organization of the market and the 
products or measures concerned; 
- the period during which or the moment at which 
the irregularity was committed; 
- the practices  adopted in  committing the  irregu-
larity; 
- the  manner  in  which  the  irregularity  was  dis-
covered; 
- the national authorities of bodies which recorded 
the irregularity; and 
- the  financial  consequences  and  possibilities  of 
recovery. 
Where  some  of this  information,  and  in  particular 
that concerning the practices adopted in committing 
the  irregularity  and the  manner in which  this  was 
discovered,  is  not available,  Member States shall as 
far as  possible supply the missing information when 
forwarding subsequent quarterly lists of irregularities 
to the Commission. 
Article 4 
Each Member State shall communicate without delay 
to  the  other  Member  States  concerned  and to  the 
Commission  any  irregularities  which  are  liable  to 
have effects outside its territory very quickly or which 
show that a new fraudulent practice has been adopted. 
Article 5 
1.  During  the  month  following  the  end  of each 
quarter, Member States shall inform the Commission 
of all judicial or administrative procedures instituted 
with  a  view  to  recovering  sums  wrongly  paid and 
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which is relevant in this respect. 
2.  At the  same  intervals  the  Commission  shall  be 
informed of the  progress  of the  procedure  referred 
to  in  the  preceding  paragraph  and of the  amounts 
which  have  been  or are  expected  to  be  recovered, 
and, where appropriate, of the reason for abandoning 
legal proceedings. 
3.  Furthermore, as far as possible before a decision 
is  given,  the Commission shall be informed in detail 
of the  reasons  for  partial  or  complete  failure  to 
recover sums due. 
4.  Where  a  judicial  or  administrative  decision  is 
given  at the end of the proceedings,  Member States 
shall communicate that decision  or the main points 
thereof to the Commission. 
Article 6 
1.  Where  the  Commission  considers  that  irregu-
larities or negligence have taken place in one or more 
Member  States,  it  shall  inform  the  Member  State 
or States concerned thereof, and that State or those 
States shall hold an administrative inquiry in which 
servants of the Commission may take part. 
The Member State shall communicate to  the  Com-
mission  the  report  and the  inquiry findings.  If the 
Commission does not take part in the inquiry, it shall 
be  kept  informed  of its  progress  by  means  of the 
quarterly communications provided for in Article  5. 
2.  Where the inquiry does not show that there has 
been an irregularity or negligence, the Fund Commit-
tee shall be informed of the results of the inquiry and 
where appropriate shall study its implications for the 
Community. The Member State in question shall then 
have one month in which  to make known its  final 
reasoned position in the light of the study made by 
the Fund Committee. 
3.  Where the inquiry shows that there has been an 
irregularity or negligence,  or where  this  is  accepted 
by the Member State concerned following the proce-
dure referred to in paragraph 2,  the  Member State 
shall institute as rapidly as possible an administrative 
or judicial procedure to establish formally that there 
has been an irregularity or negligence. It shall keep 
the  Commission  informed  of the  progress  of the 
procedure  in  accordance  with  Articles  3,  4  and  5. 
Article 7 
1.  The Commission shall maintain appropriate con-
tacts with the Member States concerned for the pur-
pose  of supplementing  the  information supplied on 
the  irregularities  referred  to  in  Article  3,  on  the 
procedures referred to in Article 5,  and, in particular, 
on the possibility of recovery. 
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2.  Without  prejudice  to  such  contact,  the  matter 
shall be put before the Fund Committee where the 
nature of the irregularity is  such  as  to suggest that 
identical  or  similar  practices  could  occur  in  other 
Member States. 
3.  Furthermore  the  Commission  shall  organize 
meetings  at  Community  level  for  the  appropriate 
representatives  of the  Member  States  in  order  to 
examine with  them the information obtained under 
Articles 3, 4 and 5 and paragraph 1 above, in particular 
with regard to  the lessons  to  be  learned from it in 
connection  with  irregularities,  preventive  measures 
and legal  proceedings.  As  far  as  necessary  it shall 
keep the Fund Committee informed of this work and 
shall consult that Committee regarding any proposals 
which  it  intends  to  submit  to  the  Council  for  the 
prevention of irregularities. 
4.  At the request of a  Member State or, under the 
arrangements laid down in paragraph 3, of the Com-
mission, the Member States shall consult each other 
where  appropriate  within  the  Fund  Committee  or 
any other competent body, for the purpose of closing 
any  gaps  which  become  apparent in  the  course  of 
application of  provisions in force and which prejudice 
Community interests. 
Article 8 
The Fund Committee shall be informed every quarter 
by the Commission of the order of magnitude of the 
sums  involved in the irregularities which have been 
discovered,  and of the various  categories  of irregu-
larity, broken down by type and with a statement of 
the number. In a special chapter of the annual report 
on the  administration of the Fund, provided for in 
Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70, the Com-
mission  shall  give  the number of cases  which  have 
been notified and of those which have been closed, 
together with the sums recovered and the sums written 
off. 
Article 9 
Member  States  and  the  Commission  shall  take  all 
necessary precautions to ensure that the information 
which they exchange remains confidential. 
Article 10 
Where the Guidance Section of the Fund has entered 
only partly into the financing of a project and in cases 
of partial  recovery,  the  financial  consequences  of 
irregularities or negligence which cannot be charged 
to  the  administrative  authorities  or  bodies  of  a 
Member State shall be shared by that Member State 
and the Fund in proportion to their financial partic-
ipation. Article 11 
Where the irregularities  relate  to sums of less  than 
1000 u.a.,  Member  States  shall  not  forward  the 
information provided for in Articles 3 and 5 to the 
Commission unless the latter has expressly requested 
it. 
Article 12 
1.  Without prejudice to Member States' obligation 
to  recover  sums  wrongly  paid,  irregularities  and 
negligence  relating  to  the  accounting  periods  from 
1962/63  to  1966/67  shall  not  entail  repayment  by 
Member States to the Community. 
2.  With  regard  to  irregularities  and  negligence 
which  relate  to the period from  1 July  1967  to  31 
December  1970,  Member  States  shall  declare  the 
amounts concerned in their claims for reimbursement, 
the detailed rules for which are to be adopted pursuant 
to  Article  9  and  10  of Regulation  No  17/64/EEC. 
3.  Irregularities  and  negligence  relating  to  expen-
diture by the Guidance Section of the  Fund before 
the  entry  into  force  of this  Regulation,  with  the 
exception  of  the  expenditure  on  projects  under 
Article  13  of Regulation  No  17/64/EEC,  must  be 
notified  to  the  Commission.  Member  States  shall 
forward  information  to  the  Commission  regarding 
the irregularity or negligence recorded. 
Article 13 
Before the end of 1972  the Commission shall report 
to the Council on the application of this Regulation. 
This  Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States. 
It should be noted that the text adopted by the Council does not afford the Commission the full 
range of possibilities it wished to reserve for itself in its proposal: 
- The Commission is kept informed in certain specific cases; in others it will itself solicit infor-
mation from the Member States; 
- not being required to deliver an opinion on Member States' legislation, the Commission will 
find it less easy to promote harmonization of existing national provisions; 
- the Council did not agree that the Commission should be allowed to intervene or be represented 
in administrative and judicial procedures; 
- the Commission will not be allowed to give its approval prior to the completion of procedures 
that would curtail the recovery of sums paid. 
3.  Mutual assistance in connection with levies and the recovery of  sums paid in error 
Regulation 283/72 had been in force for less than a year when difficulties arose due to the lack 
of coordination between the  national legislations. On 15  December 1972 the Commission sub-
mitted a proposal for a directive to the Council on mutual assistance for the recovery of sums 
paid in error in the framework of the common agricultural policy and of agricultural levies and 
customs duties. This proposal calls for two comments: 
- it could have been included in Chapter IV of this report since it als·o  relates to the European 
Communities' own resources; 
- it can be compared to the agreement referred to in Chapter IV on mutual assistance by the 
customs  authorities of the six  Member States,  although this  agreement has a  number of 
limitations, as will be seen later. 
The proposed directive was approved by Parliament on 16 March 1973. 
91 (a)  Explanatory memorandum 
'A clear  need  has  arisen  for  common  rules  on  the 
recovery of certain claims for repayment in a Member 
State other than that in which they were substantiated. 
If Community regulations are to be properly adminis-
tered,  it must be  assured that they are applied in a 
consistent manner throughout the Community. More 
specifically, whenever a claim to repayment in favour 
of public authorities is established by a  Community 
regulation,  the implementation  of this  regulation  is 
thwarted if recovery  cannot be effected  in  any one 
Member State. The present situation is  that recovery 
can be effected in  the Member State where the claim 
was substantiated but not in any other. 
One consequence of this situation is that it prejudices 
the  recovery  of customs  duties,  levies  and  other 
charges  of equivalent  effect  introduced  under  the 
common agricultural policy, and also the recovery of 
sums paid in error by the EAGGF. 
Article  8  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  729/70  of the 
Council of 21  April 1970 on the financing of the com-
mon  agricultural  policy1  provides  that  Member 
States  shall  take  the necessary  measures  to  recover 
sums lost as a result of irregularities and negligence. 
On 7  February  1972,  the Council  adopted  the first 
implementing regulation (Regulation (EEC) No 283/-
72 of the Council of 7 February 1972,  OJ No L 36, 
10 February 1972, p. 1), providing in particular for an 
exchange  of information  between  the  Commission 
and the  Member  States  on irregularities  and negli-
gence and on the procedures for recovering the sums 
involved. 
However,  this  regulation  does  not include any pro-
vision  for  the  recovery,  in  another  Member  State, 
of sums paid in error under the EAGGF. 
Although  legislation  in  each  of the  Member  States 
provides for  the recovery of claims duly established 
within  the  country,  this  does  not  apply  to  claims 
established in another Member State. Member States 
cannot  at  present  recover  amounts  paid  by  the 
EAGGF if the debtor or his distrainable assets are in 
another  Member  State.  What  makes  the  situation 
particularly serious is  that the parties concerned can 
use  export licences  which  are  valid  throughout the 
Community and not simply in the Member State where . 
their business is  based. The situation is  similar with 
regard to aids, premiums, etc  ... 
This situation is  clearly detrimental to the EAGG  F 
which,  in accordance  with  Article  8  of Regulation 
(EEC) No 729/70, bears the financial consequences of 
irregularities  or  negligence,  save  where  these  are 
attributable to national administrative authorities or 
other bodies. It  also jeopardizes the proper implemen-
tation  of Community  regulations  and  their  equal 
application to all parties concerned. 
~ OJ No L 94, 28 April 1970, p. 13. 
OJ No C 2, 8 January 1970 p. 25. 
3  OJ No C  12,  30 January 1970,  p. 9. 
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The situation is  exactly the same with regard to the 
recovery of agricultural levies.  Even if non-recovery 
of these levies  does  not adversely affect Community 
revenue, since recorded own resources are now made 
available  to  the  Community,  it  still  means  that 
Community provisions are not applied in full. 
The upshot is  that  the  Community  regulations  are 
not applied  equally  to  all  parties  concerned,  which 
leads to distortion of competition, and that the prin-
ciple  of  a  single  agricultural  market  is  .  partially 
waived. This concept requires not only that the same 
provisions should apply in all Member States, but also 
that they should apply in exactly the same manner to 
all  parties  concerned,  wherever  they  are  based.  It 
seems  incompatible  with  this  principle  that  agri-
cultural  levies  cannot  be  recovered  because  the 
debtor is based, or his distrainable assets are situated 
outside  the  creditor  Member  State.  This  holds  all 
the more true in that existing regulations, especially 
those  governing import and export licences,  clearly 
encourage  the  internationalization  of  commercial 
transactions in  agriculture. Just as  internal frontiers 
must  be  abolished  for  economic  and  commercial 
activities,  so  too they must disappear as  far as  the 
administrative  and  customs  consequences  of these 
activities  are  concerned.  The  very  existence  of a 
customs union, and respect for the principle of equal 
treatment under customs law,  thus require that cus-
toms  duties  should be  recoverable in each  Member 
State of the Community, no matter where they were 
actually substantiated.' 
(b)  Text of  the proposed directive 
'THE COUNCIL OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community and in  particular Articles  43 
and 100 thereof; 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
729/70  of 21  April  1970  on  the  financing  of the 
common agricultural policy1 and in particular Article 
8 (3) thereof; 
Having  regard  to  the  Opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament;2 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee;3 
Whereas it is not at present possible to enforce in one 
Member State a  claim  for  repayment  substantiated 
by a document drawn up by the authorities of  another 
Member State; Whereas the fact that national provisions relatmg to 
recovery  are  only  applicable  within  national  terri-
tories is in itself an obstacle to the establishment and 
functioning of the common market; whereas,  in the 
specific  case  of  the  common  agricultural  policy, 
this situation prevents the rules  on agriculture from 
being applied fully and fairly; 
Whereas it is  therefore necessary to adopt common 
rules on mutual assistance for recovery; 
Whereas those rules should apply in respect of sums 
paid in error in connection with the common agri-
cultural policy,  and in respect of agricultural levies 
and customs duties; 
Whereas  it  is  necessary  to  lay  down  conditions 
governing the formulation of  applications for recovery 
particularly as  regards  the documents required,  and 
to stipulate recovery must be effected in accordance 
with the laws  and regulations in the State in which 
the receiving authority is situated; 
Whereas  the  person  concerned  may  commence 
proceedings  to contest  the  claim  for  repayment  or 
the enforcement thereof;  whereas,  in  such case,  the 
receiving  authority  can  suspend  proceedings  for 
enforcement unless the applicant authority has stated 
that  all  time  limits  for  contesting  the  claim  for 
repayment have expired; 
Whereas  the  receiving  authority  must  be  able  to 
authorize  deferment  of  payment  or  payment  by 
instalments and to take protective measures; whereas, 
however,  the  claims  for  repayment  must  not  have 
any preference or priority in the state in which  the 
receiving authority is situated; 
Whereas  it  is  necessary  to  determine  under  what 
circumstances  the receiving authority should not be 
bound  to  grant  the  assistance  requested  and effect 
recovery;  whereas  an application from an applicant 
authority need not be granted if it would be contrary 
to public policy in the state where the request is made 
or if the  applicant  authority has  not exhausted  all 
available  means  of recovery  in  its  own  territory; 
Whereas  this  Directive  should  not  curtail  mutual 
assistance  between  certain  Member  States  under 
bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements; 
whereas  detailed  rules  for  the  application  of this 
Directive  should  be  adopted  by  the  Council  on  a 
proposal from the Commission; 
HAS  ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
This Directive lays down the rules to be incorporated 
in the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States for the recovery of debts of the 
kind specified in Article 2. 
Article 2 
This Directive shall apply in respect of duly substan-
tiated rights to the repayment of: 
(a) sums paid in error in connection with the common 
agricultural policy; 
(b) levies,  premiums,  supplementary  and  compen-
satory  amounts,  additional  amounts  and  com-
ponents and other charges imposed by the insti-
tutions of the  Communities  on trade with non-
member countries in connection with the common 
agricultural  policy  and levies  and  other charges 
provided  for  in  connection  with  the  common 
organization of the market in sugar; 
(c)  Common Customs Tariff duties and other charges 
imposed  by institutions  of the  Communities  on 
trade with non-member countries; 
(d) interests and costs in connection with the above-
mentioned debts. 
Article 3 
For the purposes of this Directive, 'applicant author-
ity'  means  an  authority  in  a  Member  State  which 
makes  an  application  for  assistance  and  'receiving 
authority'  means  the  authority in  another  Member 
State  to  which  the  application  for  assistance  is 
submitted. 
Article 4 
At the request of  the applicant authority, the receiving 
authority  shall  serve  and  give  formal  notice  of all 
instruments  and  decisions  relating  to  the  recovery 
of the debt. 
Article 5 
1.  At  the  request  of the  applicant  authority,  the 
receiving  authority shall,  where  the  document sub-
stantiating the right to  repayment renders  it enfor-
ceable, effect recovery of the debt. 
2.  Recovery  may not be requested if the  right  to 
repayment or the document rendering it enforceable 
is  being  contested  under  the  law  of the  Member 
State  in  which  the  applicant  authority  is  situated. 
3.  The application for recovery shall be accompanied 
by an official copy or a certified copy of  the document 
rendering  the  right  to  repayment  enforceable  and, 
where appropriate, by the original or a certified copy 
of terms  and  conditions  on  which  the  debt  was 
guaranteed. 
4.  The applicant  authority shall  forward  all  other 
relevant documents and information to the receiving 
authority.  Where  the judgement or decision  giving 
rise to the right to repayment is final,  the applicant 
authority  shall  state  this  fact  in  its  application. 
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laws, regulations and administrative provisions appli-
cable in respect of similar claims in the Member State 
in  which  the  receiving  authority  is  situated.  The 
document rendering the right to  repayment enforce-
able  shall,  where  appropriate,  be  authenticated., 
recognized or supplemented by a document rendering 
it enforceable in the territory of the Member State in 
which the receiving authority is situated. 
6.  Repayment  of the  debt  shall  be  made  in  the 
currency of the Member State in which the receiving 
authority is situated. 
Article 6 
1.  Where  the  right  to  repayment  is  contested, 
proceedings shall be commenced by the person con-
cerned before the competent authority of the Member 
State  in  which  the  applicant  authority  is  situated, 
in  accordance with  the laws  and regulations of that 
state.  The person concerned at the same  time  shall 
give notice of the proceedings to the receiving author-
ity. 
- If the applicant authority states in its application 
that the judgment or decision  giving  rise  to  the 
right to repayment is final, the receiving authority 
may  only  suspend  proceedings  for  enforcement 
if so requested by the applicant authority. 
- If the  applicant  authority  does  not  state  in  its 
application that the judgment or decision  giving 
rise to the right to repayment is final, the receiving 
authority shall  suspend proceedings  for  enforce-
ment  procedure  pending  the  decision  of  the 
competent authority; the receiving authority may 
take protective measures to secure the repayment 
of the debt. 
2.  However,  where  it is  the enforcement measures 
in the Member State in which the receiving authority 
is  situated  that are  contested,  proceedings  shall  be 
commenced before the competent court or tribunal of 
that Member State, in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of that state. 
Article 7 
The  recetvmg  authority  may,  where  the  relevant 
provisions  allow  this,  and  by  agreement  with  the 
applicant  authority,  grant  the  debtor  deferment  of 
payment  or  authorize  payment  by  instalments. 
Article 8 
Rights  to  repayment  shall  have  no  preference  or 
priority in the  Member State in which the receiving 
authority is situated. 
Article 9 
On the request of  the applicant authority, the receiving 
authority shall  take protective measures.  The provi-
sions of Articles 5 and 6 shall be applicable 'mutatis 
mutandis'. 
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Article 10 
The receiving authority shall be bound to: 
(a) grant the assistance provided for in this Directive 
if enforcement of the right to repayment would be 
contrary to public policy in its country. 
(b) undertake recovery of the debt where the applicant 
authority has not exhausted  all  available  means 
of recovery in its own territory. 
Reasons must be given for any refusal of assistance. 
Article 11 
The  instruments  and  documents  forwarded  to  the 
receiving authority may be used only for the purpose 
of this Directive. 
Article 12 
The  Member  States  waive  all  claims  against  each 
other for  reimbursement of costs  arising out of the 
application of this Directive. 
However,  the  Member State in which  the applicant 
authority is  situated shall  be liable to the receiving 
authority  for  the  pecuniary  consequences  of  any 
proceedings  commenced at its  request by the  latter 
authority  which  are  pronounced  to  be  unfounded. 
Article 13 
The Council, acting on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, shall lay down detailed rules for the provision of 
assistance, on the conversion and transfer of the sums 
recovered,  on the  fixing  of a  minimum  amount in 
respect  of sums  to  be  recovered  and  on  all  other 
related matters. 
Article 14 
This  Directive  shall  not  affect  any  more  extensive 
measures of mutual assistance which are now or may 
in  the future  be  applied  by certain  Member  States 
by virtue of agreements or arrangements. 
The provisions relating to such agreements or arrange-
ments shall be notified to the Commission which shall 
inform the other Member States thereof. 
Article 15 
The  Member  States  shall not later than  . . •  bring 
into force  the  measures  necessary  to  comply  with 
this  Directive. 
Article 16 
Each Member State shall inform the Commission of 
the provisions which it has adopted to implement this 
Directive. The Commission shall forward this infor-
mation to the other Member States. 
Article 17 
This  Directive is  addressed  to the  Member States.' CHAPTER IV 
CONTROL OF THE COMMUNITIES' OWN RESOURCES 
On 21  April 1970, the Council, applying Article 201  of the EEC Treaty, decided to replace the 
contributions from Member States by  what are  known as  the Communities'  'own resources'. 
This decision also  laid down that the financial  regulations would  specify  how these resources 
were to be collected and checked, paid over and made available to the Commission. 
These resources-at present, agricultural levies and customs duties-later, value added tax-are 
collected by the Member States on behalf of the Communities. The question, therefore, was how 
to share the task of controlling these resources. 
By  Regulation No 2/71, the Council made the Member States' administrations responsible for 
control, leaving the Community institutions no more than the possibility of exercising 'supple-
mentary' controls to verify that sums due had been properly substantiated and collected. 
Because of the nature of own resources, a good many Community measures, necessary in them-
selves, were related directly to the finances of the Communities. In this connection, the manage-
ment of the customs union assumes a distinctive aspect.  The same applies to organizations of 
agricultural markets based, as far as external relations are concerned, on levies. 
It remains to be seen how provisions already adopted or to be adopted in the future with regard 
to control can be applied to the value added tax. 
The background documentation for this chapter may be arranged as· follows: 
I  - The budget revenue of the European Communities: 
1.  The decision of 21  Aprill970 creating the European Communities' own 
resources 
2.  Resources derived from new Member States 
3.  Other available resources 
II  -The Regulation implementing the Decision of 21  Aprill970 
III - Provisions governing the control of the Communities' own resources: 
1.  The harmonization of customs legislation 
95 2.  The agreement on mutual assistance between the customs authorities of 
the six Member States 
3.  Control exercised by the Communities 
4.  The recovery of debts 
Section I - Budget revenue of the European Communities 
This section deals  only with sources  of budget revenue  other than the ECSC  levy  and funds 
placed at the disposal of the Associated African States and Madagascar. 
At the present time, the Communities' budget revenue is governed by various texts which empha-
size the temporary nature of current financial provisions. 
These  basic texts  will  be found below,  complete with the corresponding totals from the  draft 
budget for the financial year 1973.
1 
1.  The Decision of  21  April 1970 creating the European Communities' own resources 
Article 1 
The  Communities  shall  be  allocated  resources  of 
their own in accordance with the following articles in 
order  to  ensure  that  their  budget  is  in  balance. 
Article 2 
From 1 January 1971, revenue from: 
(a) levies,  premiums,  additional  or  compensatory 
amounts,  additional  amounts  or  factors  and 
other duties  established  or to be established  by 
the  institutions  of the  Communities  in  respect 
of trade with  non-member  countries  within  the 
framework  of the  common  agricultural  policy, 
and also contributions and other duties provided 
for  within  the  framework  of  the  organization 
of the markets in sugar (hereinafter called 'agri-
cultural levies'): 
Contributions and other duties provided for within the framework of the 
organization of the markets in sugar amount to: 
Belgium 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
12 000 000 u.a. 
38 000 000 
75 000 000 
11 000 000 
12 000 000 
148 000 000 u.a. 
1  The budget for the 1973 financial year had still not been published in February. Norway's failure to join the Communities made it  necessary 
to draw up an amendatory budget for both revenue and expenditure. This amendatory budget is under consideration. 
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or factors and other duties established by the institutions of  the Communities 
in respect of trade with non-member countries within the framework of the 
common agricultural policy amount to: 
Belgium 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
(b) Common Customs Tariff duties and other duties 
established or to be established by the institutions 
of the  Communities  in  respect  of  trade  with 
77 210 000 u.a. 
166 370 000 
61  000 000 
239 700 000 
120 000 
142 700 000 
687 100 000 u.a. 
non-member  countries  (hereinafter  called  'cus-
toms duties'); 
Customs duties and other duties mentioned in Article 2 (b) of the Council's 
Decision of  21  April1970 amount to: 
Belgium 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
shall,  in accordance  with Article  3,  constitute  own 
resources  to  be entered in the budget of the Com-
munities. 
In  addition,  revenue  accruing  from  other  charges 
introduced within the framework of a common policy 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community or 
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community  shall  constitute  own  resources  to  be 
entered in the budget, of the Communities, subject to 
the procedure laid down in Article 201  of the Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Com-
munity having been followed. 
Article 3 
1.  From  1  January  1971,  the  total  revenue  from 
agricultural levies shall be entered in the budget of  the 
Communities. 
From the  same  date,  revenue  from  customs  duties 
shall  be  progressively  entered in  the  budget of the 
Communities. 
The amount of the customs  duties  appropriated to 
the Communities  each year  by  each  Member  State 
shall be equal to the difference  between a  reference 
109 697 500 u.a. 
511  182 500 
311 000 000 
214 000 000 
3 270 000 
154 750 000 
1 303 900 000 u.a. 
amount  and  the  amount  of the  agricultural  levies 
appropriated  to  the  Communities  pursuant  to  the 
first subparagraph. Where this difference is  negative, 
there shall be no payment of customs duties by the 
Member State concerned nor payment of agricultural 
levies by the Communities. 
The reference  amount referred  to in  the third sub-
paragraph shall be: 
50  %in 1971 
62.5% in 1972 
75  %in 1973 
87.5% in 1974 and 
100  % from 1 January 1975 onwards 
of the  total  amount of the  agricultural  levies  and 
customs  duties  collected  by  each  Member  State. 
The Communities shall refund to each Member State 
10%  of the  amounts  paid in  accordance  with  the 
preceding subparagraphs in  order to cover  expense 
incurred in collection. 
2.  During the period from  1 January  1971  to  31 
December  1974,  the  financial  contributions  from 
Member States required in order to ensure that the 
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apportioned on the following scale: 
-Belgium  6.8 
- Federal Republic 
of Germany  32.9 
-France  32.6 
-Italy  20.2 
- Luxembourg  0.2 
- Netherlands  7.3 
3.  During the same period, however,  the variation 
from year to year in the share of each Member State 
in the aggregate of the amounts paid in accordance 
with paragraphs 1 and 2 may not exceed 1% upwards 
or 1.5% downwards, where these amounts are taken 
into  consideration  within  the  framework  of  the 
second subparagraph. For 1971,  the financial contri-
butions  of  each  Member  State  to  the  combined 
budgets for  1970  shall be taken as  reference for the 
application  of this  rule,  to  the  extent  that  these 
budgets are taken into consideration within the frame-
work of the second subparagraph. 
In  the  application  of the  first  subparagraph,  the 
following  factors  shall  be  taken  into  consideration 
for each financial year: 
(a) expenditure  relating  to  payment  appropriations 
decided on for the financial year in question for the 
research and investment budget of the European 
Atomic  Energy  Community,  with  the  exception 
of expenditure  relating  to  supplementary  pro-
grammes; 
(b) expenditure  relating  to  appropriations  to  the 
European Social Fund; 
(c)  for  the  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and 
Guarantee  Fund, expenditure  relating  to  appro-
priations  to  the  Guarantee  Section  and  to  the 
Guidance  Section,  with  the  exception  of appro-
priations  entered or  re-entered  for  accounting 
periods  preceding  the  financial  year  concerned. 
For  the  reference  year  1970,  such  expenditure 
shall be:  · 
- for the Guarantee Section, that referred to in 
Article  8  of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
728/70 of  21  April1970 laying down additional 
provisions  for  financing  the  common  agri-
cultural policy; 
- for  the  Guidance Section,  an amount of 285 
million  units  of account  apportioned  on the 
basis of the scale laid down in Article 7 of that 
Regulation; 
it being understood that, for calculating the share 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, a percentage 
of 31.5  shall  be  taken  as  the  reference  scale; 
(d) other expenditure  relating  to  the  appropriations 
entered in the budget of the Communities. 
Should the application of this  paragraph to one or 
more Member States result in a deficit in the budget 
of the Communities, the amount of that deficit shall 
be shared for the year in  question among the other 
Member  States  within  the  limits  laid  down  in  the 
first  subparagraph  and  according  to  the  scale  of 
contributions laid down in Paragraph 2.  If necessary, 
the operation shall be repeated. 
The contributions provided for in Article 3 (2  and· 3)  of the Decision of 
21  Apri11970 amount to: 
Belgium 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
4.  Financing from the Communities' own resources 
of  the  expenditure  connected  with  research  pro-
grammes  of the European Atomic Energy  Commu-
nity  shall  not  exclude  entry  in  the  budget  of the 
Communities of expenditure relating to supplemen-
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113 800 410 u.a. 
502 516 213 
579 709 860 
342 892 010 
4 006 622 
86 094 043 
1 629 019 158 u.a. 
tary programmes or the financing of such expenditure 
by  means  of financial  contributions  from  Member 
States  determined according to a  special scale fixed 
by a unanimous decision of the Council. The contributions provided for in Articles 3 (4) and 4 (6) of the Decision of 
21  April 1970 amount to: 
Belgium 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
5.  By  way of derogation from this  Article,  appro-
priations entered in a  budget preceding that for the 
financial  year  1971  and  carried  over  or  re-entered 
in a later budget shall be financed by financial contri-
butions  from  Member  States  according  to  scales 
applicable at the time of their first entry. 
Appropriations  to  the  Guidance  Section  which, 
although entered for the first  time in the budget for 
1971,  refer  to  accounting  periods  of the  European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund preceding 
1 January 1971 shall be covered by the scale relating to 
those periods.  1 
Article 4 
1.  From 1 January 1975, the budget of the Commu-
nities shall, irrespective of other revenue, be financed 
entirely from the Communities' own resources. 
Such  resources  shall  include  those  referred  to  in 
Article 2 and also those accruing from the value added 
tax and obtained by applying a rate not exceeding 1% 
to  an  assessment  basis  which  is  determined  in  a 
uniform  manner  for  Member  States  according  to 
Community rules.  The rate shall be fixed  within the 
framework  of the  budgetary  procedure.  If at  the 
beginning of a financial year the budget has not yet 
been adopted, the rate previously fixed  shall remain 
applicable until the entry into  force  of a  new  rate. 
During the period from 1 January 1975 to 31  Decem-
ber 1977, however, the variation from year to year in 
the  share  of each  Member  State in  relation  to  the 
preceding  year  may  not  exceed  2%.  Should  this 
percentage  be  exceeded,  the  necessary  adjustment 
shall be made, within that variation limit, by financial 
compensation  among the  Member States concerned 
proportionate to the share borne by each of them in 
respect  of revenue  accruing  from value  added  tax 
or from  the  financial  contributions  referred  to  in 
paragraphs  2  and 3. 
2.  By  way  of  derogation  from  the  second  sub-
paragraph of paragraph 1,  if on 1 January 1975  the 
1  See 3 (b) below. 
131  842.56 u.a. 
1 059 453.95 
30 344.64 
680 039.74 
2 893.92 
666 277.19 
2 570 852.00 
rules determining the uniform basis for assessing the 
value  added  tax  have  not  yet  been  applied  in  all 
Member States but have been applied in at least three 
of them,  the financial  contribution to the budget of 
the Communities to be made by each Member State 
not yet applying the uniform basis for assessing the 
value added tax shall be determined according to the 
proportion of its  gross  national product to the sum 
total of the gross  national products of the  Member 
States. The balance of the budget shall be covered by 
revenue accruing from the value added tax in accor-
dance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, 
collected by the other Member States. This derogation 
shall cease to be effective  as  soon as  the conditions 
laid down in Paragraph 1 are fulfilled. 
3.  By  way  of  derogation  from  the  second  sub-
paragraph of paragraph 1,  if on 1 January 1975  the 
rules determining the uniform basis for assessing the 
value added tax have not yet been applied in three or 
more  Member  States,  the  financial  contribution  of 
each Member State to the budget of the Communities 
shall be determined according to the proportion of its 
gross national product to the sum total of the gross 
national products of the Member States.  This dero-
gation shall cease to be effective as soon as the con-
ditions laid down in paragraphs 1 or 2 are fulfilled. 
4.  For the purpose of paragraphs  2  and 3,  'gross 
national product' means the gross national product at 
market prices. 
5.  From  the  time  of complete application  of the 
second subparagraph of paragraph 1,  any surplus of 
the  Communities'  own  resources  over  the  actual 
expenditure during a  financial  year shall be carried 
over to the following financial year. 
6.  Financing  expenditure  connected  with  research 
programmes of the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity from the Communities' own  resources  shall 
not exclude entry in the budget of the Communities 
of expenditure relating to supplementary programmes 
or the  financing  of such  expenditure  by  means  of 
financial  contributions  from  Member  States  deter-
mined according to a special scale fixed pursuant to a 
decision of the Council acting unanimously. 
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The revenue referred to in Articles 2,  3 (1  and 2)  and 
4 (1  to 5)  shall be used without distinction to finance 
all expenditure entered in the budget of the Commu-
nities  in  accordance  with  Article  20  of the  Treaty 
establishing a single Council and a single Commission 
of the European Communities. 
Article 6 
1.  The Community resources referred in Articles 2, 
3 and 4 shall be collected by the Member States in 
accordance with national provisions imposed by law 
regulation or administrative action, which shall, where 
necessary,  be  amended  for  that  purpose.  Member 
States  shall  make  these  resources  available  to  the 
Commission. 
2.  Without  prejudice  to  the  auditing  of accounts 
provided for in Article 206 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community or to the inspec-
tion arrangements made pursuant to Article 209  (c) 
of that treaty, the Council shall, acting unanimously 
on a proposal of the Commission and after consulting 
the  European Parliament,  adopt provisions  relating 
to the supervision of collection, the making available 
to  the Commission and the payment of the revenue 
referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 4 and also the procedure 
for application of Articles 3 (3)  and 4. 
Article 7 
1.  Member States shall be notified of this Decision 
by the Secretary-General of the Council of the Euro-
pean  Communities  and  published  in  the  Official 
Journal of the European Communities. 
Member States shall notify the Secretary-General of 
the  Council of the European  Communities  without 
delay  of the  completion  of the  procedures  for  the 
adoption of this  Decision  in  accordance  with their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
This Decision shall enter into force on the first day of 
the month following receipt of the last of the notifi-
cations  referred  to  in  the  second  subparagraph.  If, 
however, the instruments of ratification provided for 
in Article 12 of the Treaty amending Certain Budget-
ary Provisions of the Treaties establishing the Euro-
pean  Communities  and  the  Treaty  establishing  a 
Single  Council  and  a  Single  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities  have  not  been  deposited 
before  that  date  by  all  the  Member  States,  this 
Decision shall enter into force on the first day of the 
month  following  the  Deposit  of the  last  of those 
instruments of ratification. 
2.  Resources derived from new Member States 
The amounts payable by the new Member States are laid down in the Act concerning the condi-
tions of  accession and the adjustments to the Treaties, attached to the Treaty of 22 January 1972.1 
Article 129 
1.  The financial  contributions from  Member States 
referred to in Article 3 (2) of the Decision of  21  April 
1970 shall be apportioned as follows: 
- for the new Member States:2 
Denmark  2.42% 
Ireland  0.60% 
Norway  1.66% 
United Kingdom  19.00% 
2.46% 
0.61% 
19.32% 
and for  the  original  Member  States  in  accordance 
with the scale laid down in Article 3 (2) of  the Decision 
of 21  April 1970  after the financial contributions of 
the  new  Member  States  specified  above  have  been 
deducted. 
2.  For 1973, the basis for calculating the variations 
referred to in Article 3 (3) of the Decision of  21  April 
1970 shall be: 
- for  the  new  Member  States,  the  percentages 
referred to in paragraph 1  ; 
- for  the  original  Member  States,  their  relative 
share for the preceding year, account being taken 
of the  percentages  for  the  new  Member  States 
specified above. 
1  The Acts on the accession of  Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom to the European Communities are published in English 
in Official Journal of  the European Communities, Special Edition, 27  March 1972. 
2  These are the figures as modified following Norway's decision not to accede. 
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The  Communities'  own  resources  and  also  the 
financial  contributions  and,  where  appropriate,  the 
contributions referred to in Article 4 (2,  3 and 4)  of 
the Decision of 21  April 1970,  shall be due from the 
new  Member  States  to  the  following  extent  only: 
- 45.0% in 1973, 
- 56.0% in 1974, 
- 67.5% in 1975, 
- 79.5% .in 1976, 
- 92.0% in 1977. 
The Communities'  own  resources payable by the new  Member States  ave  been calculated in 
the aggregate; a break-down according to category was  not yet possible when  the draft bud-
get was being drawn up. 
They amount to: 
Denmark 
Ireland 
(Norway 
United Kingdom 
29 936 250 u.a. 
11  514 666 
26 392 500) 
364 631 078 
432 474 494 u.a. 
The contributions from the New Member States amount to: 
Denmark 
Ireland 
(Norway 
United Kingdom 
16 506 657 u.a. 
5 466 008) 
21 972 665  u.a. 
3.  Other available resources 
(a)  The  Treaty of  8 Apri/1965 establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission1 
Article 20 
1.  The administrative expenditure of the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the revenue relating 
thereto, the revenue and expenditure of the European 
Economic Community and the revenue and expendi-
ture  of the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community, 
with the exception of that of the Supply Agency, the 
Joint Undertakings and that which must be entered 
in the research and investment budget of  the European 
Atomic  Energy  Community,  shall  be shown  in  the 
budget of the European Communities in accordance 
with the appropriate provisions of the Treaties estab-
lishing  the  three  Communities.  This  budget,  which 
shall  be  in balance  as  to revenue  and expenditure, " 
shall take the place of the administrative budget of  the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the budget of 
the European Economic Community and the operating 
. budget of the European Atomic Energy Community. 
2.  The portion of the  expenditure covered  by the 
levies  provided for in Article 49  of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Coal and Steel Community shall 
be fixed at eighteen million units of account. 
ECSC levies appropriated in accordance with Article 20  of the Treaty of 
8 April1965 amount to  18 000 000 u.a. 
1  OJ No 152, 13 July 1967. 
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agricultural policy1 
Owing to the delay in auditing the accounts,  the contributions relating to the period  1968-69 
(Guarantee Section) are still entered in the budget for 1973.  These contributions are laid down 
in Article 11  of Regulation No 130/66. 
Article 11 
1.  The expenditure of the Guarantee Section of the 
Fund shall be covered by financial contributions from 
the  Member  States  calculated,  for  the first  part,  in 
proportion to  the  levies  collected  by  each  Member 
State in relation to third countries and, for the second 
part, as far as is necessary, according to a fixed scale. 
2.  The first  part of the  contributions  of Member 
States shall be equal to 90 %  of the total amount of 
the levies  collected by  Member States in relation to 
third  countries  during  the  accounting  period  in 
question. 
3.  The second part of the contributions of Member 
States shall be calculated according to the following 
scale: 
Belgium  8.1 
Federal Republic of Germany  31.2 
France  32.0 
Italy  20.3 
Luxembourg  0.2 
Netherlands  8.2 
The contributions provided for in Regulation No 130/66/EEC relating to the 
financing of  the common agricultural policy (Guarantee Section) amount to: 
Belgium 
Federal Republic of Germany 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
(c)  Deductions made from the incomes of  officials 
14 242 508  u.a. 
50 411  015 
38931173 
44 000 877 
258 550 
22 155 877 
170 000 000 u.a. 
Revenue from the tax on the wages, salaries and allowances of officials and other staff members 
of the Communities and staff contributions to pensions amount to 17 126 120 units of account. 
(d)  Re-entry of  lapsed appropriations 
A sum of 350 000 units of account for assistance to redundant workers in Italian sulphur mines 
has been re-entered in the budget for 1973. The sum was allocated on the credit side in accordance 
with Article 200 (1) of the EEC Treaty. 
(e)  Miscellaneous revenue: 8 838 820 units of account. 
Revenues entered in the draft budget for 1973 are summed up in the following table: 
1  OJ No 165, 2 September 1966. 
102 Agricultural levies* 
Sugar contributions 
Customs duties* 
Contributions from Member States* 
687 100 000 u.a. 
148 000 000 
1 303 900 000 
1 629 019 158 
Contributions from Member States to finance supplementary programmes 
of Euratom  2 570 852 
Customs duties and agricultural levies collected by the new Member States 
Contributions from the new Member States 
432 474494 
21  972 665 
18 000 000  ECSC levies 
Contributions  to  financing  the  common  agricultural  policy  (Guarantee 
Section) for 1968-69  170 000 000 
17126120 
350 000 
8 838 820 
Deductions from salaries 
Re-entry of appropriations 
Miscellaneous revenues 
* These items are derived from the six 'original' Member States.  4 439 352 109 u.a. 
Section II  - The Regulation implementing the Decision of 21 April 1970 
On  2 January 1971,  the Council adopted a regulation implementing the Decision of 21  April 
1970 on the replacement of contributions from Member States by the Communities' 'own resour-
ces'. The text of this regulation, in an English translation, is as follows:
1 
TITLE I 
General Provisions 
Article 1 
The Communities' own resources within the meaning 
of the Decision of 21  April 1970  (hereinafter called 
'own  resources')  shall  be  established  by  Member 
States in  accordance with their own provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action and 
shall be made available to the Commission in accor-
dance with this  Regulation without prejudice to the 
provisions  to  be  adopted in  due  course  concerning 
revenue derived from value added tax. 
Article 2 
1.  For the purposes of  application of  this Regulation, 
an entitlement  shall  be deemed to be established as 
soon as the corresponding claim has been duly deter-
mined by the appropriate department or agency of  the 
Member State. 
2.  The  competent  department  or  agency  of  the 
Member State shall revise the entitlement established 
in accordance with paragraph 1 where the need for a 
rectification arises. 
1  OJ Special edition, 1971 (I),_pp. 4-9. 
Article 3 
Member  States  shall  take all  requisite  measures  to 
ensure  that  the  supporting  documents  concerning 
established entitlements and the making available of 
own resources are kept for three years. 
Article 4 
1.  Each Member State shall inform the Commission, 
at the latter's request: 
(a) ofthenames of  the departments or agencies respon-
sible  for  establishing  own  resources  and,  where 
appropriate, their statutes; 
(b) of  the general provisions laid down by law, regula-
tion, administrative action, or relating to account-
ing  procedure,  concerning the  establishment  of 
own resources and their being made  available  to 
the  Commission. 
2.  The Commission shall pass such information to 
other Member States at their request. 
Article 5 
Each Member State shall  draw up yearly a  closing 
statement of account together with a  report on the 
establishment and control of own resources, and shall 
forward this to the Commission before 1 June of the 
year following the financial year concerned. 
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1.  Accounts for own resources shall be kept by the 
Treasury of  each Member State and broken down into 
types of resources. 
2.  The established entitlements  shall be  entered in 
those accounts within a period of sixty days following 
the end of the month during which the entitlements 
were established. 
Each Member State shall forward to the Commission, 
within  the  same  period,  a  monthly  state  of those 
accounts showing the position as regards the entitle-
ments established for the month concerned. 
3.  The established entitlements shall be entered in 
the  accounts  of the  Communities  as  revenue  to  be 
collected insofar as the amounts in question have not 
been paid over. 
4.  The amounts actually paid over shall be entered 
as revenue in the budget of the Communities. 
TITLE II 
Provisions  for  making  available  and  paying  over  the 
Communities' own resources 
Article 7 
1.  The amount of own  resources  established  shall 
be entered by each Member State on the credit side of 
the account opened with the Treasury for this purpose 
in the name of the Commission. This account shall be 
kept free of charge. 
2.  Each amount shall be entered gross.  Within the 
thirty days  following  notification of each entry,  the 
Commission shall issue a transfer order in favour of 
the Member State for the amounts corresponding to 
the standard refund of collection costs referred to in 
the fifth sub-paragraph of  Article 3 (1) of  the Decision 
of 21  April1970. 
Article 8 
1.  Own resources to be established by each Member 
State, together with its financial contribution, shall be . 
the subject of a  provisional estimate  entered in the 
budget,  account  being  taken of Articles  3  (3)  and 
4 (1) of the Decision of 21  April 1970. 
2.  Payment shall  be made of the amount actually 
established  by  the  Member  State  for  the  kind  of 
resources involved; where appropriate, payment shall 
be made in the proportion fixed by the budget, subject 
to rectification when closing the accounts. 
3.  Adjustment shall be made for amounts which a 
Member  State  may  have  overpaid  or which  might 
still be owing. 
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Article 9 
1.  The entry referred in Article 7 (1)  shall be made 
within a period of sixty days following the end of the 
month during which the entitlement was established. 
2.  Any delay in making the entry shall give rise to the 
payment of interest by the Member State concerned 
at a rate equal to the highest rate of discount ruling in 
the Member States on the due date. This rate shall be 
increased by 0.25% for each month of delay. 
Article 10 
1.  The entitlements established under Article 2  (2) 
shall be entered in the monthly return corresponding 
to the date of revision and shall be added to or sub-
tracted  from  the  total  amount  of the  established 
entitlements. 
The provisions of  Article 9 (2) shall also apply to these 
new entitlements. 
2.  The costs  of collection  referred  to  in the fifth 
subparagraph  of Article  3  (1)  of the  Decision  of 
21 April1970 shall be refunded, account being taken of 
the entitlements established under Article 2 (2). 
Article 11 
1.  The  Commission  shall  have  at its  disposal  for 
implementation of the budget the amounts credited 
to  its  account.  Orders  and  instructions  which,  in 
accordance  with  actual  needs,  it  forwards  for  this 
purpose to the Treasury or to the appropriate depart-
ment of each Member State shall be carried out as 
soon as possible. 
2.  In cases  of actual liquidity difficulty  and where 
all  possibility  of  obtaining  advances  against  the 
financial  contributions  of Member  States  has  been 
exhausted, the Member States shall, at the Commis-
sion's request, make an advance on future resources not 
exceeding one-and-a-half month's estimated revenue. 
Advances exceeding the amount indicated in the first 
subparagraph and justified by the requirements of a 
rectifying  or  supplementary  draft  budget  may  be 
authorized by the Council acting by a qualified major-
ity on a proposal from the Commission. The method 
for settling the accounts shall be fixed at the same time 
as the authorization is given. 
Article 12 
Transfers of funds shall be made, so far as possible, 
from the currencies of Member States having a surplus 
revenue  into  the  currencies  of the  other  Member 
States. They shall be restricted to actual cash require-
ments. TITLE III 
Provisions concerning measures of control 
Article 13 
1.  Member States shall take all requisite measure to 
ensure that the amounts corresponding to the entitle-
ments  established  under  Article  1  and 2  are  made 
available to the Commission in accordance with this 
Regulation. 
2.  Member States shall not be required to place at 
the Commission's disposal the amounts corresponding 
to established entitlements solely where,  for reasons 
of 'force majeure', these amounts could not be col-
lected. 
3.  Every six months Member States shall communicate 
to  the  Commission,  where  appropriate  within  the 
framework  of  existing  procedures,  comprehensive 
information and questions of principle concerning the 
most important problems arising from the application 
of  this Regulation, and in particular matters in dispute. 
Article 14 
1.  Member  States  shall  carry  out the  verifications 
and inquiries concerning established entitlements and 
the making available of own resources. The Commis-
sion shall make use of its powers in accordance with 
this Article. 
2.  Accordingly, Member States shall: 
- carry out any additional measures of control the 
Commission may ask for in a reasoned request; 
- associate the Commission, at its request with the 
measures of  control which they are carrying out. 
Member States shall take all steps required to facilitate 
these measures of control. Where the Commission is 
associated with these measures,  Member States shall 
place at its disposal the supporting documents referred 
to in Article 3.  In order to restrict as far as possible 
additional measures of control, the Commission may, 
in special cases, require that certain documents be put 
at its disposal. 
3.  The  measures  of control  referred  to  in  para-
graphs  1  and  2  shall  not prejudice  the  following 
measures: 
(a) the measures  of control undertaken by  Member 
States in accordance with their own provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action; 
(b) the measures  provided for  in Article 206  of the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity and Article 180 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Atomic Energy Community; 
(c)  the  inspection  arrangements  made  pursuant  to 
Article  209  (c)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European  Economic  Community  and  Article 
183  (c)  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Atomic Energy Community. 
4.  Before  the  end of 1973,  the  Commission  shall 
report to the Council on the functioning of  the system. 
5.  The  Council  shall,  acting  unanimously  on  a 
proposal from the Commission, determine: 
(a) the  conditions  which  officials  appointed by the 
Commission must satisfy when they carry out the 
verifications  provided  for  in  this  Article,  in 
particular with regard to professional secrecy and 
the procedure whereby they exercise their powers 
of investigation; 
(b) where required, other provisions for applying this 
Article. 
Article 15 
The  provisions  of  Community  law  applicable  to 
matters referred to in the first paragraph of Article 2 
of the Decision of  21  Apri11970, in particular regard-
ing nomenclature, origin, value for customs purposes, 
Community transit and inward processing,  shall be 
applied by the appropriate authorities of the Member 
States when establishing own resources. 
TITLE IV 
Procedure for application of Articles 3 (3) and 4 (1) of 
the Decision of 21 April 1970 
Article 16 
1.  For the purpose of this Regulation, the 'share of 
a Member State' means the proportion of  expenditure 
entered in the budget of  the Communities and financed 
by means of own resources within the meaning of the 
Decision of21 April1970 deriving from that State and 
also,  where  appropriate,  by means  of the  financial 
contributions of that State, calculated in accordance 
with the scale shown in Article 3 (2) of that Decision. 
2.  The upper  limit of the  share  of each  Member 
State for any given financial year shall correspond to 
its share in the financing of the budget of the Com-
munities  for  the preceding financial  year calculated 
in accordance with Article  3 (3)  of the Decision of 
21  April 1970, plus 
- 1% until 30 December 1974; 
- 2% between 1 January 1975 and 31 December 1977. 
3. · The lower limit of the share of  each Member State 
for any given  financial  year  shall  correspond to  its 
share in the financing of the budget of  the Commu-
nities  for  the preceding financial  year calculated in 
accordance  with  Article  3  (3)  of  the  Decision  of 
21  April 1970 less 
- 1.5% unti121 December 1974; 
- 2% between 1 January 1975 and 31 December 1977. 
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For the purpose of application of Article 3 (3)  and 
4  (1)  of the Decision of 21  April 1970  and without 
prejudice to Article 3 (5) of that Decision, the follow-
ing factors shall be taken into account: 
(a) the expenditure incurred during the financial year 
in question, plus the appropriations carried over 
to the following financial year, less the appropria-
tions carried over from preceding financial years 
and written off, and also revenues other than own 
resources and financial contributions from Member 
States; 
(b) for each  Member State,  the resources  for which 
an  entitlement  has  been  established  during  the 
financial year in question. 
Article 18 
1.  Insofar as  the  shares  of certain  Member States 
do not fall within the limits referred to in Article 16 
(2 and 3), the shares above and below the limits shall, 
where  necessary,  be  adjusted  to  bring them within 
those limits; any deficiency in the budget shall then 
be  apportioned among the other Member States in 
accordance with the scale laid down in Article 3 (2) of 
Decision of 21  April 1970.  c 
2.  This operation shall be repeated if necessary. 
3.  Any surplus resulting from the application of this 
Article shall be carried over to the following financial 
year. 
Article 19 
For budgets up to and including that for the financial 
year ending 31  December 1974,  the adjustment pro-
vided for in Article 18  shall be carried out when the 
budget is  finally passed and shall be finally  adopted 
when the accounts for revenue  and expenditure are 
submitted. 
Article 20 
1.  From the financial year 1975 up to and including 
the year ending 31  December 1977, the adjustment to 
the budget provided for in Article 18  shall be carried 
out when the accounts for  revenue and expenditure 
are submitted. 
2.  This adjustment shall give  rise to financial com-
pensation between the Member States concerned. 
Article 21 
1.  The  financial  compensation  referred  to  in 
Article 20 (2) shall be effected in accordance with the 
third subparagraph  of Article 4  (1)  of the Decision 
of 21  Apri11970. 
2.  The  Commission  shall  communicate  to  the 
Member  States,  during  the  month  following  the 
closure of the accounts for revenue and expenditure, 
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the  compensation  account  which  it has  drawn  up, 
showing the debit or credit balance of each Member 
State.  Each debtor Member State shall pay to each 
creditor Member State part of the amount shown in 
its  debit  account,  that part being  proportionate  to 
the share of the creditor Member State in the total 
amount entered in the credit account. 
3.  In. the month following this communication, the 
debtor  Member  States  shall  pay  to  the  creditor 
Member  States  the  amount  owing  in  the  national 
currency of the latter at the parity declared  to  the 
International Monetary Fund. 
Article 22 
The  percentages  to  be  taken  into  account  for  the 
calculations  under  Articles  16  to  20  shall  in  each 
operation be rounded off at the fourth decimal place. 
TITLE V 
Procedure  for  application  of Article  4  (2,  3  and  4) 
to the Decision of 21 April 1970 
Article 23 
1.  This Article shall be applicable where it may be 
necessary to take provisional measures of derogation 
under Article 4 (2  and 3)  of the Decision of 21  April 
1970. 
2.  The gross national product at market prices shall 
be calculated on the basis of statistics established by 
the Statistical Office  of the European Communities; 
it shall correspond,  for each  Member State,  to  the 
arithmetical  average  for  the first  three  years  of the 
five-year period preceding the financial year in respect 
of  which Article 4 (2 and 3) of the Decision of  21 April 
1970 is  applied. 
3.  The gross national product shall be established in 
units of account at the parities declared to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. 
If  there is  a change of parity in the course of a year, 
a  parity based on the parities declared to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and weighted on a time  basis 
shall be applied. 
4.  As long as  the derogation provided  for  in Art-
icle 4 (2) of  the Decision of  21 April1970, is applied to 
one or more Member States,  the Commission shall 
fix,  in  its  preliminary  draft  budget,  the  estimated 
percentage of  the budget to be covered by the financial 
contributions of  the Member State or States concerned 
on the basis of the proportion of their gross national 
product to the sum total Of the gross national prod-
ucts  of the  Member  States,  and shall establish the 
rate  of the  value  added  tax  corresponding  to  the 
remainder of the budget to be covered by the other Member  States.  The amounts  shall  be approved in 
accordance with budgetary procedure. 
5.  If at the close of the accounts  for  the financial 
year in question the Commission finds that the Mem-
ber States which have paid financial contributions on 
the basis of the gross national product have, in terms 
of percentage,  actually  covered  by  means  of those 
financial contributions more than their share, it shall 
establish the necessary adjustments, taking account of 
the provisions of  the third subparagraph of  Article 4 (1) 
of the Decision of 21  Apri11970. 
6.  For the purposes of this Regulation, 
(a) the  gross  national  product  at  market  prices  is 
equal  to  the  gross  domestic  product  at  market 
prices plus income from employment, property and 
business received from the rest of the world less 
the  corresponding  flow  towards  the  rest  of the 
world; 
(b) the gross domestic product at market prices, which 
represents  the  final  outcome  of production  by 
resident productive units, corresponds to the total 
production of goods and services by the economy, 
less  the  total  intermediate  consumption,  plus 
import charges. 
TITLE VI 
Procedure  for  application  of  Article  4  (5)  of  the 
Decision of 21  April 1970 
Article 24 
1.  The balance of one financial  year to be carried 
over to the following financial year, in accordance with 
Article 4 (5)  of the Decision of 21  April 1970,  shall 
consist of the difference between 
- expenditure incurred during the financial year in 
question, plus the appropriations carried over to 
the  following  financial  year,  less  appropriations 
carried over from the preceding financial years and 
written off; and 
- all  the revenue  credited  to  the accounts for  the 
financial  year in  question,  less  that part of the 
revenue credited to the accounts for the preceding 
financial year which was not collected during the 
financial year in question. 
2.  The outstanding amounts within the meaning of 
the second indent of paragraph 1 shall be recorded 
separately in a  suspense account and credited to the 
account for the financial year during which they are 
actually collected. 
3.  The balance  to  be carried  over shall  be finally 
determined, in accordance with budgetary procedure 
at the  same  time  as  the  accounts  for  revenue  and 
expenditure referred to in Articles 19 and 20 are closed. 
TITLE VII 
Provisions  relating  to  the  Advisory  Committee,  on 
the Communities' Own Resources, and final provisions 
Article 25 
1.  An  Advisory  Committee  on  the  Communities' 
Own Resources  (hereinafter called  'the Committee') 
is hereby set up. 
2.  The Committee shall consist of representatives of 
the  Member  States  and of the  Commission.  Each 
Member State shall be represented on the Committee 
by not more than five officials. 
The Chairman of  the Committee shall be  a  represen-
tative of the Commission. 
Secretarial  services  for  the  Committee  shall  be 
provided by the Commission. 
3.  The  Committee  shall  adopt  its  own  rules  of 
procedure. 
Article 26 
The Committee  shall examine  the  questions  raised 
by  its  Chairman,  on  his  own  initiative  or  at  the 
request of  the representative of  a Member State, which 
concern the application of this Regulation, in partic-
ular: 
(a) information  and  communications  provided  for 
in Article 4 (1) (b), 5 and 13  (3); 
(b) cases of  force majeure referred to in Article 13 (2); 
(c) measures of control and inspection provided for 
in Article 14 (2). 
Article 27 
This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day 
following its publication in the Official Journal of  the 
European Communities. 
It  shall have effect from the date of  entry into force of 
the Decision of 21  Apri11970. 
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At the time of  compilation of  the present corpus, the body of  rules on the control of  own resources 
was still in a state of flux.  Much remains to be done before customs laws can be harmonized and 
cooperation achieved between the authorities responsible for collecting these resources. 
1.  The harmonization of  customs laws 
Article 15 of Regulation No 2/71lays down that Community customs legislation shall be applied 
to the establishment of own resources by the competent authorities in the Member States. 
It would be impossible to cite here all the studies that have been made on this subject. We shall 
confine  ourselves  to the Written Question No 87/70,  put by Mr Brouwer and Mr Westerterp 
(Christian-Democrat, Netherlands) on 15  May 1970,  to which the Commission of the Commu-
nities did not reply unti11 July 1971, i.e. after it had laid down, on 28 April1971, a general pro-
gramme for approximating national customs laws.1 
The question ran as folJows: 
'1.  In view of the agreement in principle reached' in 
the Council on the financing of the Communities by 
resources of  their own, in which customs revenue is to 
be gradually incorporated, and in view of the need to 
ensure smooth operation of  the customs union through 
uniform rules for the levying of customs duties, does 
the Commission consider that the harmonization of 
customs laws must be expedited in order to solve, in 
particular, the following problems as soon as possible: 
- exemption from customs duties; 
- waiving  and  refunding  of customs  duties,  and 
settlement of arrears; 
- special  customs  arrangements  whereby  customs 
duties are either levied in part or not at all,  (e.g. 
temporary  imports  other  than  those  effected  as 
part of processing traffic); 
- fixing the dates of payment of customs duties; 
- the  position  of  debtors  at  Community  level, 
bearing in mind that the creditor here is the Com-
munity  and  that  Member  States  merely  act  as 
administrative agents for collection purposes; 
- customs  clearance procedure and export formal-
ities? 
2.  Does the Commission agree with questioners that 
Community control to ensure that customs duties are 
properly levied should seek to establish not only that 
the national receiving authorities correctly report the 
revenues collected by them to the central administra-
tion of Member States, but also,  and above all, that 
the national customs authorities accurately assess the 
amount of duty payable in each case? 
3.  Is the Commission aware of the article published 
on 26 June 1969 in the German periodical 'Blick durch 
die Wirtschaft' on the present situation regarding the 
harmonization of national customs laws,  and of the 
Council's  reply  to  Written  Question No 422/69  by 
Mr Vredeling?2 
Is it true that, out of a total staff of 5 261,  the Com-
mission has only about six Grade A and a few Grade B 
officials to carry out the tasks referred to in points 1 
and2? 
4.  In view of the present situation and of the prob-
lems which will  certainly arise in the customs sector 
during the negotiations with the countries applying to 
join  the  Community,  does  not  the  Commission 
consider it desirable to expand substantially those of 
its departments responsible for customs matters?' 
1  Written question No 87/70, OJ No 70, 16 July 1971. For the general programme of approximating national customs laws,  see  the Com-
mission's Fifth General Report Sections 122 et seq., and the Bulletin of  the European Communities, No 6,  1971. 
2  OJ No C 38, 1 Apri11970. p. 8. 
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'Points 1 and 2: The Commission fully shares the point 
of  view put by the honourable members. It  is felt that 
the proper functioning of the customs union and the 
allocation of  customs duties to the budget of  the Com-
munities as  own resources make it necessary first  to 
draw up a common body of  customs law to ensure that 
customs  duties  are  assessed,  substantiated and col-
lected in the same manner in the Six Member States 
and,  secondly,  to  introduce  control  measures  in 
respect of these duties which will require Commission 
intervention. 
The  Commission  has  accordingly  taken,  or intends 
shortly to take, the steps required to proceed with both 
these courses of action. 
In the first  place, it has forwarded to the Council a 
draft regulation implementing the Decision of21 April 
1970  on  the  replacement  of financial  contributions 
from  Member States  by the  Communities'  own  re-
sources. This draft, approved on 2 January 1971, con-
tains  provisions  to ensure,  with  the  Commission's 
participation,  control  of the establishment and col-
lection of customs duties as provided for in Article 6 
of that Decision. 
In the second place,  the Commission has adopted a 
programme  of  action  for  harmonizing  national 
customs  laws,  which  it  intends  to  forward  to  the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Economic 
and Social Committee and which it will carry out with 
the least possible  delay.  This  programme embodies 
the various points raised in the first paragraph of the 
question put by the honourable members. 
Points 3 and 4: The Commission has taken cognizance 
of the  article  published  on  26  June  1969  by  the 
German periodical  'Blick  durch  die  Wirtschaft'  on 
the present situation regarding the harmonization of 
national customs laws, and of the Council's reply to 
Written Question No 422/69 by Mr Vredeling. 
It is  true that on 15  May 1970 the Commission, out 
of  a total staff of 5 261, had only six Grade A and two 
Grade B officials to carry out the tasks referred to in 
points 1 and 2 of the question. 
Conscious of the need to reconsider the size  of the 
departments  responsible  for  completing,  improving 
and managing the customs union, the Commission has 
since taken a first series of steps aimed at gradually 
improving the situation referred to by the honourable 
members. 
In particular, it has made the customs directorate a 
separate department-'Management of the  Customs 
Union'---:under  the  direct  authority of Mr Spinelli, 
member of the Commission. 
In addition,  the Commission recently  requested  the 
Council to approve a supplementary budget in order 
to give this new department the administrative support 
needed  to  complete  the  harmonization  of national 
customs laws and ensure efficient management of the 
permanent services to be provided in this sector. If  the 
Council acc.epts the proposals recently submitted to it, 
the measures put in hand will very soon produce the 
results desired by the honourable members. 
Furthermore, a division entitled 'Own Resources and 
Finance'  has  been  set  up  under  the  Directorate-
General for Budgets with responsibility for the control 
functions  provided  for  in  Article  14  of Regulation 
No 2/71 of  the Council in conjunction with the depart-
ment for the 'Management of  the Customs Union' and 
the Member States. 
2.  The agreement on mutual assistance between the customs authorities 
of  the six Member States 
On 7  September  1967,  the  governments  of the  Member  States  of the  European Community 
signed an agreement on administrative cooperation for the purpose of  preventing or suppressing 
fraudulent  operations with  regard to levies  and customs  duties.  In the  case  of five  Member 
States, this agreement came into force on 1 June 1970,  and with  regard to Italy on 1 January 
1972. 
The agreement has certain limitations which should be pointed out here: 
(i)  it is  to be applied by the customs authorities, and covers  only customs duties and levies. 
It concerns  neither  export refunds  nor internal  market intervention  provided  for  under 
the organizations of agricultural markets; 
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levies.  Future revenue  from  the value  added tax  are  beyond the scope  of the agreement 
inasmuch as this tax is not levied at the external frontiers of the Community; 
(iii)  the  essential  object of the  agreement is  to promote an exchange  of information between 
the  various  customs  authorities  in  order  to  facilitate  the  prevention,  investigation  and 
suppression of offences against the customs laws of the Member States; 
(iv)  the Convention has so far been ratified by six  Member States:  new Member States would 
have to sign and ratify it. 
The text of the agreement is as follows: 
The Governments of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, 
Whereas  violations  of  customs  laws  damage  the 
economic and fiscal interests of their respective coun-
tries and the legitimate interests of trade, industry and 
agriculture and compromise the aims of the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities; 
Whereas  it  is  important  to  ensure  that  customs 
duties are correctly levied in  order  to guarantee  the 
uniform application of  the tariff arrangements provided 
for in these Treaties; 
Persuaded  that  cooperation  between  the  customs 
administrations  would  make  for  a  most  effective 
campaign  against  violations  of customs  laws  and 
further  endeavours  to  apply  customs  duties  with 
greater exactitude; 
Anxious  to  ensure the  development and functioning 
of  the customs union of  the Contracting States through 
close collaboration between the customs administra-
tions; 
HAVE AGREED  UPON THE FOLLOWING: 
Article 1 
1.  The Contracting States shall assist one another, 
through  their  customs  administrations  and  in  the 
conditions  set  forth  below,  in  ensuring  the  proper 
collection  of customs  duties  and  other  charges  on 
imports and exports and in preventing, investigating 
and suppressing violations of customs laws. 
2.  If, however, in a Contracting State the execution 
of certain provisions laid down in the present agree-
ment fa11s within the competence of  an authority other 
than the customs administration, this authority shall 
be  regarded  as  the  customs  administration  for  the 
purposes  of the  agreement.  In  this  connection,  the 
Contracting States shall communicate to one another 
the relevant information. 
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Article 2 
For the purposes of this  agreement,  'customs laws' 
shall  mean  the  laws  and  regulations  relating  to 
imports,  exports  and goods  in transit,  regardless  of 
whether  they  concern  customs  duties  and  all  other 
charges  or  measures  of prohibition,  restriction  or 
control. The expression 'customs duties' also  covers 
the levies introduced pursuant to the Treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Community. 
Article 3 
The  customs  administrations  of  the  Contracting 
States  shall  strive  to  harmonize  the  functions  and 
working hours of the customs offices situated at their 
common frontiers. 
Article 4 
1.  The customs  administrations of the Contracting 
States shall communicate to one another, on request, 
all information likely to ensure the proper collection 
of customs duties and other charges on imports and 
exports,  particularly information which  will  help  to 
determine  the  customs  value  and tariff category  of 
goods. 
2.  Where an administration does not have the infor-
mation requested it shall institute enquiries under the 
laws  and regulations  applying in its  country to  the 
collection  of customs  duties  and  other  charges  on 
imports and exports. 
Article 5 
The customs administrations of the Contracting States 
shall exchange lists of goods in which traffic in viola-
tion of  customs laws is known to occur on importation, 
exportation or in transit. 
Article 6 
Whether  of their  own  accord  or  on  request,  the 
customs  authorities of each  Contracting State shall, wherever possible, exercise special surveillance within 
their area of responsibility. 
(a) over  the movements,  particularly  when  entering 
or leaving their territory, of persons suspected of 
committing,  professionally  or  habituaHy,  viola-
tions of the customs laws of another Contracting 
State; 
(b) over places  where  abnormal quantities  of goo~s 
are stored in such a  way as  to suggest that thetr 
whole  purpose  is  for  trade  in  violation  of the 
customs laws of another Contracting State; 
(c)  over vehicles, vessels or aircraft suspected of being 
used to violate the customs laws of  another  Contrac-
ting State. 
Article 7 
The customs administrations of  the Contracting States 
shall supply one another, on request, with any certif-
icate stating that goods exported from one Contract-
ing  State  to  another  Contracting  State  have  been 
legally brought into the territory of  the latter State and 
indicating, where necessary,  the customs category in 
which these goods have been placed. 
Article 8 
The customs administration of each Contracting State 
shall, of its own accord or on request, communicate 
to the customs administration of another Contracting 
State, in the form of reports, certificates or certified 
copies  of documents,  all  information at its  disposal 
on operations which have taken or are planned to take 
place and which constitute or appear to constitute a 
violation of the customs laws of this latter State. 
Article 9 
The  customs  authorities  of each  Contracting  State 
shall communicate to the customs authorities of the 
other Contracting States  all potentially useful  infor-
mation on violations of customs laws,  particularly on 
new  means  or methods employed to commit them; 
they shall transmit to the said authorities copies or 
extracts  of reports  prepared  by  their  investigation 
departments relating to particular methods used. 
Article 10 
The customs administrations of  the Contracting States 
shall  arrange for  their investigation  departments  to 
liaise  and  exchange  information  to  facilitate  the 
prevention, investigation and suppression of  violations 
of the customs laws of their respective countries. 
Article 11 
Duly authorized officials of  the customs administration 
of  one of  the Contracting States shall, with the consent 
of the customs administration of another Contracting 
State  and  for  the  purposes  of this  agreement,  be 
entitled  to  obtain  from  the  offices  of  this  latter 
administration all information deriving from entries, 
registers and other documents kept for the purpose of 
implementing customs  laws.  These  offic~als  sh<~:ll  be 
authorized to make a copy of these entnes, regtsters 
and other documents. 
Article 12 
At the request of the courts or authorities of a Con-
tracting  State  to  which  violations  of customs  laws 
have been referred, the customs administrations of  the 
other Contracting States may authorize their officials 
to appear as witnesses or experts before the aforesaid 
courts or authorities.  Within the limits fixed  by the 
authorization, these officials shall give evidence on the 
observations made by them in the exercise of their 
duties. The summons to appear shall state in what case 
and capacity the official is to be heard. 
Article 13 
1.  The  customs  administration  of  a  Contracting 
State, shall, at the request of  that of  another Contrac.t-
ing  State,  instigate  all  official  enquiries,  and  m 
particular arrange for the hearing of  persons suspected 
of violations of customs laws,  and also of witnesses 
or experts. It shall communicate the results of these 
enquiries to the applicant administration. 
2.  These enquiries shall be conducted under the laws 
and regulations of the State to which application was 
made. 
Article 14 
Officials of  the customs administration of a  Contract-
ing State responsible for the investigation of  violations 
of customs  laws  may,  on  the  territory  of another 
Contracting State and with the consent of the compe-
tent  officials  of the  customs  administration  of this 
State, be present at operations carried out by these 
latter  officials  to  investigate  and  establish  similar 
violations wherever these are of interest to the former 
administration. 
Article 15 
The customs administrations of  the Contracting States 
may, in their reports and written evidence and also in 
the course of court proceedings, adduce as proof, the 
information  gathered  and  the  documents  consulted 
under the conditions specified by this agreement. The 
probative force  of such information and documents 
and the use made of them in legal proceedings depend 
upon national law. 
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When, in the cases provided for by this agreement, the 
officials  of the customs  administration of one Con-
tracting State are in the territory of another Contract-
ing State, they must be able at any time to give proof 
of  their presence in their official capacity. While in this 
territory,  they  enjoy  the  protection  guaranteed  to 
officials  of the customs administration of this  State 
by national laws and regulations. They enjoy the same 
status  of these  latter  officials  as  regards  the  penal 
consequences  of offences  committed  against  or  by 
them. 
Article 17 
The customs administration of a  Contracting State, 
shall at the request of  that of  another Contracting State 
notify the parties concerned, or have them notified by 
the  appropriate  authorities,  in  accordance  with  the 
rules in force in this State, of all acts or decisions of  the 
administrative authorities relating to  the  implemen~ 
tation of customs laws. 
Article 18 
The Contracting States shall mutually waive all claims 
to the refunding of costs arising from  the  implemen-
tation of  this agreement, except the allowances payable 
to experts. 
Article 19 
1.  The customs administrations of the Contracting 
States  shall  not  be  bound to  render  the  assistance 
provided for by this  agreement in cases  where such 
assistance is  likely to run counter to public policy or 
other essential interests of their State. 
2.  When assistance is  refused,  the reasons shall  be 
given. 
Article 20 
t.  Information,  communications  and  documents 
obtained may be used only for the purposes of this 
agreement. They may not be communicated to persons 
other than those required to use them for these pur-
poses  unless  the  releasing  authority  has  given  its 
explicit  consent  and  provided  that  the  legislation 
applying  to  the  receiving  authority does  not forbid 
such communication. 
2.  Request, information, experts' reports and other 
communications obtained by the customs administra-
tion of a Contracting State under this agreement shall 
enjoy the same protection as accorded by the national 
law of this State to documents or information of like 
nature. 
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Article 21 
No request for assistance may be made if the customs 
administration of the applicant State would be unable 
to provide such assistance itself if so requested. 
Article 22 
The assistance  called for  in this  agreement shall be 
provided directly between the customs administrations 
of the Contracting States. These administrations shall 
agree on practical methods of application. 
Article 23 
1.  Nothing in the provisions of this agreement shall 
prevent  more  extensive  mutual  assistance  between 
Contracting States under other agreements or arrange-
ments. 
2.  This agreement shall apply only to the European 
territories of the Contracting States. 
Article 24 
1.  This agreement shall be ratified or approved and 
the  instruments  of ratification  or approval  shall  be 
deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Italian Republic, which shall notify all the signatory 
States thereof. 
2.  It  shall come into force, with regard to Contracting 
States  which  have  deposited  their  instruments  of 
ratification or approval, on the first day of the third 
month following the deposit of the second instrument 
of ratification or approval. 
3.  It  shall come into force, with regard to States which 
ratify or approve it at a later date, on the first day of 
the third month following the deposit of their instru-
ment of ratification or approval. 
Article 25 
1.  This agreement shall be concluded for an unlimited 
period. 
2.  Any Contracting State may denounce it at any 
time three years after it has come into force for this 
State,  by addressing notification  to  the  Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs  of the Italian Republic,  which shall 
notify the other Contracting States of  the denunciation. 
3.  The denunciation shall take effect on the expiry 
of a period of six months starting from the date on 
which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Italian 
Republic receives notification of such denunciation. 
This agreement drawn up in a single copy in German, 
French, Italian and Dutch, all four texts being equally 
authentic,  shall  be  deposited in the  archives  of the 
government  of  the  Italian  Republic,  which  shall 
forward a certified true copy to each of the signatory 
States. 3.  Community Control 
Article 6 of the Decision of  21  April1970 granting the Communities resources of  their own stipu-
lates that the Council shaH make provision for supervising their collection. 
Articles 13  to 15  of Regulation No 2/71, quoted earlier, reserve control over collection for the 
Member States, without prejudice,  however,  to the controls exercised  by the Audit Board or 
those provided for or to be provided for by financial regulations. Article 14lays down, in addition, 
that officials appointed by the Commission must comply with certain requirements in carrying 
out verifications in association with the measures of control undertaken by the Member States. 
(a)  Rights and obligations of  officials appointed by the Commission 
In implementation of Article 14  (5)  of Regulation No 2/71, the Commission has proposed the 
following measures to the Council:
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Article 1 
The Commission  shall  entrust  the  verifications  and 
enquiries with which it is associated to officials whom 
it  specifically  appoints.  These  tasks  concern  the 
establishment and the  making available  of own re-
sources  as  referred  to  in  Article  14  (1)  of  Regu-
lation No 2/71  of the Council dated 2 January 1971. 
These officials shall be given written terms of  reference 
stating their identity and qualifications. A list shall be 
communicated  to  the  competent  authorities  of the 
Member States. 
Article 2 
The  officials  appointed  by  the  Commission  and 
associated  with  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
Member  States  responsible  for  carrying  out  the 
measures of verification and control: 
(a) shall accomplish their task of investigation, taking 
due account of administrative provisions applying 
to  the  national  departments,  agencies  and au-
thorities; 
(b) shall not divulge  any  secret information,  in any 
form whatsoever, except to authorized persons. 
(b)  The report of  a parliamentary delegation 
Article 3 
The departments and agencies responsible for estab-
lishing the Communities' own resources and placing 
them at the Communities' disposal as well as the com-
petent authorities of the  Member States  responsible 
for carrying out the necessary verifications and meas-
ures of control shall provide the officials appointed by 
the Commission  with the assistance they require  to 
discharge their duties and draw up their report. 
These officials shall, in particular, verify: 
(a) the conditions in which the operations of estab-
lishing,  entering  in  the  accounts  and  making 
available of the Communities' own resources are 
carried out and supervised; 
(b) the measures taken by the Member States to ensure 
that  own  resources  are  established  and  made 
available in accordance with  Community regula-
tions; and 
(c)  the  existence  of the  necessary  supporting  docu-
ments  and  their  conformity  with  the  operations 
referred to above. 
On 5 February, the Committee for Finance and Budgets received the report of a delegation which 
it had sent to Naples to look into the methods employed for establishing and collecting  the 
Communities' own resources. Extensive quotations from this report are given hereafter. 2 
1  Doc. No 112/72. See the report by Mr Aigner on behalf of  the Committee for Finance and Budgets, Doc. No 139/72, and the Resolution of 
10 October 1972, OJ No C 112,27 October 1972. 
2  PE 32.210. 
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Committee  for  Finance  and  Budgets  made  up  of 
Mr Petre (Christian-Democrat, Belgium),  Mr Beylot 
(European  Democratic  Union,  France),  Mr  Koch 
(Socialist,  Germany)  and  Mr  Durand  (Liberal, 
France) went to Naples to follow the work of respon-
sible officials of the Commission of the Communities. 
The tatters' task was to conduct, pursuant to Article 14 
of Regulation No 2 of the Council dated 2 January 
1971 and in association with the responsible authorities 
of the Member States, the verification and enquiries 
relating  to  the  establishment  and  making  available 
of the Communities' own resources by the authorities 
of the Member States.' 
'Throughout the visit, the Italian authorities repeated-
ly expressed their appreciation of the fact that, for the 
first time, a parliamentary delegation-and, what was 
more, a  delegation from the European Parliament-
had  joined  them  in  examining  such  fundamental 
problems. This point should be drawn to  the Com-
mittee's attention, for it is in itself sufficient justifica-
tion for this visit and for further visits which might 
well be made to other important central customs offices 
in the Member States. 
'These authorities were immediately informed that the 
aim of the parliamentary delegation was to form on 
the spot a clearer opinion of the problems encountered 
by the authorities in the Member States in establishing, 
collecting  and  making  available  the  Communities' 
own resources and that for this purpose, the delegation 
expected the Commission officials to describe the tasks 
they set themselves; the delegation also expressed its 
appreciation to the Italian authorities for the informa-
tion they had provided. 
'It was only proper that these remarks should be made, 
first  because  the  Commission  officials  are,  as  the 
above-mentioned  Article  14  of Regulation  No  2/71 
itself states,  associated with the verifications carried 
out by the national authorities and, secondly, because 
the  Communities'  provisions  for  determining  the 
rights  and obligations  of officials  appointed by the 
Commission to duties  of this  nature are not yet in 
force.' 
'A.  PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING 
THE COMMUNITIES' OWN RESOURCES 
These resources are established by a series of adminis-
trative measures taken by the customs offices with the 
object of determining the various components which 
comprise the basis of assessment. 
This is  done entirely by the customs administration 
placed under the authority of the Ministry of Finance 
and the Treasury. The normal procedure is as follows: 
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(a) the  customs  declaration,  stating  the  nature  and 
origin of the goods concerned, is first accepted; 
(b) the goods are subjected to a customs examination, 
with special  reference  to their classification  with 
regard to the tariff, value or quantity, and origin; 
(c)  the information obtained during stages (a) and (b) 
provides  the  basis  for  clearing  the  goods-i.e. 
establishing the precise amount of  credit to apply to 
the basis of  assessment-with regard to the amount 
of the agricultural levy or the CCT duty rate. All 
the duties applicable are entered separately in the 
customs declaration at this stage; 
(d) during the next stage,  the tax credit is  entered in 
the  accounts.  This  consists  in  recording  in  a 
special  register  the  customs  declaration,  which 
becomes  equivalent  to  a  customs  certificate  and 
constitutes the sole documentary evidence of the 
legal status of the goods,  together with  the cor-
responding credit; 
(e)  finally, the amount due is collected by the customs 
accounts  department on  the  basis  of the  duties 
established during the preceding stages.  Payment 
is  due  before  the  goods  are  actually  delivered, 
although exceptions may ,be made (deferment of 
payment up  to  a  maximum of eighteen  months 
may be authorized, but a surety is always demanded 
before the goods are delivered).' 
'B.  APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE 
PROCEDURES TO AGRICULTURAL 
LEVIES AND  CUSTOMS  DUTIES 
The agricultural levies applied by the frontier customs 
offices  in each Member State are as notified by telex 
to each capital by the Commission and immediately 
transmitted to the frontier customs offices. At Naples, 
the amount of these levies  is  displayed on a  public 
noticeboard. The rate of  the levy applied is that of  the 
date of  submission of  the import declaration. 
Receipts from levies are entered in the accounts by the 
frontier customs offices.  Following a  series  of book 
entries in strictly supervised central offices  (these are 
made using official forms showing acceptance by one 
office and transmission to the next) they arrive at the 
Italian Treasury,  which then makes payment to the 
Commission  within  the , time-limits  laid  down  in 
Regulation  No  2/71  implementing  the  Decision 
instituting the Communities' own resources. 
As regards the establishment, collection and payment 
of  customs  duties,  the  procedure  applied  is  that 
described above for the agricultural levies.' 'C. APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS 
CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT AND 
COLLECTION OF THE 
COMMUNITIES' OWN RESOURCES 
It must be emphasized that, particularly in the case of 
the  agricultural  levy,  the  Community  text  gives  a 
somewhat vague definition and that this may give rise 
to difficulties.  1 
A clearer definition was attempted in a letter sent by 
the Commission to Member States a year ago, listing 
those  duties  that cannot be  classed  as  agricultural 
levies.  While  its  legal  basis  is  admittedly  open  to 
question, the letter has certainly helped the Member 
States to reduce considerably the problems raised by 
the definition. 
During their visit to Naples, the Commission officials 
went into these problems. They studied the work of 
an office specially set up by the Directorate of  Customs 
at Naples to  deal  with the levies,  and observed the 
methods  by  which  this  office  verified  goods  and 
classified  them with  regard to  the categories of the 
customs  tariff.  They found  that it is  impossible  at 
Napels to import agricultural produce into the Com-
munity without observing the following two conditions: 
(a) an import certificate must be produced; 
(b) the goods must actually enter the port. 
The rate of levy applied to these imports is that valid 
at the moment when these two conditions are fulfilled. 
The Commission officials also looked into the condi-
tions  in which  the rates  of levy  transmitted by the 
Commission are applied. This is not a minor problem 
since even telex transmission may take some time and 
so give rise to difficulties. 
The  Commission  officials  also  reported  on  their 
findings with regard to the levying of customs duties 
on goods  for inward processing.  The application of 
the  relevant  arrangements  raises  serious  problems, 
particularly with regard to the determination of the 
basis of assessment in cases where part of the goods 
has  been  re-exported  to  third  countries  after  pro-
cessing. 
This is  a  complex sphere in which irregularities may 
well occur. 
The  officials  naturally  inquired  how  the  Italian 
authorities  decide  when  to  apply  the  arrangements 
for inward processing, how they are applied, and what 
is done to meet the difficulties arising when goods are 
re-exported.  They  also  verified  the  rates  of levies 
applied by the Italian authorities since June 1972 in the 
cereals sector in relation to the directives issued by the 
Commission. 
A  check  was  also  made  of the  accounts  of own 
resources for the same period and their payment to the 
1  See Decision of 21  April 1970, Article 2, page 96. 
Communities. This task was made easier by the fact 
that daily returns are available to the customs author-
ities  for  accounting  control  purposes. An analysis 
of customs receipts made it possible to ascertain to 
what extent  the  actual  daily  takings  tally  with  the 
entries in the books. In the accounting control process 
it was  possible to check all the signatures appended 
to each of the documents on its way first to the central 
treasurer's office in Naples and then to the Treasury. 
These accounting data were also made available to the 
parliamentary  delegation  for  checking  against  the 
books and accounting vouchers. 
D. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST FRAUDS 
The parliamentary delegation stressed that the entire 
European Parliament was paying close attention to the 
problem offrauds involving the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, often on the basis of 
falsified  customs  declarations  or import certificates. 
The delegation  enquired  about the extent  to  which 
the financial authorities collaborate with the judiciary 
for  the  purpose  of suppressing  such  offences.  The 
Inspector-General of  the Ministry of  Finance explained 
that the financial and customs  administration  com-
prises an administrative department and a fiscal police 
division  engaged in the  prevention and suppression 
of irregularities in this field.  This body, the 'Guardia 
di  finanza',  is  a  specialized military police force-a 
point of especial importance in view of the fact that 
these  irregularities  are  often  the  work  of persons 
intimately  acquainted with  administrative  practices. 
It is  composed of about thirty thousand men whose 
essential  duty  lies  in  uncovering  irregular  practices 
and, in a wider sense, combatting customs and fiscal 
evasions. 
Members  of the  customs  administration  also  enjoy 
police powers within each customs area. The Italian 
customs  official  is  directly  responsible  to  the state, 
also for sums collected on behalf of the Communities. 
This responsibility also extends to cases of error and 
negligence. 
The Italian authorities engaged in combatting fraud 
collaborate with the customs authorities of the other 
Member  States  of the  Community on the  basis  of 
an agreement on mutual assistance between customs 
administrations, signed in Rome in 1967. This agree-
ment will evidently have to be revised and adjusted to 
the enlarged Communities. 
It  often happens that the customs authorities at Naples, 
as  soon as  any suspicion of irregularities arises,  ask 
for information from the customs authorities of other 
Member States: this collaboration has proved effective, 
especially with regard to false invoices. 
Irregularities due to fraud come under the penal code. 
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The preceding ch~pter has already dealt with the combatting of fraud and the recovery of sums 
paid in error by the Community under the common agricultural policy. Although it has recognized 
that the recovery of such debts may be the subject of a Community regulation the Council has 
not so far agreed to a similar regulation with regard to the Communities' own resources. Since 
such a step seems indispensable to the proper execution of the Communities' budget, the Com-
mission,  which is  responsible for implementing the budget, recently submitted a  proposal for 
mutual assistance between the authorities of Member States in this sphere. 
(a)  The Commission's original proposal 
In May :1970, the Commission, in its proposed regulation implementing the Decision on the Com-
munities' own resources/ had envisaged the following article, to be included as Article 14: 
Article 14 
1.  The  Member  States,  acting  in  accordance  with 
their national provisions laid down by law, regulations 
and administrative action, shall take the steps neces-
sary to 
(a) ensure the regularity of  operations entailing entitle-
ment to recovery  of the  Communities'  own  re-
sources. 
(b) ensure that operations attracting tax are effectively 
taxed and that the corresponding revenue is  col-
lected in full. 
(c)  prevent and institute proceedings for irregularities. 
(d) recover sums  lost as  a  result of irregularities  or 
negligence. 
The Member States shall notify the Commission of 
measures taken in this connection and particularly of 
the progress of  administrative and judicial proceedings. 
2.  Failing full recovery of  the revenue from operations 
on which duties have been established,  the financial 
consequences  shall  be  borne  by  the  Member  State 
responsible for recovery, unless this State proves that 
these  consequences  do  not result from  irregularities 
or  negligence  attributable  to  the  departments  or 
agencies responsible for recovery. 
3.  The financial  consequences  of failing  to recover 
the revenue from operations on which no duties have 
been established shall be borne by the Communities, 
except those resulting from irregularities or negligence 
attributable  to  the  departments  or  agencies  of the 
Member States. 
4.  The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall, where necessary, 
lay down the general rules for applying this Article. 
This Article is not to be found in the text of the Regulation as adopted by the Council. 
(b)  Mutual assistance in the recovery of  debts 
The proposed directive of the Commission on mutual assistance in the recovery of sums paid 
in error under the common agricultural policy,  and of agricultural levies  and customs  duties 
has already been quoted in Chapter III, Section IV. It  should be referred to insofar as it concerns 
levies and customs duties-resources which are paid into the budget of the Communities. 
1  Doc. No 63, 1970-1971. The proposal eventually became Regulation No 2/71, reproduced in Section II of this Chapter. 
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RULES  OF THE AUDIT BOARD 
In April  1970,  the Member States decided to increase the powers of the European Parliament 
in two clearly defined areas: adoption of the budget and control of  its implementation. As a result 
of its increased responsibilities Parliament has given special attention to the rules of the Audit 
Board, on the basis of  whose work Parliament, after the Council, gives the Commission a discharge 
in respect of its implementation of the budget. 
The procedure adopted by the Audit Board in the exercise  of its functions is  at present being 
amended by the general financial regulations. 
Certain practical aspects of the Audit Board's functioning remain to be defined,  aspects which 
Parliament has felt obliged to study with particular care since the Board became the instrument 
of its new powers. 
The following documents are presented in this chapter: 
I  - Texts defining the Rules of the Audit Board 
1.  Article 206 of the EEC Treaty 
2.  The decision of 15 May 1959 relating to the Rules of the Audit Board 
3.  The financial  regulations  establishing the procedure to be  adopted for 
presenting and auditing accounts 
II  - Practical procedures to be adopted by the Audit Board in the exercise  of its 
control functions 
1.  Mr Gerlach's report 
2.  The opinion of the European Parliament 
Section I - Texts laying down the Rules of the Audit Board 
On 22 April 1970, the Member States concluded a treaty modifying the allocation of  the budgetary 
powers provided for in the Treaties establishing the Common Market, Euratom and the ECSC. 
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give a discharge on the financial management and accounts of the European Communities. 
1.  Article 206 of  the EEC Treaty 
The old version of Articles 206 EEC,  180 ECSC, and 78  ECSC conferred on the Council the 
right to grant a discharge in respect of the accounts. This right is henceforth vested in Parliament 
as well as in the Council. 
A comparative table of the old and revised texts is given below: 
Old Article 206 
The accounts of all revenue and expenditure shown in 
the  budget  shall  be  examined  by  an  Audit  Board 
consisting of auditors whose independence is  beyond 
doubt, one of whom shall be chairman. The Council 
shall,  acting unanimously,  determine the number of 
the auditors. The auditors and the chairman of the 
Audit Board shall be appointed by the Council, acting 
unanimously, for a period of five  years. Their remu-
neration shall be  determined by the  Council,  acting 
by a qualified majority. 
The purpose of the  audit,  which  shall be based on 
records and, if  necessary, performed on the spot, shall 
be to establish that all revenue has been received and 
all expenditure incurred in a lawful and regular manner 
and that the financial  management has been sound. 
After the close of  each financial year, the Audit Board 
shall draw up a report, which shall be adopted by a 
majority of its members. 
The Commission shall submit annually to the Council 
and to the Assembly  the  accounts of the preceding 
financial  year relating  to  the implementation of the 
budget, together with the report of the Audit Board. 
The Commission shall also forward to them a financial 
statement of the  assets  and  liabilities  of the  Com-
munity. 
The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority, give 
a  discharge  to  the  Commission  in  respect  of the 
implementation of the budget. It shall communicate 
its decision to the Assembly. 
Revised Article 206 
Paragraphs 1-3  unchanged. 
The Council and the Assembly shall give a discharge 
to the Commission in respect of the implementation 
of the budget.  To this end, the report of the Audit 
Board shall be examined in turn by the Council, which 
shall act by a qualified majority, and by the Assembly. 
The Commission shall stand discharged only after the 
Council and the Assembly have acted. 
2.  Decision of  15 May 1959 establishing the Rules of  the Audit Board 
The Audit Board is still governed by the Council decision of 1959 determining its composition, 
incompatibilities, and the conditions governing the performance and termination of duties. 
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The functions defined both in Article 206 of  the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community and 
in Article 180 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy  Community shall be exercised  by a 
single Audit Board. The Board shall exercise its func-
tions in the general interest of the Communities, shall 
have full autonomy and shall act on its own respon-
sibility. 
The Audit Board shall  meet  regularly  and at least 
every two months. 
Article 2 
The Audit Board shall  consist  of six  auditors  who 
shall be chosen as a rule from among persons having 
the status of an official or servant or a legal person 
governed  by  national  or  international  public  Jaw. 
Their independence must be beyond doubt and they 
must possess recognized qualifications and ability in 
the field of  accountancy, economics and finance or the 
auditing of public accounts. 
Only nationals of Member States may be members of 
the Audit Board. 
Article 3 
The  auditors  shall  be  appointed  by  the  Councils, 
acting unanimously, for a period of five years. 
The Council shall, acting unanimously, appoint one of 
the auditors to be Chairman of the Audit Board for 
the same period. 
Article 4 
The auditors shall, in the performance of their duties, 
neither seek nor take instructions from any Govern-
ment or from any other body. 
They shall refrain from any action incompatible with 
their duties. 
Article 5 
The office of auditor shall be incompatible with any 
other office in the service of the Communities. 
When entering upon their duties the auditors shall give 
a  solemn  undertaking  that,  both  during  and  after 
their term of office,  they will  respect the obligations 
arising  therefrom,  and  in  particular  their  duty  to 
behave  with  integrity  and discretion  as  regards  the 
acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. 
Article 6 
The duties of an auditor shall end on non-renewal of 
his appointment, on his death or on his resignation. 
Where an auditor resigns, his letter of  resignation shall 
be addressed to the Chairman of the Audit Board for 
transmission to  the Presidents of the  Councils. This 
latter notification shall constitute notice of vacancy. 
An auditor who ceases to perform his duty before the 
end  of his  normal  term  shall  be  replaced  for  the 
remainder  of that term.  The  Councils  may,  acting 
unanimously, decide that such a vacancy need not be 
filled. 
Article 7 
If  an auditor no longer fulfils  the conditions required 
for the performance of his  duties,  or if he has been 
guilty  of serious  misconduct,  particularly  if he  has 
violated one of the obligations set out in Article 5, the 
Court  of Justice  may  compulsorily  retire  him,  on 
application by the Councils or the Audit Board. In the 
event of such  serious  misconduct,  the  auditor may 
also,  subject to the same conditions,  be declared to 
have forfeited any pension rights or other benefits in 
their stead. 
The Court of Justice may provisionally suspend the 
auditor from office on application by the Councils or 
the Audit Board. 
An  auditor  who  has  ceased  to  perform  his  duties 
before the end of  his normal term shall be replaced for 
the remainder of that term. The Council may, acting 
unanimously, decide that such a vacancy need not be 
filled. 
Article 8 
In the performance of their  duties  as  auditors,  the 
auditors shall enjoy the benefit of Articles  11  to  14 
and Article 17 of the Protocols on the Privileges and 
Immunities  of the  European  Economic  Community 
and of the European Atomic Energy Community. 
Article 9 
The Audit Board shall adopt its own rules of  procedure. 
Article 10 
The Councils shall, on a proposal from and in agree-
ment  with  the  Audit  Board,  appoint  the  executive 
staff to be placed under the Board's authority. 
Save as otherwise agreed by the Audit Board, its staff 
shall not engage in other employment, whether gainful 
or not. 
119 Save as otherwise provided by the Councils, the rules 
set out in the Staff Regulations of Officials  and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the 
Communities shall apply to such staff. 
For the purpose of certain auditing duties of a special 
nature and of limited duration, the Audit Board may 
enlist the help of experts. 
3.  Financial regulations establishing the procedure to be adopted 
for presenting and auditing accounts 
On  15  December  1969,  the Council laid down financial  regulations containing several articles 
on the duties of the Audit Board. Amendments to these regulations have been proposed by the 
Commission,  1 in the light of which the European Parliament has proposed several amendments 
of its own.  2  These amendments are shown overleaf. 
A number of textual innovations have been made: 
(i)  The Audit Board may, at its request, be present when the Commission carries out control 
measures relating to the common agricultural policy, the recovery of own resources and to 
any fund  set  up by  the Community.  The  question  arises  here  of whether the  European 
Development Fund may be regarded as having been ~set up' by the Community (Article 87) 
since it has its origin in an agreement concluded between the Community and the AASM. 
The agreement provides for a specific sum to cover the full  range of Community aid but 
the EDF was set up by an internal agreement between the Member States. 
(ii)  Paragraph 1 of Article  89  has been amended by Parliament with the object of requiring 
the Commission to facilitate  the Audit Board's examination of departments involved in 
the management of Community finances  and in the expenditure of funds on behalf of the 
Communities;3 
(iii)  Paragraph 4 of  Article 89 authorizes the Audit Board to verify the internal control measures 
performed by each institution; 
(iv)  The last two paragraphs of Article 89 extend the competence of the Audit Board to organiz-
ations outside the institutions; 
(v)  The Audit Board may, on its own initiative or at the ~equest of  the Council or of  Parliament, 
draw up reports on specific questions relating to closed financial years  and accounts (Art-
icle 90, paragraph 3); 
(vi)  Parliament has proposed an addition to Article 90  reserving itself the right to call on the 
Council or Commission for reports on specific problems relating to budget years that have 
not yet been closed; 
(vii)  Article 92,  paragraphs· 2 and 3,  stipulates that the institutions must consider measures to 
be taken to meet observations made in the decisions giving discharge. 
1  Doc. No 247/72. 
2  Doc. No 298/72. 
3  In this connection see Mr Gerlach's report in Section II of this chapter. 
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Amendments proposed by Parliament 
Article 85 
The Audit Board shall enjoy complete indepen-
dence in deciding on the organization of  its work 
to perform its tasks. The Audit Board shall act 
and take decisions on the collegial principle. 
The Audit Board and the officials in its depart-
ments shall form a single unit for administrative 
purposes. 
The Audit Board may delegate verification tasks 
to its staff. Delegations of  power shall be notified 
by  the  Audit  Board itself or by  one  of its 
members  to  the  authorities  with  which  the 
seconded agent will be working. 
Article 86 
(unchanged) 
Article 87 
(unchanged) 
Article 88 
(unchanged) 
Article 89 
The  Commission  and the  other Community 
institutions shall provide the Audit Board with 
every facility and give it all the information it 
considers  necessary  to  accomplish  its  task, 
with particular reference  to  control of depart-
ments which are involved in the management of 
Community finances and commit expenditure for 
the account of the  Communities. They shall in 
particular make available to the Audit Board 
all documents relating to the award of  contracts 
and all cash and material accounts, all receipts 
and vouchers, as well as all relevant adminis-
trative documents, all documentation relating 
to revenue and expenditure, all inventories, and 
all establishment plans of departments which 
it may consider necessary for verification of  the 
management accounts against documents or on 
the premises. 
(Unchanged) 
Article 90 
(Unchanged) 
All the institutions shall address their replies to 
the Audit Board.  Institutions other than the 
Commission shall  at the same  time  forward 
their replies to the latter. The Audit Board shall 
append to its annual report an assessment of  the 
standard of  financial management. 
(Unchanged) 
The  European  Parliament  may  request  the 
Commission or the Council to submit reports 
or analyses concerning specific problems even 
where these relate to financial years for which 
accounts have not yet been closed. 
(Unchanged) 
(deleted) 
Article 91 
Article 92 
By 30 April of the following year, the Council 
and the Assembly shall give a discharge to the 
Article 85 
Commission in respect of the implementation 
of the budget. If this date cannot be met, the 
Council  or  the  European  Parliament  shall 
inform the Commission of  the reasons why this 
decision has had to be postponed. 
The institutions shall  take all  necesary  mea-
sures  to give  effect  to  the  observations  con-
tained in the  decisions  on discharge.  At the 
request  of the  Council  or of the  European 
Parliament  they  shall  report  on  the  actions 
taken as a result of these observations, and in 
particular on the instructions given by them to 
their departments involved in implementation 
of the  budget.  These  reports  shall  also  be 
communicated to the Audit Board. 
(Unchanged) (b)  The opinion of  Parliament on the draft financial regulations 
At its sittings of 13  and 14  February 1973,  Parliament debated the report submitted by Miss 
Flesch (Liberal, Luxembourg) on behalf of the Committee for Finance and Budgets. 
1 The debate 
was dominated by. three main issues: 
(i)  the provisional nature of the financial  regulations in preparation which are based on the 
premise that the Council remains the principal budgetary authority but that other provisions 
must be introduced in 1975 when Parliament's budgetary powers are to be strengthened; 
(ii)  the need to develop internal control; 
(iii)  a difference of views on the concept of external retrospective control reflected in an amend-
ment tabled by Mr Gerlach and Mr Aigner. 
Speaking of the need for stronger internal control Mr Aigner said: 
'The new financial rules do not take sufficient account 
of the fact that the collection of own resources and 
execution of the vast majority of the  Community's 
tasks are not the responsibility of  the Commission, but 
of Member States  administrations on behalf of the 
Communities.  The only provision is  that the Audit 
Board may be present at the  audits  at its  request. 
I need do no more than refer to Articles 13 and 14 of 
the  Council  Regulation No 2/71.  Apatt from  these 
provisions, all the new financial rules are set out as if 
the collection of all revenue and the execution of all 
tasks was the sole responsibility of the Community's 
departments. And that is not so.' 
'And here a reproach I have to make to the Commis-
sion-not for the first time, as you know-is that it has 
not  organized  the  internal  supervision  to  be  suffi-
ciently independent, that it has not given it the neces-
sary latitude, and in my opinion the internal super-
vision  must  also  be  expanded  into  a  Community 
supervisory  service,  together  with  the  supervisory 
services  of the  Member States.  In other words,  not 
only co-operation in the external audit, but above all 
co-operation-at  Member  State  level-in  internal 
supervision.' 
Mr Aigner and Mr Gerlach tabled an amendment to Article 90 of the draft financial regulations 
relating to the concept of retrospective control. The amendment read as follows: 
'The  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  may 
request from the Audit Board reports or analyses in 
the matter of  specific problems and also with reference 
to financial years not expired.' 
Mr Deniau, Member of the Commission, had this to say on the subject: 
'The  Commission  is  obviously  in  a  rather  delicate 
position. It is  at one and the same time the guardian 
of the Treaties  and is  therefore  responsible  for  the 
general balance between the institutions, and it is the 
main organ controlled or affected inasmuch as under 
Article 205 of the Treaty it is  the Commission which 
is  responsible for executing the whole budget of the 
Communities. Furthermore, it is obviously the budget 
section which more immediately concerns it which is 
by far the most important. 
In this matter, therefore, I am completely willing and 
determi~ed to strengthen the controls. 
This being the case, the work must be divided up in 
a  completely  clear  way  and  far  from  rivalling  or 
1  Doc. 298/72. 
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opposing each other, the various controls which may 
exist must be complementary in their functions  and 
independent in their organization and operation. 
The internal control forms part of  the execution of  the 
budget and is thus the sole responsibility of  the Com-
mission. The function of this control is essentially of 
a preventive character. It  is a question of enlightening 
the Commission as to the legality of  acts of  a budgetary 
nature and their  compliance  with  the  principles  of 
good financi~:~l administration so as to give a warning 
which  may enable it to avoid  any errors or abuses 
which  might  be  committed.  Should  its  financial 
controller refuse his  endorsement-and I  would say 
at once that here again I personally consider that the powers,  authority  and  methods  of investigation  of 
our :financial controller should be strengthened-it is 
up to the European Commission, as you know, to take 
the :final  decision  and possibly  overrule  this  refusal 
to  endorse,  for  reasons  which  may  be  of general 
interest.  In  exercising  this  responsibility  the  Com-
mission  naturally remains  subject  to the control of 
the budgetary authority through the discharge proce-
dure. 
On the  other hand,  the supervision  effected  by the 
Audit Board is external and a posteriori. This emerges 
clearly from Article 206 of  the Treaty: just as Article 205 
made the European Commission responsible for the 
execution of the budget, so Article 206 states explicitly 
that the accounts for the total revenue and expenditure 
shall be examined by an Audit Board and that it shall 
make its  report after the end of the :financial  year. 
What is involved is an assessment which may be a very 
broad one, of all the legal and economic aspects of  the 
budgetary administration of the Community once it is 
completed. It thus goes without saying that an inter-
vention by the Audit Board in the execution of the 
current  budget  would  be  contrary  to  the  terms  of 
Article 205, which reserves this responsibility for the 
European Commission. 
It seems to me of vital importance to separate these 
two types of control, each one having a highly impor-
tant mission which it must be fully able to perform, 
and  which  missions  are  complementary.  The  text 
submitted to you for consultation duly observes this 
principle. It  is this which has enabled the Commission 
to  accept the numerous and by no means negligible 
amendments which this draft introduces in respect of 
the  powers  of the Audit Board and the  conditions 
governing their exercise. In this extension we  are no 
doubt limited  by the Treaties  of which  I  have just 
recalled the basic provisions and by the actual status 
of the Audit Board, which it will be up to the bud-
getary authority to modify if necessary. 
Within this double limit, however,  the strengthening 
of  the external control as  proposed is  already signifi-
cant. It is this which has enabled the Commission to 
assent to these provisions, more especially by reason 
of the considerable improvement which Article 85  of 
the  new  :financial  regulation  gives  to  the  working 
methods of the Audit Board.  Henceforth the Com-
mission  has  the  assurance  that the controls will  be 
effected at a high level when important matters are at 
stake, and that the executive tasks of the control will 
be carried out under the authority of the Audit Board 
itself. 
Thus most of the objections which the Commission 
could feel  about a  practice which has hitherto been 
somewhat faulty, against extending the powers of the 
Audit Board,  become pointless,  a  fact  which  I  per-
sonally welcome. The present text seems to me good, 
clear and coherent. 
'I believe it is not possible, as I have already said, to 
mix two functions together. And, as much as I should 
like the Audit Board, an institution for which I have 
the greatest respect, to have its powers increased and 
its vocation to some extent transformed into a kind of 
European Audit Office,  I believe it is not wise to mix 
statutorily the function of  an Audit Office with that of 
a body or organ which is certainly less eminent. which 
might  for  instance  be  the  general  Inspectorate  of 
Finance. These are not the same functions,  nor the 
same tasks. The one is bound to the Executive and the 
execution of the budget, the other is a control effected 
a  posteriori,  on  the  basis  of vouchers  and,  where 
necessary, on the spot once the :financial year is closed. 
In any case this would place us in an extremely difficult 
position  as  regard  the  strict  interpretation  of the 
Treaty. 
With  regard to  the complementary  nature of these 
two  controls,  however,  I  believe  that  a  number of 
important steps have already been taken and, as  you 
know, it is  now planned-and I  personally am very 
happy  about  it,  for  I  have  always  favoured  this 
solution-that all cases in which the European Com-
mission overrules a refusal by its :financial controller 
to  give  his  endorsement must be submitted to the 
Audit Board. For if the European Commission does 
overrule such a refusal, it must have very good reasons 
for doing so, and in my opinion it is  most advisable 
that it should explain these reasons to others.  I  feel 
this point is one of the most important improvements 
in the text we have before us.' 
Speaking  on  behalf of the  European  Democratic Union, Mr Offroy called for the  institut~on 
of a 'dialogue' between the Committee for Finance and Budgets and the Audit Board: 
'If, for instance, once every three months the members 
of  the Audit Board could discuss with the members of 
the parliamentary Committee for Finance and Budgets 
the question of the execution of the budget and the 
control effected by this Board, such a dialogue would 
be of value for it would certainly make it possible to 
discern  on  what  points  the  European  Parliament 
should exercise its vigilance. We could than report to 
the. Parliament on these various points. These neces-
sary personal contacts between the members of the 
Audit Board and the members of the parliamentary 
Committee  should  thus  be  adcied  to  the  relations 
provided for in the draft regulation.' 
But as far as the amendment was concerned, Mr Offroy shared Mr Deniau's view: 
'This amendment is  contrary, not only to Article 205 
quoted by Mr Deniau but also to Article 206 of the 
Rome Treaty, which indicates that the .control must 
be effected  by the Audit Board after the closing of 
each :financial year. By providing for controls during 
the :financial year, the amendment thus runs formally 
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hope that Parliament will not adopt it. It seems to me 
that there is on the part of the authors of this amend-
ment a confusion between what we call in our country 
the Inspectorate of Finance and the Audit Office. The 
Inspectorate of Finance  comes under the executive 
authority and obviously acts during the execution of 
the budget, by forestalling any obstacles which might 
arise in applying the budgetary rules. The Audit Office, 
on  the  contrary,  acts  after  the  winding  up  of the 
budget, to check whether the rules have been applied. 
There must not be any confusion between these two 
bodies, and that is  why I  think it advisable, on this 
point, to abide by the amendments proposed by the 
Committee for Finance and Budgets. 
I should like to point out, moreover, as a member of 
the  Committee  for  Finance  and  Budgets  and  as 
Rapporteur  on  the  budget  of the  European  Com-
munities, that after having been discussed and rejected 
by  the  Committee  the proposal of Mr Aigner and 
Mr Gerlach has finally not been incorporated in the 
report  and  proposals  of  Miss  Flesch.  We  should 
therefore  keep  to  the  amendments  proposed  by 
Miss Flesch.' 
Mr Gerlach (Socialist,  Germany) justified his  amendment by referring to common practice in 
national Audit Offices: 
'The proposed amendment that I am moving here, has 
nothing at all to do with Article 205, but takes up a 
practice that is common in national Audit Offices. 
I should like to refer you to an article written by the 
President of the Federal Audit Office:  '15,000 million 
without  adequate  supervision:  we  need  a  European 
Audit Office' by Mr Schafer, President of the Federal 
.  Audit Office.  In it he shows, giving very  precise and 
d.(ftailed evidence that we must expand the functions of 
the existing Audit Board into a type of  European Audit 
Office.  I quote from the law constituting the Federal 
Audit Office in the Federal Republic. Paragraph 88 (2) 
reads: On the basis of audit results, the Federal Audit 
Office  can advise  the Bundestag,  the Bundesrat, the 
Federal Government and individual Federal Ministers. 
Translated  into  our  terms,  this  means  that  the 
European Audit Office, or to use current terminology 
the  Audit  Board,  can  advise  Parliament  and  the 
Council of Ministers on the basis of audit results. My 
proposal says  no more than this  and it does not in 
any way affect the Commission's budgetary rights. 
I  find  it very  surprising  that  the  Commission  has 
changed its view of the Audit Board in this way. I am 
very pleased, but it has no consequences. It does not 
accept  genuine  supervision  as  it  really  should,  but 
rejects any supervision of the efficiency of the budget 
management and accounting. And we, the Parliament 
as  an authority and also  the  Council of Ministers, 
want to commission the Audit Board with reports and 
analyses so that it can introduce additional checks at 
our request, as a result of our own decisions, and not 
merely when the accounts are closed.' 
To  settle  the  matter  Mr Bertrand  (Christian  Democrat,  Belgium)  proposed  a  change  in the 
amendment: 
'I should also like to request those moving the amend-
ment to make a small alteration, that would make it 
possible for an analysis or report to be given regarding 
specific problems. This can be asked of the Commis-
sion or of the Council. The text of the amendment, 
however,  runs:  'The  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament may request from the Audit Board reports 
or analyses in the matter of  specific problems, and also 
with reference to financial years not expired. This is 
where unlawfulness starts. The Audit Board cannot, 
according  to  Article  206,  prepare  any  reports  on 
unexpired financial years, in view of  the fact that tp_ey 
cannot have sight of  the complete receipts and expen-
diture accounts. I  should therefore like to ask those 
moving  the  amendment  to  agree  to  the  following  · 
wording: 
'The  European  Parliament  may  request  from  the 
Commission or the Council reports or analyses in the 
matter of  specific problems and also with reference to 
unexpired financial years.' Then partial satisfaction is 
achieved. And in this way the first step can be taken. 
I should further like to propose to those moving the 
amendment that they bring up this problem again at 
a time when we are looking at the proposals regarding 
the extension of the budgetary powers of Parliament 
together  with  the  Commission.  Then  will  be  the 
moment for, in fact, proceeding further than provided 
for under Article 206. I would have nothing against it 
if recourse were made to Article 235  of the Treaty in 
order to effect an amendment of  Article 206, as a result 
of which  the audit could be tightened and an audit 
office could be set up such as we have in our national 
parliaments.' 
Following the debate the changed amendment proposed by Mr Bertrand
1 was added to Article 90 
of the draft financial regulations despite opposition from Mr Gerlach. 
1  See page 121. 
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of its control functions  · 
During its meeting on 14 May 1971, the Committee for Finance and Budgets found that a detailed 
examination of the manner in which the Audit Board exercised its functions  in practice was 
essential and instructed Mr Gerlach (Socialist, Germany) to look into the matter. 
1.  Mr Gerlach's analysis 
In 1971  two memoranda, one from the Commission and the other from the Audit Board, both 
of them relating to the powers of the Audit Board and the procedures employed in exercising 
them, were referred to the Committee for Finance and Budgets. 
In his analysis, Mr Gerlach listed the points which had given rise to divergent interpretations. 
Serious  divergences  of interpretation have arisen on 
the following provisions: 
(i)  the accounts of  all revenue and expenditure shown 
in  the  budget  shall  be  examined...  (Art.  206, 
para. 1 of the Treaty establishing the EEC); 
(ii)  the nature of the retrospective control exercised 
by the Audit Board; 
(iii) verification of sound financial management; 
(iv)  the audit performed on the spot and the availa-
bility of  documents .in accordance with Article 206, 
para. 2 of the Treaty establishing the EEC and 
the  aforementioned  Article  8  of the  financial 
regulations; 
(v)  the delimitation of  the internal and external audit 
functions; 
(vi)  the contacts of the Audit Board with the Com-
munity  institutions  and in  particular  with  the 
budget authorities. 
(a) The question of  the 'global audit' of  budget accounts, 
revenue and expenditure 
In accordance with Article 206, para. 1 of the Treaty 
establishing the EEC, 'the accounts of  all revenue and 
expenditure shown in the budget shall be examined by 
an Audit Board  ... '.  In the abovementioned  memo-
randum from the Commission on the Audit Board's 
powers, reference is made to the Board's undertaking 
a  'global audit', the word 'global' being intended to 
mean  'carried  out en  bloc'  rather  than  'complete, 
relating  to  all  the accounts'.  The Commission  thus 
places  a  highly restrictive,  if not one-sided interpre-
tation on the idea contained in the Treaty of an audit 
of the accounts of 'all revenue and expenditure'. 
The Audit Board considers that the expression 'global 
audit'-which  is  not  found  in  the  Treaties-is 
ambiguous.  In  its  view,  the  use  of the  word  'all' 
simply means that no revenue or expenditure may be 
excluded from the audit; in no way does it imply that 
the audit should be restricted or carried out en bloc. 
A  'global  audit'  would  mean  that. the  audit is  not 
performed in minute detail. However, an audit cannot 
be effective unless that is the case and at the very least 
the door should be left open for such detailed exam-
ination in certain cases. 
Strictly speaking, the audit procedures are not specified; 
Neither  the  Commission  nor the  Audit  Board can 
deduce  from  this  provision  of the Treaty practical 
audit procedures that would indicate how the audit 
should  be  performed,  since  it  has  already  been 
established  that  it  relates  to  the  accounts  of all 
revenue and expenditure. 
(b) The problem of'retrospective control' 
In its memorandum the Commission states that the 
Board performs its audit retrospectively since it cannot 
in any circumstances cover revenue that has not yet 
been collected or expenditure that has not yet been 
finally committed. 
In this connection the Commission recalls  Art. 205, 
para.  1 of the EEC Treaty, which provides that the 
Commission shall, in accordance with the provisions 
of the regulations issued pursuant to Art. 209, imple-
ment the budget on  its own  responsibility and within 
the limits of appropriations. Any intervention on the 
part of the Audit Board before completion of  the legal 
acts  resulting  in  budget  revenue  and  expenditure 
would  be  incompatible  with  the  provisions  of the 
treaties. 
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Board acts  after revenue and expenditure have been 
entered in the accounts.  In addition to  estimates of 
expenditure  and  revenue,  commitments,  payments, 
substantial claims etc., accounting also includes items 
which represent mandatory accounting stages in the 
implementation of the budget  ... '. 
The provisions relating to the presentation and audit-
ing of the accounts lay down a fundamental principle, 
viz. that the Board's audit is performed retrospectively. 
Nevertheless, it may be asked whether verification of 
'sound financial management' does not in part require 
concomitant control measures. 
(c)  Verification of  'sound financial management' 
This  is  a  problem which  it  is  important to  resolve 
within the framework of the new financial regulations, 
despite the Commission's observation that it does not 
appear easy to formulate a  satisfactory definition of 
sound financial management. It would be interesting 
to know what proposals the Commission has advanced 
in this matter, pursuant to its obligations. 
The Commission considers that in pursuance of this 
principle, as  set out in Art. 206, para. 2,  of the EEC 
Treaty and in Art.  2  of the financial  regulations of 
30 July 1968 on the establishment and implementation 
of the budget of the European Communities, and on 
the  responsibilities  of the  authorizing  officers  and 
accounting officers, 1 the powers of  the Audit Board do 
not extend to the organization and operation of the 
departments  of the  institutions  as  such,  since  this 
could inhibit all freedom of action. 
For its  part,  the  Audit Board makes  the  following 
statement on this subject: 'Furthermore, it is  also the 
Audit  Board's  task  to  establish  that  the  financial 
management  is  sound;  for  this  purpose  the  Audit 
Board not only requires  access  to the book entries, 
it must also be able to obtain adequate and up-to-date 
information on the methods and procedures governing 
administrative and financial management'. 
The comments  made by  Mr von  der  Groeben  and 
Mr von Boeckh on the Treaty establishing the EEC 
are interesting in this context. In para. 10, they remark 
on the subject of Art. 206:  'contrary to the provisions 
of the Treaty establishing the ECSC (Art. 78, para. 6, 
second  sub-paragraph,  BGBl  II,  1952,  p.  445), 
according to which  the auditor of that Community 
simply checks that accounting operations and financial 
management are properly conducted, the Audit Board 
must not only establish that revenue and expenditure 
are legal and in order but also satisfy itself as to the 
soundness of the financial management. Apart from 
the legal aspect, therefore, the audit is also concerned 
with the economic aspect of financial management. In 
order to be able to satisfy itself as to the soundness of 
the financial management, the Audit Board must also 
check that the budget measures were appropriate. The 
1  See OJ No L 199, 10 August 1968. 
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term financial management should doubtless be taken 
to mean not only  the  actions  of the administrative 
departments  of the  Community  with  regard  to  the 
budget,  but also  the  budgetary  implications  of the 
staffing and material resources of the administrative 
departments themselves. 
This is  in clear contradiction with the Commission's 
view on this question. 
The problem is  to delimit the activities of the Audit 
Board. 
There are three aspects to the limitations on the kind 
of public financial audit under consideration here: 
(a) limits as to the extent and frequency of  the financial 
audit; 
(b) limits in time; 
(c)  limits  with  regard to the institutions (or persons) 
subject to audit. 
The problem of sound financial  management has  a 
bearing on all three points. For instance, an analysis 
of the establishment plan is  useful  in verifying  that 
financial management has been sound and this is but 
one  example  with  reference  to  staff utilization  and 
mobility.  Here  again,  the  Commission  appears  to 
hold a different view. 
However, the principal of  sound financial management 
must also be viewed from the standpoint of business 
management (cost effectiveness). This raises problems 
of organization  and  the  achievement  of maximum 
efficiency with the same or even less  manpower and 
equipment. 
Concomitant control, involving scrutiny of the pro-
cedures  employed  and,  for  example,  an analysis  of 
how internal financial control operates (new provisions 
designed to modernize the public audit system-which 
could also  be applied in the Member States-might 
prove  necessary  here)  constitutes  a  requirement  to 
which  consideration should be given with an eye  to 
future revisions of the Treaty. 
Views  may also  differ  with regard to the limitation 
under point (a)  i.e.  the frequency of  financial control. 
On the one hand, the institution subject to the audit 
must have freedom to organize its assigned adminis-
trative tasks, in other words, there must be no inter-
ference  with  this  freedom or with financial  manage-
ment. On the other hand, the activities of the institu-
tion subject to the audit must be readily intelligible. 
It seems desirable that the concept of 'sound financial 
management'  should  not  be  interpretated  in  an 
excessively restrictive manner. The power of discharge 
and  control  of  the  management  of  expenditure, 
including the administrative expenditure of  Parliament, 
call for more than mere investigation of  the account-
ancy aspects of financial management. 
A  sufficiently broad interpretation of the concept of sound financial management would also be in closer 
keeping with the Commission's own interests. 
In economics, the concept of  sound financial manage-
ment implies an effort to achieve a given objective with 
the least possible resources, or, conversely, to obtain 
the best possible result with available resources. It is 
generally accepted that an external audit does not com-
prise  an  evaluation  of the  specified  objective,  but 
consists only in establishing to what extent the resources 
employed to  achieve  that objective are  consistent with 
sound management.  However, political control of the 
implementation of the budget must establish whether 
due regard has been given to the overall objectives of 
the budget and their relationship with one another. 
A close definition of  the concept of  sound management 
is thus difficult, if only because it is  often impossible 
to make an accurate arithmetical comparison between 
the resources employed and the result obtained; this 
is  frequently  the  case with  administrative  activities. 
Owing to the special nature of the  activities  of the 
Community  institutions,  cost  effectiveness  analyses 
are difficult  to make.  Plainly,  the concept of sound 
financial  management  cannot  provide  self-evident 
premises  for  decision-making  from  which  exact 
inferences can be drawn. For  this reason  the problem 
of sound financial  management  must  be  considered 
afresh  for  certain  groups  of cases,  or  even  for  each 
individual  case.  For  a  proper  assessment  of sound 
financial management, none of  the evaluation criteria 
must be left out of account. 
The members of the Audit Board in their capacity as 
'judges' must therefore exercise considerable caution 
in  this  area,  but should,  at the  same  time,  take  a 
broader view of their duties under the Treaty estab-
lishing the EEC. 
The problems  discussed  recently  by the  Committee 
for  Finance  and  Budgets  in  connection  with  the 
management of  public funds in the Communities have 
shown  that  sound  financial  management  requires 
unremitting attention. 
(d) Audits performed on  the  spot  and availability  of 
records 
In accordance with Article 206,  paragraph 2,  of the 
Treaty establishing the EEC, the audit performed by 
the  Audit Board shall  be  based on records  and, if 
necessary, on the spot. 
The Commission takes the view that the audit should 
be based on records and that the Audit Board's fact-
finding  powers ought essentially  to  take the form of 
requests in writing,  on-the-spot audits being carried out 
only in exceptional circumstances. 
The Audit Board contends that 'the difficulties which 
have arisen stem on the contrary from a  refusal  to 
allow records held by the management departments 
to  be  consulted  (for  example,  the  refusal  by  the 
EAGGF  departments  to  allow  inspection  of files 
relating  to  'guidance'  projects  financed  from  1964 
appropriations  but  still  not  closed  at  the  end  of 
1970).' 
For the purpose of  administrative simplification, it will 
often  be  preferable  to  perform  audits  on  the  spot 
rather  than  in  the  form  of written  requests.  The 
written procedure can involve too many formalities. 
Examination of files  and direct access  to the depart-
ments  concerned  are  a  commonplace  feature  of 
comparable  activities  exercised  by  national  audit 
bodies. 
Apart from establishing whether they should constitute 
the  exception-which can  certainly not be  inferred 
from the text of the Treaty-it may also be asked who 
is  to decide whether on-the-spot audits are necessary 
or not.  This  decision  should lie  with  the  audit  body 
rather than the institution concerned. 
The Treaty provision stipulating that the audit shall 
be based on records  and, if necessary,  on the spot, 
certainly  suggests  that  on-the-spot audits  should be 
restricted, but not that they should be exceptional. 
In  particularly  important  and  delicate  matters  a 
member of  the Audit Board should be present at such 
audits and the only assignment given to officials should 
be to carry out preliminary research.  1 
(e)  Delimitation  of and co-operation between internal 
and external control 
In the Commission's view, co-operation between internal 
financial control by the institutions and the Board's 
external audit can be  disputed on legal  grounds.  It 
considers that the two  are totally separate as regards 
both  procedures  and  the  nature  of the  operations 
involved.  Consequently,  referral  by  the  internal 
financial control department to the Audit Board-as 
proposed by the Committee for Finance and Budgets 
should  the  financial  Controller  refuse  his  endorse-
ment-would exceed  the  Board's powers.  Since  the 
Audit Board's control is  retrospective,  and internal 
control carried out concomitantly, the two functions 
should be clearly distinguished. 
The  Audit  Board  has  pointed  out that  'the  Audit 
Board's lack of information  on  internal control gives 
cause for concern with regard to  the financial manage-
ment of the  Communities.  It restricts the effectiveness 
of the  audits,  leads  to  gaps  and duplication  of effort 
and  prevents  the  Audit  Board  from  assessing  the 
effectiveness of  internal control'. 
While  direct  relations  between  internal  control and 
external audit are desirable  to ensure  a  satisfactory 
exchange of information in this field,  there must be 
no sharing of responsibilities as a result. 
1  This will be settled in the new Article 85 of the general financial regulations, see page 121. 
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the  Audit  Board  should  be  informed  of any  gaps 
revealed by internal control. This applies also to the 
rules governing internal control. 
The Audit Board's contention  that internal control 
and external  audit pursue  the  same  aim cannot be 
accepted without reservation. The fact is that internal 
control is  itself subject to the much more searching 
external audit. It  is concerned with the implementation 
of  the budget and for the time being at any rate, serves 
what is more or less a 'security' purpose. 
Close collaboration between the two is necessary and 
desirable,  and is  in fact the rule,  if not the guiding 
principle behind the concept of auditing,  in several 
Member States. 
In the final  analysis,  the Audit Board must be in a 
position at all  times  to evaluate the effectiveness  of 
internal  control  and  must  therefore  be  informed 
without delay of all relevant provisions. 
(f) Contacts between the Audit Board and Community 
bodies, in particular the budget authorities 
The Commission infers from Article 206 para. 3 of the 
Treaty establishing the EEC which stipulates that 'the 
Commission shall submit annually to the Council and 
to the Assembly the accounts of  the preceding financial 
year  relating  to  the  implementation  of the  budget, 
together  with  the report of the Audit Board',  that 
'it was not the intention of  the treaties to establish under 
this sytem direct relations between the Audit Board  and 
the  institutions  in  whom  the  power  of decision  in 
budgetary matters is vested'. It goes on to stress that: 
'a direct contact is established only between the Audit 
Board  and  the  Commission  on the  one hand,  and 
between the latter and the institutions authorized by 
the treaties  to give  it a  discharge in respect of the 
implementation of the budget, on the other'. 
The Audit Board strongly disputes this view:  'there is 
nothing in the treaties which restricts either directly 
or indirectly, direct contacts between the Audit Board 
and  the  various  institutions  of  the  Communities. 
It would at the  very  least  be  surprising  if,  under  the 
discharge procedure, for example, the budget authority 
were to receive explanations direct from the institution 
subject to the audit, but could not from the control body. 
On  the  contrary,  direct  contacts  with  the  budgetary 
authorities are basic to  the role of the  external audit 
body,  one of whose  essential tasks is  to provide these 
authorities with valid information to the fullest necessary 
extent'. 
In the exercise of  its supervisory function, Parliament, 
by its very structure, is largely dependent on the Audit 
Board, and this makes direct relations essential. These 
should even go so far as to include the possibility for 
the Audit Board to carry out special investigations in 
specific cases, at the request of  Parliament. Conversely, 
the Audit Board ought to be entitled to pass informa-
tion to the budgetary authorities independently of the 
annual report, and to establish the required contacts 
should anomalies be brought to its notice.1 
In  the  Member  States  such  relations  between  the 
Control bodies (audit offices) and the government and 
Parliament are regarded as normal and useful. 
The Commission's position on this matter is  legally 
untenable and is  not supported by present practice. 
It  represents  a  retrograde  step  in  relation  to  the 
present situation, and would probably not be in the 
interests of the Commission itself.' 
2.  The opinion of  the Committee for Finance and Budgets 
On 23  February 1973,  the Committee for Finance and Budgets discussed and  adopted unani-
mously a motion for a resolution submitted by Mr Gerlach. The motion was  to be debated at 
the March part-session of the Parliament but was deferred to a later date. The motion reads as 
follows
2
: 
The European Parliament, 
(i)  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 1971 3
, 
and especially point 16 thereof to the effect that 
the  exercise  by  the  Audit Board of its  powers 
should  be  more  clearly  defined  in conjunction 
with all the institutions and bodies concerned so 
that the responsibility of each Community insti-
tution becomes apparent in the course of  auditing 
and budgetary management, 
(ii)  having  regard to the  statute  laid  down  by  the 
Council  in  1959  for  the  Communities'  Audit 
Board,"' 
1  When the general financial Regulations were debated in February 1973, an  amendment  to  this  effect  was rejected by Parliament and 
a new paragraph added at the end of Article 90- See page  1~6. 
2  Doc. 321/72. 
3  OJ No C 66,  1 July 1971, p. 43. 
4  OJ No 46,  17 August 1959. 
128 (iii)  having regard to the views of the chairmen of  the 
national audit offices,  as  put to the Committee 
for Finance and Budgets on 14 and 15 September 
1972; 
(iv)  having regard to the new proposals concerning 
the European Communities' budgetary arrange-
ments with regard to the Audit Board (especially 
Articles 85  to 92, Doc. 247 /72), 
(v)  having regard to the powers conferred upon it by 
Article 206 of the EEC Treaty, 
(vi)  having regard to the report of the Committee for 
Finance and Budgets (Doc. 321/72), 
A.  General principles 
1.  Considers that if it is to carry out responsibly the 
obligation imposed on it by Article 206  of the 
EEC Treaty to give a discharge in respect of the 
implementation of the budget, the Audit Board, 
as  the external audit body of the Communities, 
must be given the necessary powers not only in 
hudgetary law but also in practice; 
2.  Considers that the importance of the Community 
budget and the mass and complexity of budget 
operations, including those within  the Commu-
nity Fund, call for  improved practical arrange-
ments for the performance by the Audit Board of 
its duties; 
3.  Calls for the statute laid down by the Council in 
1959 for the Audit Board to be revised in accord-
ance with  the  progress  already  achieved in the 
European Communites' budgetary arrangements 
and  with  regard  to  the  Community's financial 
autonomy based on its own resources; 
4.  Calls for revision of  the Treaty provisions so that 
the Audit Board is  made into a European Audit 
Office by analogy with national audit offices; 
5.  Therefore agrees  with the Commission that the 
new  budgetary arrangements,  in so far  as  they 
affect  the  Audit  Board,  should  be only  provi-
sional; 
B.  Practical auditing arrangements 
6.  Agrees with the Commission of the Communities 
that the work of  the Audit Board consists basically 
in  retroactive  supervision  of the  financial  and 
budgetary  management  of  the  Communities 
but-having regard also to point 3 of this resolu-
tion-calls for exceptions to this principle, since 
Parliament's  supervisory  function  must  be 
constantly safeguarded, especially in the budget-
ary field; 
7.  Demands therefore: 
(i)  that the work of the Audit Board should not 
be confined to drawing up its annual report; 
(ii)  that Council and Parliament, as the budget-
ary authorities, may require the Audit Board 
to  investigate  given  situations  even  before 
the accounts relating to the budget have been 
closed and while the budget is  being imple-
mented; 
(iii)  that the Audit Board may inform Council 
and Parliament, as the budgetary authorities, 
of serious cases even before the completion 
of the financial year; 
8.  Considers that special provisions must be issued 
to enable the Audit Board to establish the sound-
ness of financial  management, and that for this 
purpose it must be given wide-ranging powers to 
enable it,  as an external body, to acquire a deep 
insight into the organization and administration 
of the  Community  organs  and  institutions.  In 
many cases it will not be sufficient for the Audit 
Board, or any staff to whom it may delegate its 
powers,  to depend solely on records:  'Financial 
management must include not only those activities 
of the Community's administrative departments 
which directly affect the budget, but also all the 
financial effects of the expansion-both in regard 
to  personnel  and  in  a  material .  sense-of the 
departments themselves';  1 
9.  Calls  attention,  however,  to  the  generally 
accepted view that it is  not part of the external 
auditing function to comment on the purpose for 
which funds are allocated, but solely to establish 
whether the funds used for that purpose meet the 
requirements of sound management; 
to.  Emphasizes that it is  the Audit Board's duty to 
satisfy  itself  as  to  the  efficiency  of  internal 
financial  audit, and that this  calls  for  a  special 
liaison  between  external  and  internal  auditing 
which should not, however, obliterate the line of 
demarcation between the two; 
11.  Firmly  opposes  any  delay  in  producing corre-
spondence  or other documents  likely  to  throw 
light on the accounts; 
12.  Considers that the audits performed by the Audit 
Board on the spot, as provided for in the Treaties, 
are  by  no  means  of an  exceptional  character 
requiring  greater  formalities,  but  an  essential 
part of any public accounting procedure; 
13.  Welcomes the provision in Article 89  of.the new 
financial regulations that 'the grant of subsidies 
to bodies outside the Community shall be subject 
to acceptance by the recipient of examination by 
the Audit Board of use made of such grants'; 
14.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution 
and the committee's report to the  Commission 
and Council of the European Communities. 
1  Commentary on Article 206 of the EEC Treaty/Von der Groeben: Boeckh. 
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EXPERIENCE OF EXTERNAL AUDITING IN THE MEMBER STATES 
The European Parliament has intimated on several occasions that it would welcome the establish-
ment of a  European Audit Office.  It would therefore seem  useful  to conclude this  document 
with a report on the various audit offices or similar bodies in the various countries, together with 
extracts from the proceedings of a meeting organized by the Committee for Finance and Budgets 
with the directors of the audit offices or their representatives. 
I  - Brief description of the bodies responsible for external auditing in the Mem-
ber States 
II  - The views of the audit offices in the Member States on: 
1.  Control of revenue 
2.  CoQtrol of expenditure 
3.  Cooperation between the audit offices and the national parliaments 
Section I - Brief description of the bodies responsible for external auditing 
in the Member States 
The bodies responsible for external auditing of the budget in the Member States vary both as 
regards their juridical constitution and their authority. The following brief account of each of 
these  national bodies is  not a  comparative study of the legislation in the nine  countries,  but 
simply a description of their main features. There is a slightly more detailed analysis of the audit 
offices in three Member States: the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United King-
dom. 
1.  FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
In its present form the 'Bundesrechnungshof' is the outcome of a long and continuous develop-
ment starting with the institution of the Prussian 'Oberrechnungskammer' in 1714,  which after 
1824 became an independent auxiliary body responsible only to the Crown. 
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and in  1871  it became the 'Rechnungshof des  Deutschen Reiches'; reorganized after the First 
World War, it faded into relative insignificance under the Third Reich.  Paradoxically enough, 
it was at this time that a debate arose as to whether the 'Rechnungshof' should not become the 
fourth (supervisory) power in the state. 
On the basis of the 'Reichshaushaltsordnung' (Imperial Budget Order) a new 'Gesetz tiber Er-
richtung und Aufgaben des Bundesrechnungshofs' (Act relating to the establishment and respon-
sibilities of the Bundesrechnungshof)
1 was passed on 27 November 1950. 
The constitutional basis of the activities of the 'Bundesrechnungshof' as the external audit body 
of the Federal Republic is called today, is to be found in Article 114 of the Basic Law.  Under 
Article 114 (2) its members enjoy judicial independence and its powers are regulated by federal 
legislation.  The regulation of these powers was  revised  within the framework  of the 'Bundes-
haushaltsordnung'  (Federal  Budget  Order)
2  (especially  Arts.  88-104  and Art.  114)  and in the 
'Haushaltsgrundsatzegesetz'  (Act  relating to  the  basic  principles  of the  budget-Arts. 42-47) 
as part of the German budget reform. 
Finally it should be noted that as the country has a federal  structure, the 'Land' audit offices 
are responsible for controlling local finance. They may also act on behalf of the Federal Govern-
ment by administrative delegation. 
The significant fact is that the historical development of the various audit offices has increasingly 
led to a shift in emphasis from a purely book-keeping· check of budget accounts and economy 
to a control of  the expediency of  expenditure and current auditing. Today the Bundesrechnungshof 
supervises the whole budgetary and economic management of all Federal organs and authorities. 
There is  also an increasingly large field in which the Bundesrechnungshof provides an advisory 
service to the government and parliament, putting its experience at their service and establishing 
for itself a place in the area of conflicting interests surrounding the Executive and Legislature. 
I-ORGANIZATION OF  THE BUNDESRECHNUNGSHOF 
1.  Members of  the Bundesrechnungshof 
Under Section  11  of the Act regulating the establishment and responsibilities  of the Bundes-
rechnungshof its members are the President, the Vice-President and the Directors, together with 
a  number  of specially  appointed  'Ministerialrate'  (Ministerial  Advisors).  They  enjoy juridical 
independence and as far as their legal status is concerned, particularly as  regards reassignment, 
removal from office and disciplinary procedure, they are subject to the special regulations applying 
to judges of the Supreme Federal Court. 
The members are appointed by the President of the Federal Republic on the sole recommendation 
of the Federal Minister of Finance, the remaining officials being appointed by the President of 
the Bundesrechnungshof. 
At the present time the Bundesrechnungshof has 49 members. 
1  Bundesgesetzblatt p. 765. 
2  The date of both is 19 August 1969 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, pages 1273 and 1284 respectively). 
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least 35  years  of age.  As  a rule such officials  will  be qualified judges or senior administrative 
officials. 
In order to be appointed members, and thus attain juridical independence, ministerial advisers 
must be heads of an audit department.  · 
2.  Organization of  the work of  the Bundesrechnungshof 
The President directs and supervises the entire work of the Rechnungshof; he is responsible for 
the organization of the administration,  for  the assignment  of duties  and for representing the 
Rec~nungshof  in its relations with outside bodies. 
At the same time he is the Chairman of the Board of the 'Deutsche Revisions- and Treuhand-
gesellschaft mbH' (German Auditing and Trust Company) and federal inspector of administra-
tive economy, a post which is rapidly gaining in importance within the framework of evaluation 
activities. 
The  President is  assisted  by  a  presidential  department with  a  statutory organization.  This  is 
significant in as far as the principle of collegiality is made subservient to the principle of respon-
sible management. The presidential department deals with all matters which do not fall  within 
the scope of the auditing activity of the Bundesrechnungshof as  such. 
The federal structure of the Republic is reflected in the 'Vereinigter Senat', consisting of  members 
of  the Bundesrechnungshof and the supreme auditing authority in each of the Lander. 
The Bundesrechnungshof itself is organized in divisions, each responsible for a different area of 
auditing. A division consists of five members. The 'GroBer Senat' is the highest decision-making 
authority in the Bundesrechnungshof. It  not only lays down the rules of procedure but also meets 
when matters arise which touch on the competence of more than one division. 
Decisions in the 'GroBer Senat' and in the other divisions are by majority voting,  abstentions 
not being allowed. The chairman has a casting vote; the chairman of each division is the Presi-
dent, who may be represented by the Vice-President. 
II  - RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUNDESRECHNUNGSHOF 
The responsibilities of the Bundesrechnungshof are laid down in the 'Gesetz iiber Errichtung und 
Aufgaben des Bundesrechnungshofs' (Act relating to the establishment and tasks of the Bundes-
rechnungshof),  the  'Bundeshaushaltsordnung'  (Federal  Budget  Order)  and  the  'Haushalts-
grundsatzegesetz' (Act relating to the basic principles of the budget). 
Under these acts the Bundesrechnungshof is  responsible for auditing the entire budgetary and 
economic management of the Federal Republic including state-operated funds and corporations. 
Parallel with the traditional checking of accounts to ensure that budget management is in line 
with the basic principles of good order and appropriateness, there is  now also what is  known 
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federal departments on the directions of the Rechnungshof. 
In accordance with Article 90  of the 'Bundeshaushaltsordnung' the purpose of this audit is  to 
ascertain compliance with the regulations and basic principles applicable to budgetary and econ-
omic activities, and especially whether 
(1)  the Budget Act and the budget estimates are being properly implemented, 
(2)  revenue and expenditure are justified and supported by documentary evidence  and budget 
accounts and those of special funds are properly established, 
(3)  due and proper economy is observed, 
(4)  the task could be carried out with less staff or material expenditure, or in another way, more 
effectively. 
The Rechnungshof also examines measures which may have financial implications. 
A further responsibility of the Bundesrechnungshof is  to advise, on the basis of  auditing experi-
ence,  the Bundestag,  the  Bundesrat,  the Federal Government and the individual federal minis-
ters.  'In as  far as  the Bundesrechnungshof advises the Bundestag or the Bundesrat, it shall at 
the same time inform the Federal Government'. (Article 88, Bundeshaushaltsordnung). 
The advice may be given at the initiative of the Bundesrechnungshof or at the request of the body 
advised. 
As the financial activities ofthe Federal Republic are no longer completely covered by the budget 
estimates and the budget accounts, the Bundesrechnungshof also has to audit the entrepreneurial 
activities of the Federal Republic, bearing commercial principles in mind. 
Finally, one of the most important tasks of the Rechnungshof is to sum up the conclusions of 
its audits in an annual report for the Bundestag and the Bundesrat; this report is also forwarded 
to the Federal Government and forms the basis for the discharge which the latter is given. 
The specific provisions of the Bundeshaushaltsordnung Article 97 (2) are: 
'The comments shall state': 
(1)  Whether the figures  in the budget accounts  and the statement of special funds  tally with 
the books and whether the audited revenues and expenditure are properly' documented, 
(2)  In what  significant  cases  the  regulations  and  basic  principles  of budgetary  and financial 
management have not been observed, 
(3)  Wha!  substantive  complaints  have  arisen  from  the  audit  of corporations  with  their  own 
legal personality, 
(4)  What measures are recommended for the future. 
In accordance with Article 97  (3)  of the Bundeshaushaltsordnung, the comments can also refer 
to future or previous budget years. 
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law if they are in receipt of statutory federal  subsidies,  or are administered by the State or if 
audit has been agreed upon with the Bundesrechnungshof. 
III - CONTROL PROCEDURES APPLIED BY THE BUNDESRECHNUNGSHOF 
1.  Auditing by preliminary audit branches 
Preliminary auditing covers not only revenues, expenditure, commitments to expenditure, assets 
and debts but also extends to activities for which formal accounts have not yet been established. 
Article  100  of the  Bundeshaushaltsordnung  expressly  mentions  'measures'  which  may  have 
financial implications. The preliminary auditing branches are directly responsible to the director 
of the authority in question; the heads of the preliminary audit branches are, however, appointed 
and dismissed on consultation with the Bundesrechnungshof and must comply with the profes-
sional instructions of the latter. 
By this process expenditure can be audited more speedily and closer to the actual date of dis-
bursement. 
2.  Scope of  audits 
The Rechnungshof can limit the audit as it sees fit and leave accounts unaudited, but this does 
not mean that its audits are limited to 'accounts'. In this way, it is easier to submit audit results 
in good time to the parliamentary bodies responsible for issuing a discharge. 
3.  Timing and nature of  audit, obligation to provide information and the consequences of  the results 
of  the audit 
Under Article 94 of  the Bundeshaushaltsordnung the timing and nature of  the audit is determined 
by the Rechnungshof which may have the necessary on-the-spot investigations made by its agents. 
It may also call on the assistance of experts. 
'In agreement with the Federal Minister responsible, the Bundesrechnungshof may also set up 
audit offices within the federal administration.' (Bundeshaushaltsordnung Article 94 (3)) 
Any required documents must be forwarded or presented to authorized officials on request within 
a specified period. 
Another important provision is  that the departments concerned must comment on the results 
of the audit within a period laid down by the Rechnungshof. 
Audit results  which raise basic issues  or matters of substantial financial  significance  are com-
municated to the Minister of Finance. 
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porated in the annual report. 
4.  Payment of  compensation and matters of  particular importance 
Claims for compensation are referred immediately by the Bundesrechnungshof to the responsible 
authorities. 
Article 99 of the Bundeshaushaltsordnung contains a provision which has considerably improved 
Parliament's supervisory powers: 'On matters of particular importance the Bundesrechnungshof 
may inform the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Federal Government at any time'. 
5.  Parliamentary discharge procedure and the position of  the Bundesrechnungshof 
The provisions of Article 114 of the Basic Law and Article 114 of the Bundeshaushaltsordnung 
make it clear that parliamentary control is  not confined to a decision for or against discharge 
of the Federal Government in respect of the accounts but rather should help to redress existing 
and prevent future misappropriations of public funds. 
The conclusions suggested by audits must be reflected in positive measures resulting from the 
interaction of Rechnungshof and Parliament. 
The attendance of a representative from the Bundesrechnungshof at meetings of the Bundestag 
Rechnungsprlifungsausschusses (audit committee) is a practical illustration of this interaction. 
The provisions of Article 114 of the Bundeshaushaltsordnung are of such great importance that 
they are quoted below in full: 
'(1)  The Federal Minister of Finance shall in the course of the next financial year render account 
to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat of all revenue and expenditure, and of assets and liabilities, 
with a view to the discharge of the Federal Government (Article 114 (1)  of the Basic Law). The 
Bundesrechnungshof shall  report  directly  to  the  Bundestag,  the  Bundesrat  and  the  Federal 
Government. 
(2)  Having regard to the opinion of the Bundesrat, the Bundestag shall establish the essential 
facts and decide on measures to be introduced. 
(3)  Individual matters may be referred back to the Bundesrechnungshof for further classification. 
(  4)  The Bundestag shall specify  a  date by which the Federal Government shall report to the 
Bundestag and the  Bundesrat  on the  measures  introduced. If measures  do  not achieve  their 
intended purpose, both the Bundestag and Bundesrat may reconsider the matter. 
(  5)  Either the Bundestag or the Bundesrat may expressly disapprove of certain items.' 
The above provisions and, not least, the publication of the reports of the Rechnungshof ensure 
that the comments  appended to the audit made by the  Bundesrechnungshof are not merely 
intellectual exercises  but contribute to continual improvement in the use  of public funds.  The 
ideal of careful management that inspired the Prussian Oberrechnungshof mentioned earlier has 
thus evolved into a modern system of control of public finance by an audit office. 
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AUDIT OFFICES (LANDESRECHNUNGSHOFE) 
Under Article  109  of the Basic Law the Federation and 'Lander' have separate budgets which 
they administer independently of each other. 
As  part of the 1969 budget reform, Article 109 (3)  of the Basic Law was redrafted to allow the 
introduction  of the  necessary  legislative  powers  to  make  basic  budget  legislation  applicable 
equally to the Federation and the 'Lander', thus ensuring uniform budgetary administration. 
From the point of view of financial management, however, the responsibilities of the Federation 
and the 'Lander' cannot be as  clearly demarcated as  provided for in the constitution and this 
does not simply apply to cases of 'joint expenditure' where in any event the principle of separation 
is infringed. The result is that there are numerous areas of overlap in the submission of accounts 
and auditing by the federal  and provincial Audit Offices.  Article 45  of the Basic Budget Law 
makes due allowance for this fact: 
'If more than one Audit Office  is  responsible, the audit shall  be  carried out jointly.  Inas-
much as the constitution does not require the audit to be performed by a specified Audit Office, 
responsibilities in this field may be delegated by agreement between the Audit Offices.' 
A distinction should be made between cases where the Federal Audit Office and one of  the provin-
cial Audit Offices are responsible for a joint audit and those in which auditing responsibilities are 
delegated _by  the  Federal  Audit  Office  to  a  provincial Audit  Office-or  vice  versa-under 
Article 93  of the Federal Budget Order. Under Article 45 of the Basic Budget Law,  each Audit 
Office acts as of right in the case of overlapping responsibilities whereas in the case of Article 93 
it acts by delegation. 
Article 43 of the Basic Budget Law is also important in this connection. It  stipulates that, without 
prejudice to more extensive provisions contained in provincial legislation, the Audit Offices may 
investigate departments which do not come under Federal or provincial administration if: 
(1)  they  are  responsible  for  sections  of the  budget  or receive  compensatory  payments  from 
the Federal Government or the 'Lander'; 
(2)  they administer federal or provincial funds or assets; 
(3)  they receive payments from the Federal Government or the 'Lander'. 
If  the departments in question transfer funds to third parties, the latter may also be audited by 
the Audit Offices. 
2.  FRANCE 
The French 'Cour des Comptes' is a jurisdictional organ, independent of both government and 
parliament, which was set up by the Law of 26  September 1807.  Frequent changes have  since 
been made in its organization powers and operating procedures. Its present statutes were codified 
by the Law of 22 June 1967, supplemented by the Decree of 20 September 1968. 
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properly  kept.  However,  since  1936  its  responsibilities  have  gradually  been  extended  to  the 
administrative control of sound. and orderly management on the part of public authorities. 
I - ORGANIZATION 
As a jurisdictional body the 'Cour des Comptes' is broadly organized on the lines of the other 
large French jurisdictional bodies such as the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Council of State. 
1.  Membership 
The 'Cour des Comptes' is composed of civil servants with the rank of magistrates appointed for 
life.  It consists  of approximately  200  magistrates  incorporated  in  the  following  hierarchical 
system: 
- the first president, 
- divisional presidents,, 
- conseillers-maitres (senior counsellors), 
- conseillers-referendaires (referendaries first and second class), 
- auditors (first and second class). 
The 'Cour' also  has  an office  of public prosecutions headed  by  a  procurator general,  who  is 
assisted by advocates-general. There is a general secretariat for internal administration. 
The members  of the 'Cour' are appointed by decree issued by the President of the Republic. 
The first president, divisional presidents and senior counsellors are appointed by a decree issued 
by the Council of Ministers. 
Most of the auditors are recruited from the graduates of the 'Ecole Nationale d 'Administration', 
and,  following  promotion,  subsequently  make  up  the  majority  of the  counsellors.  However 
about 30  per cent of the counsellors are recruited from  among outside civil  servants, mainly 
from the staff of the Ministry of Finance. 
2.  Organization 
The  'Cour' is  divided  into  five  divisions,  each  subdivided  into  sections.  Each  division  has  a 
president and its complement of senior counsellors. 
In theory the first four divisions are· able to deal with matters of any kind, but in practice each 
has its traditional responsibility for ce_rtain categories of accounts. 
The fifth division, called the 'social division' audits the accounts of the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
social bodies and the social security system. 
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are often seconded to other government authorities or semi-public bodies. 
II-POWERS 
The 'Cour des Comptes' is responsible for auditing public expenditure (a retrospective control). 
This audit takes on two distinct forms: jurisdictional control of  the accounts of  public accountants, 
and administrative control of the management of public funds. 
1.  Jurisdictional competence of  the 'Cour des Comptes' 
The 'Cour' audits the accounts of the principal public accountants on an annual basis. It  examines 
and assesses these accounts for conformity with the budget, but is  not competent to judge the 
liability of the accountants this being the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance. 
The jurisdictional competence of the 'Cour' extends to all public accounts presented in the form 
of general accounts including those of local authorities. It has no control over the budgets of 
the parliamentary assemblies or expenditure paid out of special funds. 
The jurisdictional competence of the 'Cour' is a matter of public law and it has an automatic 
right of access  to all public accounts.  It enjoys extensive powers of investigation and enquiry 
(submission of documents, interrogation of officials, etc.). 
Its decisions have the force of 'res judicata' and are hence self-executing. However appeals may 
be made through internal channels (to the divisions meeting jointly) or to a higher court i.e., 
the Council of State. 
2.  Administrative competence 
As stated in Article 47 of the 1958 Constitution, 'the 'Cour des Comptes' shall assist Parliament 
and the government in the supervision of the implementation of finance acts'. 
Within this context the 'Cour' is in fact responsible for the verification of the sound and proper 
management of all  bodies  subject to public accounting regulations: the State, local authorities 
and public administrative establishments. 
This  supervision  extends  to bodies  which  are not subject to public accounting regulations but 
receive subsidies from public money and also to all social security institutions. 
The administrative supervision carried out by the 'Cour des Comptes' is  not in any way juris-
dictional. Its competence is limited to the reporting to the government, parliament and the public 
of irregularities or cases of inefficiency observed in the management of public bodies. 
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The 'Cour' works differently according to whether it is exercising jurisdictional or administrative 
powers. 
1.  Jurisdictional control 
Public accounts are examined by a 'conseiller-referendaire' who checks them to see that they are 
in order.  His  work is  reviewed  by a  'conseiller-maitre' and then submitted to the competent 
division. If  the accounts are found to be in order the division accepts the accountant's figures 
by issuing a 'discharge order'. 
If the division  discovers  irregularities  which  the accountant is  unable  to  explain,  the  'Cour' 
declares him to be in 'debit'. He then has to pay the amount of the debit, otherwise he is liable 
to compulsory distraint.  The Minister of Finance may,  however,  discharge the accountant if 
he considers that the irregularity is due to 'force majeure'. He may also, for reasons of  expediency, 
grant the accountant remission of all or part of the debit. 
2.  Administrative control 
The administrative control carried out by the 'Cour' is designed to facilitate the examination of 
public accounts. It may take one of several forms. 
(a)  Representations to  the  Parliamentary assemblies-there are two ways in which this  is  done 
- the 'Cour' addresses a report to Parliament on each draft budgetary law. The report is accom-
panied by a statement to the effect that the individual accounts of the accountants tally with 
the general accounts of the Ministries and the Treasury drawn up by the Ministry of Finance; 
- the first president of the 'Cour' may inform parliamentary committees of findings it has made 
in examining public accounts. The 'Cour' may also carry out specific enquiries at the request 
of the parliamentary financial committees. 
(b)  Representations  to  Ministers  and officials:  if the  'Cour' discovers  serious  irregularities  or 
malpractices in the financial operations of a ministerial department, the first president informs 
the Minister in a special official letter (known as a 'refere'). 
If  a less serious error is  ascertained the office of public prosecutions of the 'Cour' addresses an 
internal memorandum to the official responsible. 
(c)  The  annual public report of the 'Cour': Every year the 'Cour' addresses a general report on 
all the accounts which it has checked to the President of the Republic, and this report is  also 
laid before the parliamentary assemblies. It  contains an assessment of the soundness and quality 
of administrative management and records the principal errors or abuses ascertained. 
The report is published in the Official Gazette and widely commented on in the press. 
N.B.  The 'Cour des Comptes' has functional links with four public bodies which, although they 
have a separate legal constitution, are in fact presided over by the first president of the 'Cour' 
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maitres' of the 'Cour'. The bodies referred to and their activities are as follows: 
(i)  financial  control:  Commission  de  verification  des  comptes  des  entreprises publiques  (public 
enterprises audit committee) created by Law of 6 January 1948; 
(ii)  jurisdictional control:  Cour  de  discipline  budgetaire  et financiere  (disciplinary  tribunal for 
budgetary and financial matters) created by the Law of 25 September 1948; 
(iii)  advice  on management:  Comite  central d'  enquetes sur  le  cout  et le  rendement  des  services 
publics  (central  committee  of enquiry into  the  costs  and effectiveness  of public  services) 
created by the decree of 9 August 1946; 
(iv)  fiscal advice:  Conseil des impots (tax board) created by the decree of 22 January 1971. 
3.  UNITED KINGDOM 
'The Comptroller-General of the Receipt and Issue of Her Majesty's Exchequer and the Auditor-
General of the Public Accounts' is  an independent public officer  responsible to the House of 
Commons. His position and duties are mainly determined by the Exchequer and Audit Depart-
ments Acts of 28 June 1866 and 19 August 1921. 
The Comptroller and Auditor General heads the Exchequer and Audit Department whose main 
functions are to control receipts and issues of public money, and to audit departmental accounts. 
Most of the Comptroller and Auditor General's activity is in fact devoted to the audit of public 
accounts whereas  his  control over  Treasury payments has  become  a  constitutional formality. 
The reports made by the Comptroller and Auditor General are annually considered by a select 
committee of the House of Commons called the Public Accounts Committee. 
l-ORGANIZATION OF THE EXCHEQUER AND AUDIT DEPARTMENT 
1.  The Comptroller and Auditor General 
He is appointed by the Crown on the Prime Minister's advice.  He holds his office during good 
behaviour and is  removable only in pursuance of an address from both Houses of Parliament. 
He is frequently an ex-Treasury official who will end his career in this post. Free from responsi-
bility to any Minister, he is an officer of  Parliament, primarily responsible to the House of  Commons 
and the servant of that House. To emphasize his independent position, his salary is  charged to 
the 'Consolidated Fund' by an act which does not require annual renewal. His status is somewhat 
analogous  to that of the  Parliamentary Commissioner  for  Administration  (the  British  'Om-
budsman') and to that of Supreme Court Judges. 
The Comptroller and Auditor General has wide discretionary powers and, though it is  his job 
to aid the House, the responsibility for his actions is his alone and the annual reports he writes 
are mainly his personal comments. 
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chequer and Audit Department which is composed of civil servants, he is not one of them. 
2.  The Exchequer and Audit Department 
This department consists of  some 500 auditors of  different ranks. The hierarchy within the Depart-
ment is as follows: 
- the Secretary, 
- the Deputy Secretary, 
- the Directors of Audit, 
- the Deputy Directors, 
- the Senior Auditors, 
- the Auditors and Assistant Auditors. 
Auditors are recruited in the main from school-leavers and are given internal intensive courses 
of training for three years. They do not necessarily possess professional accountancy qualifica-
tions. 
The Department is made up of 9 divisions, each controlled by a director of audit. One is a head-
quarters division while the other 8 conduct the audit and, for this  purpose, government depart-
ments are divided between them. The great majority of auditors are housed and work in the 
account branches of the departments whose accounts they audit. 
II- RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL 
Beyond his formal control over public money, the Comptroller and Auditor General is  mainly 
responsible for auditing a comprehensive series of public accounts. 
1.  Control over public money 
The Comptroller General controls receipts and issues of public money. He alone can authorize 
the Bank of  England to give credit to the Treasury for payments out of  the 'Consolidated Fund'-
which is the account at the Bank of England through which all the public revenue passes. He will 
only give this authority when satisfied that the requirements of the Treasury have been sanctioned 
by Parliament. In practice however this control has become a mere formality and requires only 
a very small part of the staff of the Exchequer and Audit Department. 
2.  Audit of  public accounts 
As Auditor General, the Comptroller's duty is  to examine departmental and other accounts 
with a  view to ensuring that all expenditure is properly incurred-that no payments are made 
142 which go beyond any relevant statutory authority and that Treasury sanction has been obtained 
wherever necessary. He then reports to the Public Accounts Committee of the Commons. 
In addition, the Auditor General has developed, almost from the beginning, extra-statutory or 
discretionary authority to examine governmental expenditures with a view to drawing attention 
to any cases of  waste, inefficiency or extravagance, and this is one of  his most important functions. 
The annual accounts scrutinized by the Auditor General are numerous, and consist not merely 
of those of Government Departments. These include,  among others, all accounts made under 
Treasury regulations  (mainly the 'appropriation' and 'Consolidated Fund' accounts)-trading, 
manufacturing and commercial accounts of public authorities-accounts of some state owned or 
sponsored corporations or companies as well as those of various bodies receiving grants in aid-
accounts of the National Health Service, etc. The scope and extent of  the Comptroller's examina-
tions vary according to directions given by Parliament in each case. 
III - PROCEDURE OF THE AUDIT CONDUCTED BY THE COMPTROLLER AND 
AUDITOR GENERAL 
The Comptroller and Auditor General conducts  an external and a  posteriori audit of public 
accounts. In practice, the majority of auditors of the Exchequer and Audit Department are in 
fact housed and work in the account branches of the Departments whose accounts they audit. 
The large Departments have a number of the Auditor General's staff permanently in the building 
engaged  on  a  running  audit and  working  closely  with  the  departmental  accounting  officers. 
This enables the Auditor General to keep  abreast of expenditure and explains  how the audit 
, is  usually  almost completed before the appropriation accounts are formally  submitted to the 
Auditor General. 
The Auditor General relies increasingly on test audits to uncover instances of waste or lack of 
control  over  expenditure.  Eventual  adjustments  are  usually  made  on the  advice  of auditors 
without the need for more special action. It is  only when a serious matter comes to light that 
a formal inquiry in the shape of a 'reference sheet' is instituted. The extent of inquiries and the 
amount and type of information requested are matters for the discretion of the Auditor General. 
The sanction behind this control is the report to the Public Accounts Committee which can-in 
the last resort-propose to the House of Commons that it hold the Accounting  Officer  of a 
Department personally responsible for defalcation. 
In practice the Committee's work depends. almost entirely upon the audit carried out by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General.  The Comptroller sits  with the Public Accounts Committee 
and this strengthens considerably the Committee's position when it interrogates the departmental 
accounting officers. 
Most of the accounts audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General are for financial years 
ending on 31  March.  The reports he makes are normally considered by the Public Accounts 
Committee of the House of Commons during the course of the following year. 
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The 'Cour des Comptes' in Belgium is independent of the government and its main responsibility 
is budgetary control on which it reports to both Houses of Parliament. Article 116 of the Belgian 
constitution briefly specifies the principal functions of the 'Cour', and its organization is governed 
by the basic law of 29 October 1846. 
I - 0RGANIZA  TION 
The 'Cour' is composed of a first president, a second president, 8 counsellors (one of whom acts 
as  public prosecutor)  and two  clerks.  It comprises  two  divisions,  one  Flemish  and the  other 
Walloon. 
The presidents, counsellors and clerks are elected for a term of 6 years by the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives which may also  dismiss them.  The 'Cour' has a staff of approximately 350  officials 
which it recruits itself. The 'Cour' draws up its own budget and submits it to Parliament. 
II  - RESPONSIBILITIES 
The 'Cour' carries out three distinct kinds of budgetary control: 
1.  Jurisdictional control 
The 'Cour' scrutinizes the accounts of the accountants at the end of  the financial year and estab-
lishes  the  extent  of their liability in the event of irregularities. It may impose a fine  and even 
bring about the suspension or dismissal of the accountant. Its decisions may be referred to the 
supreme court of appeal on the grounds of infringement of procedure or of the law. 
2.  Preliminary administrative control 
This takes the form of endorsement of payment orders signed by the Ministers. Several categories 
of expenditure,  notably fixed  expenditure resulting automatically from current legislation (e.g. 
salaries, pensions, etc.) do not, however, require the prior approval of the 'Cour'. 
The 'Cour' scrutinizes expenditure for regularity but not for expediency. If it considers an item 
of expenditure to be improper it advises the Council of Ministers but th~ latter may decide to 
override this opinion. In this case, the 'Cour' gives its endorsement 'subject to reservation' and 
informs both Houses of Parliament. 
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This is  carried out as  and when the budget implementation accounts are audited.  The 'Cour' 
informs  both Houses  of its  findings  and  submits  'cahiers  d'observations'  (commentaries)  to 
them annually. 
Under the Law of 17 June 1971, the 'Cour' may require any information and documents needed 
for administrative control purposes to be submitted to it within a period of three months. The 
same law also makes provision for on-the-spot checks. 
The  'Cour' also  scrutinizes  the  'Compte general  de  l'Etat' (public  accounts)  before they  are 
presented to the Parliament;  these  contain a  record  of all  budget,  state fund  and Exchequer 
transactions effected during the previous year. 
5.  DENMARK 
I-ORGANIZATION OF AUDITING 
The  auditing  of all  Government accounts  is  the  responsibility  of two  authorities  working in 
collaboration. They are (a) the Government Auditors and (b) the Heads of  the Audit Departments 
of the Ministry of Economic and Budgetary Affairs (Head Auditors). 
Government Auditors are elected from among members or past members of the Danish Parlia-
ment. 
Head Auditors are appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Minister for Economic 
and Budgetary Affairs,  to whom they are directly responsible.  They are at the disposal of the 
Minister to whom they are attached for the auditing and inspection of accounts and they report 
direct to the Minister. Decisions taken by the Minister also fall within their competence. 
At the request of  the Government Auditor's Office, the Audit Departments are obliged to institute 
inquiries and draw up reports on any matters concerning the accounts about which the Govern-
ment Auditors may require information. The Government Auditors may also summon the depart-
ment heads to discuss such matters .verbally. 
A  further  body is  the  Government  Accounts  Board,  which  is  composed  of the  Government 
Auditors, the Heads of the Auditing Departments and the Head of the Budget and Accounts 
Department of the Ministry of Economic and Budgetary Affairs. 
The Government Accounts Board's task is to coordinate the work of the Government accounting 
and auditing  bodies.  The  Board may  deal  with  questions  concerned  with  the  elaboration  of 
uniform auditing procedures or which are deemed to be of common interest to members for the 
performance of their duties. 
In addition to their work on the Government Accounts Board, a number of provisions in the 
Accounts Act and the Government Auditors Act establish links between the two  Government 
auditing authorities. 
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(A)  critical auditing 
to check 
II-AUDITORS' DUTIES 
(1)  that individual  items  in the accounts  are  consonant with  current legislation,  regulations, 
other valid provisions or contracts entered into, 
(2)  that no expenditure has taken place unless authorized in the Budget or other legislation on 
appropriations, 
(3)  that appropriations are used in accordance with the terms and conditions governing them, 
(4)  that sound economic principles are observed in the administration of State finances  and in 
the management of the activities to which the accounts relate; 
(B)  auditing of  figures and bookkeeping 
to check 
(1)  that the accounts have  been  correctly presented as  regards  figures  and bookkeeping  pro-
cedures, and that items of both revenue and expenditure have been properly documented, 
(2)  that each item of revenue and expenditure has been entered correctly, 
(3)  that no item has been carried over from one financial year to another without due authoriza-
tion. 
III - AssiGNMENT OF AUDITING DUTIES 
The  auditing  of the  accounts  submitted  by  subordinate  Government  bodies  and  officials  is 
carried out by the appropriate central administrative body.  ~uch auditing is, by its very nature, 
limited to checking figures  and  bookkeeping  procedures  and to examining  critically transac-
tions effected  by the subordinate body without prior approval having been  asked  or obtained 
from the central administrative body. 
Further, the Auditing Departments audit all Government accounts. The auditing of the Govern-
ment accounts themselves is  carried out by the Government Auditors, partly, however, on the 
basis of statements from the Auditing Departments. 
There are no general provisions covering the assignment of duties as regards the inspection of 
stocks of goods and supplies. 
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AND ITS  CONSIDERATION BY THE DANISH PARLIAMENT 
The Government accounts together with the Government Auditors' report must be submitted 
to and passed by the Danish Parliament.  The report concludes  with a  recommendation that 
the Government accounts be approved. 
The Parliamentary Committee on Finance discusses the Government Auditors' report, paying 
special attention to matters on which the Auditors have commented. The Committee's report 
ends with a recommendation that the Government accounts be approved. 
6.  IRELAND 
Prior to the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 the duties of audit and control were 
carried out by the Comptroller and Auditor General of the United Kingdom in accordance with 
the Exchequer and Audit Department Acts of 1866 and 1921. 
The Constitution of the Irish Free State (1922) provides for the appointment of a Comptroller 
and Auditor General to control all disbursements and audit all accounts of money administered 
by the Parliament. The Comptroller and Auditor General Act (1923) outlines briefly the respon-
sibilities of the Comptroller and Auditor General and provides that, unless otherwise  specified 
by the Irish Parliament, he should perform such duties as were conferred on him by the British 
Exchequer and Audit Departments Acts. 
The present structure of control and audit over public funds in Ireland remains very similar to 
that of the United Kingdom. 
I-ORGANIZATION OF  THE DEPARTMENT OF THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL 
The Comptroller is  appointed by the President of Ireland on the nomination of the House of 
Deputies. He is a constitutional officer responsible to Parliament and independent of the Excutive 
Government. 
The staff in the Comptroller Department is headed by a Secretary and Director of Audit assisted 
by two Deputy Directors. It is  divided in audit groups which are housed in the  Government 
Departments whose accounts they audit. 
II- RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL 
He is responsible for the control of all disbursements and for the audit of all accounts of moneys 
administered by or under the authority of the Parliament. 
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The Comptroller and Auditor General grants credits on the 'Central Fund' to the Minister for 
Finance on the basis of requisitions made by the Minister. Before granting any credit, the Comp-
troller checks that the purpose and the amount of the credit have been approved by Parliament. 
2.  Audit of  Accounts 
The Comptroller audits a series of public accounts including the appropriation accounts furnished 
by the government Departments. In the examination of these accounts, he carries out a threefold 
audit: 
(i)  an accountancy audit,  to satisfy  himself as  to the arithmetical accuracy of the accounts, 
to check the relevant vouchers and detect eventual fraud, wasteful or improper expenditure; 
(ii)  an appropriation audit,  to ensure that monies  have  been spent on the right services  and 
within the financial limits imposed by Parliament; 
(iii)  an administrative  audit,  to ensure  that all  expenditure  has  been  regularly  authorized  by 
the Department of Finance. 
The Comptroller and Auditor General submits annually to the House of Deputies  his  report 
on the appropriation accounts. He is then required by law to draw attention to a specific series of 
eventual irregularities but he may also draw attention to cases of  wasteful or improper expenditure. 
7.  ITALY 
The Italian 'Corte Dei Conti' was created by the Law of 14 August 1862 unifying the systems in 
force at the time in the different Italian States, particularly in Piedmont. Subsequently a series 
of texts was drafted defining its statutes in more detail and these were codified by the Decree of 
12 July 1934. 
Article 100 of the 1948 Constitution states that the 'Corte' shall exercise preliminary control to 
ensure that government measures comply with the law of the land and retrospective control of 
the management of the state budget, and that it shall submit its findings  direct to both Houses 
of Parliament. 
I - 0RGANIZA  TION 
By  virtue of the law  of 29  December 1961,  the 'Corte' is  composed of a president,  divisional 
presidents,  counsellors,  senior  referendaries  and  referendaries.  It also  includes  a  procurator 
general assisted by deputy procurators general. 
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of the President of the Republic. The Council appoints the divisional presidents and the coun-
sellors,  and the referendaries are recruited by competition.  The members of the 'Corte' have 
the status of  judges and are appointed for life. 
The 'Corte' comprises 13  divisions, according to the nature and object of their control duties. 
Three divisions carry out administrative control and the other 10  exercise jurisdictional control. 
II  - RESPONSIBILITIES 
Financial control is exercised by the 'Corte' in three distinct forms: 
1.  Jurisdictional control 
This applies not only to the accounts presented by the accountants but also to operations effected 
by central government officials-and as an instance of appeal, to those effected by local govern-
ment officials-the purpose being to ascertain the extent of any misappropriation of public funds 
on their part in the exercise of their duties. 
The 'Corte' may order accountants and civil servants to make good any financial prejudice caused 
by them. Appeals against its decisions may be made to the supreme Court of appeal but only 
in cases involving incompetence. 
The 'Corte' also  exercises,  through appeals to higher authority, jurisdiction in the matter of 
pensions. 
2.  Preliminary administrative control 
Before their entry into force the 'Corte' examines all decrees signed by the President of  the Repub-
lic and by Ministers-except for those exempt from such control under special legislation. 
The decrees thus examined are certified and recorded by the 'Corte' but it may refuse to do so 
when a  decree is  not held to be in order; the government may, however, demand certification 
by special decision of the Council of Ministers,  in which case the 'Corte' grants certification 
subject to reservation and submits the matter to Parliament. The Council of Ministers, however, 
may not require the Court to certify a decree involving expenditure not provided for in the budget. 
3.  Retrospective administrative control 
The Court examines the accounts of authorizing officers and once a year, scrutinizes the general 
accounts of the state and the accounts of public enterprises and corporations under independent 
management. 
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decision to Parliament through the government. The 'Corte' also makes comments and proposals 
for reform of financial and administrative management in the Ministries, but there is no annual 
public report. 
8.  LUXEMBOURG 
The creation of the Luxembourg 'Chambre des  Comptes' in  1840  was  confirmed in the  1868 
Constitution, Article 105 of which reads:  'There shall be a 'Chambre des Comptes' responsible 
for the examination and approval of the accounts of the general administration and of all  ac-
countants  with  respect  to  the  public  Treasury'.  The  organization  and  responsibilities  of the 
'Chambre' were laid down in detail in the Laws of 19 February 1931  and 27 July 1936. 
I - ORGANIZATION 
The 'Chambre des  Comptes' is  composed of 5 life  members:  a president, two  counsellors and 
two deputy counsellors. They are appointed by the Grand Duke from a triple list of candidates 
submitted by the Chamber of Deputies.  The latter has sole authority to dismiss  or suspend a 
member of the 'Chambre des Comptes '. 
II  - RESPONSIBILITIES 
1.  The 'Chambre' exercises jurisdictional control over all the state accountants. Appeals against 
its decisions in this matter may be made to the Council of State. 
2.  The 'Chambre' also exercises administrative control over all Treasury operations, the manage-
ment of state finances and the management carried out by the state accountants. 
Preliminary administrative control is exercised over the payment orders; the 'Chambre' checks 
that they are in line with the budget, verifies  the validity of the claim and the accuracy of the 
supporting  documents.  If the  'Chambre'  refuses  its  endorsement,  the  government  may  refer 
the matter to the Council of State for arbitration. However the 'Chambre' may always  refuse 
to endorse payments which exceed budget appropriations. In exercising this control the 'Chambre' 
may make any inspection required to verify that an item of expenditure is legally in order. 
At the end of the financial year the 'Chambre' closes the accounts of the receivers and scrutinizes 
the  general  account of revenue  and expenditure  submitted to it by the  Ministry  of Finance. 
The general account is  then presented to the Chamber of Deputies along with the comments 
of the 'Chambre des Comptes '. 
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which it considers worthy  of interest.  It may also give its opinion on any matter put before it 
by a member of the government. 
9.  THE NETHERLANDS 
The Dutch Constitution (Arts.  180  and 193)  provides for an 'Algemene Rekenkamer'; whose 
organization and responsibilities  were  to be  specified  in further legislation.  This  legislation is 
contained in the Law of 21  July 1927, although it should be noted that a proposal to widen the 
responsibilities  of the  'Rekenkamer' to include control  of cost-effectiveness  was  presented by 
the Government to the States General on 7 September 1964 but failed to win approval. 
I - ORGANIZATION 
The 'Rekenkamer' is  composed of three members-one president and two  deputies.  They are 
assisted by approximately 150 auditing officials. 
The members of  the 'Rekenkamer' are appointed by the Sovereign from a triple list of candidates 
established by the Second Chamber of the States General. Appointments are made until retire-
ment age  and the appointees can only be dismissed in cases  specified  by law,  by  order of the 
Supreme Court. 
II  - RESPONSIBILITIES 
The Dutch 'Algemene Rekenkamer' exercises both jurisdictional and administrative authority. 
1.  Jurisdictional control 
The 'Rekenkamer' examines the accounts of all  public accountants. If it discovers  anomalies, 
it may impose  on the responsible  accountant a  fine  not exceeding  half of his  annual  salary. 
Furthermore a fine  of 300  guilders may be imposed on an accountant whose accounts or sup-
porting documents are overdue. An accountant sentenced to a fine may"request the 'Rekenkamer' 
meeting in plenary session, to review the decision. 
2.  Administrative control 
Administrative control by  the  'Rekenkamer' is  carried  out only  after the relevant  operations 
have been completed. 
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to secret funds and 'extraordinary' expenditure). In so doing, it may refuse to endorse expenditure 
if it is  considered improper and if the explanations of the Minister responsible are not found 
satisfactory. In such cases an act of the States General is  required to charge the expenditure to 
the budget.· The 'Rekenkamer' may appoint a committee made up of its members to carry out 
any enquiry in the administration and public services into the auditing of an account. The 'Reken-
kamer' presents an annual activity report to the Sovereign covering the financial year just ended. 
This  rep~rt is subsequently submitted to the States General. 
Finally the 'Algemene Rekenkamer' receives for approval a general statement of all State revenue 
and expenditures as established by the Minister of Finance. This statement is then presented to 
the States General together with the comments of the 'Rekenkamer'. 
In submitting the bill of 7 September 1964,  the government provided for further consolidation 
of control by the 'Rekenkamer' over the efficiency of the management of the financial affairs of 
the state, a control which it had already exercised to some extent in supervising the legitimacy 
of public accounts. 
Section II - The views of the audit offices of the Member States 
On 14 and 15 September 1972 the Committee for Finance and Budgets held a meeting in Brussels 
which was  attended by the presidents or representatives of the audit offices  of the six  Member 
States of the European Communities. The purpose of the meeting was not simply to discuss the 
organization of external auditing in each country and in the Community, but also to examine 
the possibilities  of improving financial  control of the Community budget.  The discussion was 
based on a working document outlining a number of problems, viz.  control of revenue, control 
of  expenditure, control of  sound financial management, the limits of  internal and external auditing, 
cooperation between the audit offices and their national parliaments, and the best organization, 
function and statutory basis for a European auditing institution. 
A report on this meeting was  drawn up by the Secretariat of the European Parliament.
1  For 
reasons of space the following account will be confined to extracts from this report referring to: 
(i)  control of revenue; 
(ii)  control of expenditure; 
(iii)  cooperation between the national audit offices and their national parliaments. 
Before these points are considered it should be pointed out that at the  end of the meeting a 
proposal had been made to set up a working party to examine the problems involved in the control 
of the revenue and expenditure of the European Communities. The working party was to include 
several members of the Committee for Finance and Budgets of the European Parliament, repre-
sentatives of the audit offices, and representatives of the Council, the Commission and the Audit 
Board. 
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152 The following representatives of  the audit offices of  the Member States were present at the meeting: 
Netherlands 
Mr Peschar, President 
Mr Poot, Counsellor 
Belgium 
Mr Vrebos, President 
Mr Stockmans, Counsellor 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Mr Schafer, President 
Mr Grafe, Counsellor 
France 
Mr Jacoud, Secretary General 
Italy 
Mr Greco, President 
Mr Di Stefano, Member of the Corte dei Conti 
Luxembourg 
Mr Maul, President 
Mr Zeimet, Counsellor 
Several members of the Audit Board were also present: 
Mr Freddi, President 
Mr Simons and Mr Bernard. 
1.  Control of  Revenue 
(a)  Questions raised 
The following questions were raised in connection with the collection of revenue: 
'1.  Have the audit offices of the Member States taken 
and do they still take practical measures to control 
revenue from: 
- agricultural levies (assigned to national budgets 
up to 1 January 1971); 
- the  common  customs  tariff  (partly  national 
revenue up to 1 January 1975); 
- V.A.T.  (this  will  basically  remain  national 
revenue, even after 1 January 1975). 
2.  What methods and procedures are applied for this 
purpose? 
3.  Can the governmental or parliamentary institutions 
request the audit offices to carry out checks in this 
area? 
4.  When  the  above  revenue  becomes  entirely  the 
Communities'  own  resources  (agricultural  levies 
(b)  The answers 
as from 1 January 1971; customs revenue as from 
1  January  1975)  how  should  the  situation  be 
viewed  and how could it develop  in law and in 
practice, bearing in mind especially that collection 
will  remain  in the  hands of the national admin-
istrations ? 
5.  Consequently what arrangements should be made 
for  collaboration  between  national  and  com-
munity departments  for  the control of common 
funds collected by the national authorities? 
6.  How should the Audit Board of the Communities 
carry out its  task of examining 'the accounts of 
all revenue', (EEC Treaty, Article 206)? 
7.  On what basis should collaboration be established 
between the national audit offices  and the Euro-
. pean  Audit  Board,  with  particular  reference  to 
revenue  from  V.A.T.  which  will  be  a  source of 
both national and common revenue? 
The presidents of the audit offices or their representatives gave the following answers: 
Mr Peschar (Netherlands) observed that the 'Algemene 
Rekenkamer' already audits the collection of Dutch 
revenue  to  be  paid to  the European  Communities. 
He explained that: 
(i)  officials of the 'Algemene Rekenkamer' visit the 
collecting offices  and the tax inspectors'  offices 
to carry out spot checks  to verify  whether  the 
bases  of assessment  have  been  properly  deter-
mined; 
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with  requests  from  Parliament  to  audit  this 
revenue; 
(iii)  apart from the distinction which would have to be 
established  in  the  Netherlands  administration 
between amounts which are the European Com-
munities' own resources and are collected by the 
Dutch authorities, and amounts intended for the 
Dutch Treasury, no other legal measure will  be 
required; 
(iv)  there  are  no  serious  objections  to  making  the 
reports established by the national internal con-
trol bodies  available  to  the  Community's audit 
services; 
(v)  there  should  be  close  links  between  the  Audit 
Board, the Community's internal control services 
and  the  national  internal  and external  control 
authorities, based on a full  exchange of inform-
ation allowing the Audit Board to form an opinion 
on the revenue in question in full  knowledge of 
the facts without having to review the entire range 
of audit operations; 
(vi)  cooperation  between  the  national  audit  offices 
and the Audit Board should be so arranged that 
the  work  involved  in  auditing  revenue  in  the 
Member States is kept within reasonable bounds 
and confined to essentials. 
Mr  Schafer  (Germany)  explained  his  views  on the 
control  of revenue.  Under  the  Basic  Law  of the 
Federal Republic,  customs  receipts  and expenditure 
effected within the framework of the European Com-
munities are both the exclusive province of  the Federal 
Government. Value added tax is the joint responsibility 
of the Federal and Land Governments. Although the 
latter are involved in this, the constitution allows the 
Bundesrechnungshof  to  audit  receipts  from  this 
source too viz.  income from VAT.  While VAT falls 
within the competence of the financial authorities in 
the Lander, and customs duties come under the federal 
authorities, the Bundesrechnungshof may nevertheless 
exercise a right of control in the matter. 
As regards the control of Community resources, the 
accounts are checked in the main customs offices,  at 
least in the case of  customs revenue, and in the finance 
department  services.  Here  the  Bundesrechnungshof 
makes spot checks to ensure that receipts have been 
correctly established, levied  in  good time and trans-
ferred regularly to Brussels. It also ascertains, on the 
evidence  of  the  supporting  documents,  that  the 
amounts entered in the accounts have been accurately 
appropriated to the federal budget. It  should be noted 
that the receipts submitted for audit to the Bundes-
rechnungshof must first be scrutinized by the adminis-
tration.  The administrative  departments  responsible 
for this preliminary or internal scrutiny as it is known 
must  comply  with  the  instructions  of the  Bundes-
rechnungshof, to whom they submit a report of their 
findings. 
The  federal  government  and  the  parliament  may 
request the Bundesrechnungshof to undertake certain 
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enquiries and deliver opinions but they cannot issue 
mandatory  orders  since  the  Bundesrechnungshof is 
an independent institution, subject only to the law of 
the land. However the Bundesrechnungshof generally 
complies with the requests of the government and the 
parliament as long as this does not affect the exercise 
of its powers of control. 
Even  if receipts  from  the  taxes  in  question  i.e.  the 
agricultural levies,  customs  duties  and VAT,  should 
one  day  become  entirely  the  Communities'  own 
resources,  there will  be no need to adapt either the 
relevant legal regulations or current practice, since by 
virtue  of Article  1 of EEC Regulation  No 2/71  of 
2 January 1971,  these resources 'shall be established 
by  Member  States  in  accordance  with  their  own 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action', and, by virtue of Article. 6 of  the same 
regulation, accounts 'shall be kept by the Treasury of 
each  Member State'. Article  13  states that Member 
States shall take all requisite measures to ensure that 
the  amounts  corresponding  to  the  entitlements  are 
made  available  to  the  Commission.  Furthermore, 
Article 14 requires the Member States to carry out the 
verification  of these entitlements  and resources;  the 
reference  here  being  without  doubt  to  internal 
administrative controls. 
It would be possible to audit the Communities' own 
resources in the following manner: 
1.  On the basis  of paragraph 79  (3)  of the  budget 
regulations, control of  the regular communications 
addressed by the federal treasury to a Community 
department on the collection of the Community's 
own J::esources; 
2.  Verification of the accounts kept by the national 
authorities; 
3.  Possibly, agreement of the European Communities 
to decisions of a discretionary nature for example 
in the matter of payment deadlines, and compen-
satory measures in the event of specified amounts 
being exceeded; 
4.  In as  far  as  the  staff build-up  in  the  European 
Community permits, the latter could take part in 
the  administrative  controls  to  be  effected  in the 
Member States. 
On the evidence of the documents held by the Com-
munity,  the  Audit Board would  check  whether  the 
funds due to the Community have been collected in a 
proper manner and within the prescribed periods; it 
could also carry out verifications of  the accounts of  the 
national departments, in accordance with Article 206 
(2) of the EEC Treaty. For lack of staff, however, the 
Board would not be in a position to control even  a 
small proportion of  the departments in question. Even 
with more staff it would still have to rely largely on 
the findings  of the national audit offices  in reaching 
a verdict on the regularity of the receipts. 
With  regard  to  funds  deriving  from  Value  Added 
Tax-the rate of which is  established with reference 
to a specified basis of assessment and may not exceed a certain percentage as long as this basis remains in 
relation to the gross national product as indicated in 
the publications of the Statistical Office of the Euro-
pean Community (see Article 4 of  the Council Decision 
of 21  April 1970)-the Audit Board may itself work 
out  the  amounts  to  be  transferred  and  ascertain 
whether the  Member States have properly met their 
commitments. However, if overall receipts from VAT 
are  used  as  a  basis  for  assessing  contributions,  it 
would be preferable for the national audit offices  to 
carry out the verification. In this case the Audit Board 
would only have· to check on the basis of the figure 
supplied  whether  the  Member  State  had  paid  its 
compulsory  share  of  receipts  from  VAT.  As  the 
Community's share is to be less than or equal to one 
per cent of these receipts, local controls by the Audit 
Board or the future Audit Board of the Communities 
might  be  superfluous,  for  given  the prime  interests 
of  each ofthe Member States, adequate control would 
doubtless be provided by national audit offices. 
Mr Greco (Italy) explained that under Article 13 of the 
Code of the 'Corte dei Conti' of 1934,  the 'Corte' is 
responsible for the scrutiny of state expenditure and 
the  surveillance of the collection of public revenue. 
There is  a fundamental difference between these two 
functions; the surveillance of the collection of revenue 
consists solely of  an examination of the recapitulatory 
statements of such receipts as submitted periodically 
by the various administrative authorities. With regard 
to the establishment and control of expenditure, the 
'Corte' is  authorized to initiate action: which is  not 
the case with the control of revenue. 
Consequently the 'Corte dei Conti' would be wholly 
unable to  accede  to  Government  requests  to verify 
revenue,  since it has no power to carry out detailed 
control of revenue. 
In any event Community controls of own resources 
will have to be carried out in cooperation with national 
administrative departments at least for as long as the  · 
recovery of this revenue remains in the hands of the 
national administrations. 
Cooperation between the national audit offices and  the 
Audit Board of the Community may take the form of 
on-the-spot checks, carried out jointly or separately. 
However, given the disparities in the relevant legisla-
tion of the six Member States, it would certainly be 
desirable to harmonize national provisions governing 
control in general and audit offices in particular. 
Mr DiStefano (Italy) explained, in answer to a number 
of questions, that the monies received by the regions 
are derived receipts that are discussed and approved 
by Parliament  and then  transferred from  the  State 
budget  to  the regional  budgets.  They  are  therefore 
subject  to  national  control,  being  scrutinized  at 
administrative level by internal control departments, 
and also  in  a  more general  way  to  control by the 
'Corte  dei  Conti'  on  the  basis  of  recapitulatory 
statements. 
Practical  cooperation  between  the  national  audit 
offices and the Communities' external audit authority 
in  the  control  of revenue  could  be  carried  out by 
regular  contacts  and exchanges  of information  and 
reports. Official cooperation, on the other hand, must 
be authorised by legislation not only establishing the 
principle of such cooperation but  also specifying its 
scope and procedures. Furthermore if it is agreed that 
such cooperation should be uniform for all the audit 
offices  in the Member States,  it will  be necessary to 
initiate a  process of harmonization of legislation on 
this point. If, for example, the other audit offices are 
empowered  to  scrutinize  receipts,  the  'Corte  dei 
Conti' should be given the same powers. Harmoniza-
tion of legislation  with  the  object of standardizing 
control of receipts  and expenditure  throughout the 
Community raises  difficult,  if not insuperable prob-
lems, and presupposes a firm political will to resolve 
them. 
In 1960 the audit offices of  the various countries of  the 
EEC set  up a  permanent contact committee which 
meets  once a  year to exchange information derived 
from practical experience.  It has discussed on more 
than one occasion the problem of external control of 
the management of the Communities. The next meet-
ing of this Committee is  due to take place in Paris 
in October when the topic for discussion will be 'the 
problem of  financial control raised by the replacement 
of direct national budgetary appropriations by resour-
ces transferred to and reallocated by the Community 
authorities'. 
Mr  Vrebos  (Belgium)  made  the  following  observa-
tions:  The Belgium  'Cour des  Comptes'  scrutinized 
all the operations of  the central department for quotas 
and licences  whose  task it is  to collect  agricultural 
levies. The sum accruing from levies and other dues is 
paid  into  a  Community  account  with  the  Belgian 
Treasury.  The 'Cour' examines  the  accounts of the 
customs  administration  department  and  undertakes 
spot  checks  to  determine  whether  rates  are  being 
applied correctly and whether the established duties 
have been collected. In the case of VAT, receipts are 
scrutinized locally by means of spot checks of indi-
vidual files in the financial administration department. 
The 'Cour des Comptes' is authorized by law to carry 
out its investigations on the spot and to demand any 
statement of accounts  or information which  it con-
siders necessary. 
The 'Cour des Comptes' does not act on behalf of the 
Government: but is the agent of Parliament. Favour-
able consideration is given to government requests for 
a more searching examination in a given sector. 
There has been no change since 1 January 1971  in the 
control of  agricultural levies, customs duties and VAT 
by the Cour des  Comptes.  All these  operations are 
recorded in the accounts  which  are  audited by the 
Cour des Comptes or allocated to a special section of 
the  state  budget  which  is  also  scrutinized  by  the 
'Cour des Comptes '. 
If the Audit  Board of the  Communities  wished  to 
carry  out  independent  control,  it  would  have  to 
inform the government administration, assign the task 
to external auditors (i.e.  the 'Cour des  Comptes' or 
155 the 'Chambre des  Comptes ')  in those sectors which 
they control, or request  copies  of the audit reports 
drawn up by these bodies. The Belgian Government 
would have no object~on to this. 
Mr Jacoud (France): 
In France the Communities' own resources  are col-
lected by the customs authorities and at some future 
date perhaps in the case of VAT, by the Tax Depart-
ment of the Ministry of Finance; there is no extensive 
control of these resources in France. 
The statutes governing the French 'Cour des Comptes' 
confer the right to examine State revenue in the same 
way  as  expenditure but the  'Cour' has  exercised  it 
only to a  very  limited  extent,  firstly  because  of its 
restricted means and staff and hence the requirement 
to concentrate on expenditure, and secondly because, 
in  the  French  administration,  public  receipts  are 
scrutinized most thoroughly and effectively  through 
the hierarchical control measures applied by the tax-
collection departments and also  by the Inspectorate 
General of Finance, which is  largely concerned with 
the control of receipts. 
Government  and  parliamentary  institutions  may 
request the 'Cour' to check the control of  receipts but 
this option has not been exercised. 
Various  arrangements  are  possible  for  control  by 
community services and national services; the agents 
or  commissioners  of  the  Audit  Board  could  be 
authorized, with the agreement of the governments, 
to carry out control operations in the States-either 
on the evidence of supporting documents or on-the-
spot-in cooperation with the internal control depart-
ments at present engaged in this form of control or  · 
with the audit office. Alternatively, the present control 
authorities-the internal control departments or the 
audit offices could be employed as  the agents of the 
national control authorities  and  their  findings  sub-
mitted to the Community authorities. 
Mr Maul (Luxembourg): 
The collection  of revenue  as  such is  not subject  to 
direct  control by  the  'Chambre des  Comptes'.  The 
public accountants present monthly statements to the 
'Chambre des Comptes' and these are scrutinized for 
accounting accuracy.  But this scrutiny is  based only 
on supporting documents and is  not carried out on 
the spot. The 'Chambre des  Comptes' is not author-
ized  to verify  the payment or assessment of monies 
collected. 
The 'Chambre des Comptes' may be commissioned to 
verify accounts in certain spheres, but it is not usual 
practice. 
The fact that all Community revenue will become own 
resources will  not require any change in the present 
system if the collecting  authorities  remain national. 
Control  will  continue  to  be  based  on  supporting 
documents-at the 'Chambre des Comptes' for as long 
as  collection remains the task of public accountants 
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who are subject to some extent at least, to the control 
of the 'Chambre des Comptes '. 
Cooperation between national and  community depart-
ments already exists in the matter of internal control. 
The authorized agents of the European Commission 
have paid several visits  to Luxembourg to carry out 
an audit on the basis of information supplied to them 
by the internal control departments. 
Whether  it  would  be  possible  to  expand  national 
control by the  'Chambre des  Comptes' beyond the 
limits  fixed  by  present  legislation,  in  other  words 
whether, in the case of revenue constituting the Com-
munities' own resources, this control could be carried 
further  than  is  the  case  for  specifically  national 
resources is a matter which can only be settled by the 
amendment of existing legislation.  The point is  that 
the 'Chambre des Comptes' is at present governed by 
its statutes, under which it is Parliament's control body 
for national revenue and expenditure, or at least that 
part which goes through the public accountants. If its 
authority is  to  be extended  beyond  this,  and more 
specifically, if a change is  required in control proce-
dures, it is likely that present legislation would have to 
be amended. This applies particularly in the case of 
revenue  from  VAT which  will  in  future  be both a 
national  and  a  Community  source  of income.  In 
Luxembourg VAT is collected by the 'Administration 
de !'Enregistrement' (Recording Office), the collectors 
being public accountants over whom the 'Chambre des 
Comptes' exercises its control solely on the basis of 
supporting  documents  and  not  as  to  the  actual 
performance  of the  relevant  operations.  If it  were 
desired  to extend this  control, its legal  basis  would 
have to be altered. 
Mr Coppe,  Member of the Commission of the Com-
munities, pointed out that what had been said on the 
control of  revenue should be viewed in the light of  the 
provisions of  Article 14 of Regulation No 2/71  imple-
menting the decision of 21  April 1970 on the replace-
ment of financial contributions from Member States 
by the Communities' own resources, viz. that Member 
States  shall carry out the verifications and inquiries 
concerning established entitlements  and the making 
available of own resources and further that Member 
States  shall  carry  out  any  additional  measures  of 
control the Commission may ask for in a  reasoned 
request and that the Commission may request to be 
associated with these measures of control. 
Mr Spenale, Chairman of the Committee for Finance 
and Budgets, considered that what was meant here was 
internal  Community  control  although  this  was  not 
stated explicitly.  He  observed  that  the  legal  bases 
required  for  external  control  of revenue  were  not 
adequate in many of the Member States. As revenue 
was collected at national level it was only natural that 
it should be subject to national control; it would thus 
be unnecessary  to set  up  new  control services.  But 
those items which fall  outside the scope of national 
external  control  bodies  should  be  controlled  by  a 
European control authority. For this reason contacts 
should be established at Community level between the 
audit offices  and the  Community's external control body,  especially  after  1975  when  the budget of the 
Communities  will  be  financed  entirely  from  own 
resources and the problem of cooperation will become 
crucial. 
Mr Schafer stated that the comments on Article 14 of 
Regulation No 2/71  did not refer to external control, 
(i.e. the control exercised by the Bundesrechnungshof), 
but to internal control. He agreed with Mr Coppe that, 
in the Federal Republic, paragraph 93 (2) of  the 1969 
Regulation on the Federal Budget (Bundeshaushalts-
ordnung)  was  a  possible  basis  for  external  control. 
'In agreement  with  foreign,  supranational or inter-
governmental  control  authorities,  the  'Bundesrech-
nungshof' may delegate or assume responsibility for 
carrying out the various controls if it is so authorized 
by  international  treaties,  administrative  agreements 
or the federal government.' 
The Audit Board expressed the following point of view (in a written reply): 
'As long as revenue is collected by national adminis-
trations,  it  will  remain  subject  to  control  by  the 
national  authorities  responsible  for  controlling  the 
said administrations. However this does not mean that 
there will be no gaps in this control especially in view 
of the  differences  in  the  collection  systems  in  the 
Member States. 
Furthermore, with respect to Community resources, 
the Community must be able to meet its own responsi-
bilities and  itself  ensure effective control of  this revenue. 
Two sets of control are thus found side by side, just as 
there are parallel management services.  In order to 
ensure that this arrangement works without duplica-
tion of  effort, cooperation between national and Com-
munity control bodies  is  essential  to the control of 
both revenue and expenditure. 
The  Community  Regulations  have  recognized  the 
need for such cooperation between national and Com-
munity controls but so far it has been introduced solely 
for internal control. 
With regard to external control no arrangements have 
been made for  the Audit Board to  exercise its  own 
rights of control over the officials with management 
responsibility or to ascertain the effectiveness of con-
trols already carried out.' 
2.  Control of  expenditure 
(a)  Questions 
The Committee for Finance and Budgets had submitted two series  of questions, the first  con-
cerning expenditure  in  general  and  the second relating to the common agricultural policy.  In 
general: 
'1. To what extent are the Audit Offices of  the Member 
States  involved  in  the  control  of  Community 
expenditure? 
2.  What is  the position of the Audit Offices  on the 
request  made by the  European  Parliament  that 
a  Community  control  and  inspection  authority 
be set up (for example on the basis of Article 9 of 
EEC Regulation No 729/70)? 
3.  How could such a control service function so as to 
avoid duplication of effort? 
4.  To  what  extent  could  such  a  control  service 
coordinate  the  verifications  carried  out  in  the 
Member States? 
5.  What division  of work would the Audit Offices 
recommend with a  view  to cooperation between 
the  Community's  Audit  Board,  a  Community 
control  and  inspection  service,  and  the  Audit 
Offices of the Member States? 
6.  What is the opinion of  the Audit Offices concerning 
the possibilities of increasing the effectiveness  of 
the control of Community resources on the basis 
of present  legislation  (on  the national  or Com-
munity level)?' 
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'1.  Do the Audit Offices  take part in the control of 
such expenditure? 
2.  Do the  customs  authorities  cooperate  with  the 
Audit  Offices  in  connection  with  frauds  assoc-
iated  with  the import and export of agricultural 
products? 
3.  Are  the  inspections  performed  by  the  Audit 
Offices  or with  their  participation  done  on  the 
spot or are they based solely on records ? 
(b)  Replies 
'Mr Schafer (Germany) pointed out that the powers 
of the Federal Audit Office with respect to the control 
of expenditure derive both from co-financing by the 
Federal Republic under the national budget, and from 
the  fact  that the  resomces  are  administered  by  the 
Federation  and  disbursed  by  its  administrative 
departments, the Federation being answerable to the 
Community,  where  applicable,  for  any  mismanage-
ment of  resources. Since the 'Lander' are also involved 
in  financing  structural  measures  in  agriculture,  the 
Audit  Offices  of the  'Lander'  must  be  considered, 
together with the Federal Audit Office, as responsible 
for  financial  control.  Thus,  certain  Community 
resources of the EAGGF are provided, for example, 
from  the  budget  of the  Land  of Bavaria,  notably 
refunds paid for the production of potato starch and 
potatoes for starch production. It is  thus logical that 
the Bavarian Audit Office should be entitled to exercise 
control in this particular area. As regards the regula-
tions governing the common agricultural market, the 
Federal Audit Office  has  been  granted,  under para-
graph 28 of the national legislation implementing the 
common organization of markets,  a  right of super-
vision and information with respect to those who are 
required to provide information. 
The call for the creation of a Community control and 
inspection service is to be welcomed in this connection. 
This  control  body  would  be  particularly  active  in 
Member States which cannot or will not act in a given 
field.  In particular, it could be associated with proce-
dures involving two or more Member States; it could 
also participate in verifications devolving upon nation-
al  administrations,  i.e.,  national  internal  audit 
authorities. 
After an initial period, the control service could exer-
cise  its right to enquire into the areas subject to its 
control;  it  should  have  the  authority  to  invite  the 
relevant departments in the Member States to under-
take  enquiries  and inspections,  to  follow  them  up, 
and possibly to coordinate them with its own enquiries 
and  parallel  enquiries  performed  in  the  Member 
States. This possibility is provided for in the common 
agricultural policy sector by Article 9 of EEC Regula-
tion No 729/70. 
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4.  Has direct financing by the EAGG  F of  expenditure 
associated with the common organization of agri-
cultural  markets  resulted  in  any  changes  in  the 
activities of the Audit Offices in this area? 
5.  To  what  extent  does  the  control  of resources 
allocated to this sector by the Member States over-
lap with that of Community expenditure?' 
The allocation of responsibilities  between  the Audit 
Board and the national Audit Offices could be deter-
mined by agreement. It would be difficult  to include 
the recommended Community control and inspection 
service  in  this  allocation,  since  the latter would  be 
concerned with the supervision of administration. 
The effectiveness of the control of Community resour-
ces can scarcely be improved other than progressively, 
given  the present legislative  bases  and the fact  that 
a  strengthened  Audit  Board would not  be  able  to 
exercise adequate control without the assistance of  the 
national Audit Offices.  For example, enquiries in the 
agricultural  sector,  to be effective,  not only require 
familiarity with Community regulations and a perfect 
command of the language of the country, but also a 
good knowledge  of the  functioning  of the  national 
administration, its methods of working, the adminis-
trative law of  the country, and business experience, not 
to  mention  commercial  accounting  qualifications. 
Moreover,  the  questions  that  arise  are  always  of a 
specialized  nature,  e.g.,  the  cereals  market;  finally, 
a  sound  relationship  with  the  administration  is 
essential to success. 
The  first  measure  required  to  make  control  more 
effective would be to draw up a precise list of control 
bodies and procedures, and to make a quality analysis 
of control and the rules governing its implementation 
in the countries of the EEC. The Commission already 
has  background  material  on  the  subject,  and  this 
should  be  made  available  to  all  the  countries.  If 
appreciable differences come to light as a result of this 
measure, it would be necessary to consider the pos-
sibility  of improving  the  enquiry  procedure  in  the 
countries concerned. 
It should be possible for the authorities responsible for 
the control of  administration, the Audit Board, and the 
Audit Offices to establish direct contact in the relatively 
near future. 
Although national legislation makes no provision for 
the reports drawn up by the Audit Office to be passed 
to the Audit Board, there is no legal obstacle to prevent 
it. The best solution would be to shun all legal formalism 
and  reach  a  gentleman's  agreement  providing  for 
members of the Audit Board to be accompanied by 
members of the national Audit Offices during inspec-
tions carried out in the Member States. 
Mr Maul said  that the  Luxembourg  'Chambre des 
Comptes' was involved only to a very limited extent 
in the control of Community expenditure. 
The Ministry of Agriculture is the only body author-
ized  to  make  disbursements  under the  'Guarantee  • 
section of the EAGGF, i.e. refunds and intenentions. 
These take the form of payment orders issued by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, which are submitted to the 
Audit  Office.  for  inspection  before  payment.  Sub-
sequent audits are based exclusively on records and do 
not  constitute  a  check  of  the  actual  operations 
involved. Nor as a rule at least do they take the form 
of on-the-spot audits,  for  according to the law,  the 
Audit Office  is  not allowed to perform such audits 
unless a serious doubt arises as to the facts of  the case. 
However, such inspections are a very rare exception. 
With regard to the  'Orientation'  section,  the Com-
munity  meets  certain expenditure in the  form  of a 
capital  contribution to which  a  national subsidy  is 
added. 
In this case,  the expenditure is  also effected through 
the national budget and both payment and control 
are handled in the same way as with the 'Guarantee' 
section. Applications are, it is true, made through the 
ministry which has projects and estimates scrutinized 
by its technical departments-who also carry out an 
on-the-spot control. However, the Audit Office is not 
involved in this control. 
On the basis  of the foregoing it would be necessary 
to amend current legislation and to extend the Audit 
Office's powers of control over  Community expend-
iture.  But  even  if such  a  change  were  made,  the 
'Chambre  des  Comptes'  would  not  at  present  be 
equipped  for  the  task  since  it  does  not  have  the 
professionally qualified staff required for on-the-spot 
audits and the necessary substantive checks. 
Mr  Peschar  (Netherlands)  agreed  entirely  with  the 
views expressed by Mr Schafer and with his approach 
to the problem. He referred to the proposal to amend 
Dutch agricultural legislation by involving the Audit 
Office in the control of Community expenditure as of 
1  January  1971.  In  his  opinion  the  creation  of a 
Community control and inspection  service  deserved 
the fullest support. 
He suggested  that question  3 should be put in the 
following  terms:  'How  can  this  control  service  be 
made  to  operate without  entailing  double  auditing 
and hence wasted effort?'.  Double audits cannot be 
condemned out of  hand and may even prove extremely 
useful; this depends which items of  expenditure policy 
are to  be subjected to internal and external audits. 
There is only one way of  avoiding all unnecessary work 
and that is to concert and concentrate efforts towards 
a single end. In some cases, for instance, it would be 
rational  in  allocating  responsibilities  to  distinguish 
between lawfulness and legality on the one hand and 
effectiveness on the other. 
The  possibilities  of increasing  the  effectiveness  of 
control over the application of Community resources 
are somewhat limited in the present state oflegislation. 
Even if perfectly organized, a European Audit Board 
would probably be unable at present to assume on its 
own responsibility for  external control.  All sorts  of 
practical difficulties are involved, of course, but if we 
really  wish  to  attain  this  objective,  it  would  be  a 
serious mistake to forgo such an excellent opportunity 
to  cooperate  with  the  institutions  existing  in · the 
various countries. 
Mr Stockmans (Belgium) said that the Belgian 'Cour 
des  Comptes' controlled Community expenditure to 
the extent that it is  included in the accounts subject 
to  control  (for  example  refunds,  certain  EAGGF 
expenditure and subsidies). 
He considered it  desirable  to set  up  a  control  and 
inspection service or a similar organization and shared 
Mr Peschar's opinion on double auditing and other 
points. He added that the Community's Audit Board 
could  count  on  the  cooperation  of the  'Cour  des 
Comptes'  in  carrying out inspections  and enquiries 
within the country. 
Mr  Jacoud  (France)  intimated  that  the  'Cour  des 
Comptes' was involved in the control of expenditure 
and so-called operational expenditure for the financing 
of Community policies. The situation was complex, in 
that the powers of the 'Cour' did not always reach to 
the end of the expenditure cycle,  which of course is 
where the greatest interest lies from the audit stand-
point.  The  French  'Cour  des  Comptes'  is  directly 
responsible when expenditure is made through a public 
accounting officer, for example in a situation in which 
the Ministry of Agriculture might finance  an equip-
ment operation partially from  Community funds.  It 
has  indirect  authority,  with  some  reservations,  but 
under  conditions  that  allow  it  to  obtain  sufficient 
information,  to carry out an audit when,  to take a 
hypothetical illustration, expenditure is incurred at the 
level  of a  commune or a  small local  authority but, 
because of  the small amount involved, is not submitted 
for audit to the 'Cour des Comptes' and comes instead 
under the authority of the  Paymaster General.  The 
Audit  Office  may  nevertheless,  in  pursuance  of 
Article 33 of  the decree of 1968, exercise a certain right 
to scrutinize expenditure made by a private associa-
tion. It is  conceivable  that Community expenditure 
could be ultimately effected either through a private 
association  or group  such  as  a  cooperative.  In the 
majority of cases,  however, especially with regard to 
agricultural  expenditure  which,  I  believe,  accounts 
for  90%  of Community  outgoings,  the  'Cour  des 
Comptes'  has  no  direct  powers.  Such  expenditure 
comes under the Public Enterprise Audit Committee 
and not the Audit Office.  This  committee  does,  of 
course, work closely with the Audit Office.  Its chair-
man is  one of the six presidents of the Audit Office. 
Many of the inspectors or members of the committee 
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committee is  not a  jurisdictional body,  its  function 
being to advise the Finance Minister on the regulation 
of the budgets of public establishments and national 
enterprises. 
As regards the transmission of work to the Commu-
nity's control authorities, this would seem to me to be 
possible, subject to specific or general approval by the 
government.  Since such transmission while  not pro-
hibited, is not covered by current provisions, and since 
it  involves  contact  with  a  supranational  authority, 
we consider that approval by the French government, 
either on a general basis or in specific cases, is neces-
sary. Quite clearly, such approval is even more essential 
where the Audit Committee is concerned. 
I believe that cooperation between the commissioners 
or  agents  of the  European  Audit  Board  and  the 
members of the Audit Office or the Audit Committee 
inspectors is possible, again subject to prior approval. 
This  could assume various forms,  for example joint 
enquiries, or the supply of  documents for information. 
Mr  Greco  (Italy)  considered  that  the  relationship 
between Community expenditure and national expen-
diture  (e.g.  the  Orientation section of the EAGGF) 
should be governed by the principle that Community 
institutions should control that part of the expenditure 
financed by the Community, the 'Cours des Comptes' 
being responsible for national expenditure. 
Under Community regulations, financing by the Com-
munity is already subject to control by the Commission 
department  responsible  for  internal  control.  Conse-
quently, the setting up of another Community control 
and inspection service would not be desirable to the 
extent  that this  would  tend to render unwieldy  the 
present internal control structure, which is adequately 
defined by Community texts. 
To increase the effectiveness of the control of the use 
of Community funds  on the  basis  of legislation  at 
present  in  force  throughout  the  Community,  the 
powers of the Community's Audit Board should  be 
laid down in  an appropriate regulation and a  clear 
indication  given  of  how  these  powers  should  be 
exercised.  Furthermore,  internal  control  considera-
tions demand proper application of Articles 4 and 9 
of Regulation No 729/70, the first of which stipulates 
that  Member  States  must  submit  annual  reports 
prepared by accounting authorities and bodies to the 
Commission and the second that officials of  the Com-
mission shall have the right to carry out on-the-spot 
audits. 
With respect to the control of expenditure under the 
guarantee section of the EAGGF, the Italian Audit 
Office  exercises  control  over  national  expenditure 
which gives rise to refunds made to promote exports 
to third countries. 
It is not concerned in any way with matters of fraud 
relating  to  the  import  and  export  of agricultural 
products. 
It carries out inspections on the basis of consolidated 
supporting documents. 
Its activities have not been modified as a result of the 
direct financing of expenditure for the common agri-
cultural policy. 
It has ensured that the Ministry of  Agriculture, which 
is  the  competent  authority  in  this  case,  abides  by 
Community  provisions  in  the  control  of EAGGF 
expenditure. 
In its written reply, the Audit Board made the following observations: 
'In order to reply to the questions submitted, it would 
first be necessary to define what is  meant by a Com-
munity control and inspection service  and to which 
authority it would be responsible. 
Normally, this should be a department subordinate to 
the authorizing officer, since from the point of view of 
the supervision of the justification of expenditure, he 
has the most extensive duties at the Community level. 
Like· the control carried out by the national adminis-
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trative services, this control would be placed under the 
authorizing officer  and would not be duplicated by 
national  or  Community  external  control  which  is 
applied at a different level. 
However,  this  does  not  mean  that  a  Community 
control service  ought not to be in contact with  the 
Audit Board. On the contrary, the Audit Board should 
have all the facilities necessary to ensure the effective-
ness and value of such control.' 3.  Cooperation between the Audit Offices and the national parliaments 
(a)  Questions 
1.  Could the  representatives  of the national Audit 
Offices  provide a general outline of this problem, 
having regard to the fact that the regulations of the 
Member States vary quite widely in this matter? 
2.  To what extent are the national parliaments entitled 
to ask the Audit Office to enquire into a particular 
problem?  What  use  is  made  of  this  right  in 
practice? 
(b)  Replies 
Mr Swckmans (Belgium) stated that the members of 
the Audit Office  are  appointed by  the  Chamber of 
Representatives.  They  supervise  the  implementation 
of the  national  budget  on  behalf  of  Parliament. 
They also exercise a jurisdictional function with respect 
to  the  accounting  officers  and  authorizing  officers 
and check the expenditure and revenue of the prov-
inces and of institutions in the public interest. 
The Audit Office maintains direct contacts with Par-
liament. It informs the Chambers of any gaps in the 
budgetary laws  and other laws  pertaining to public 
finances  in  an  annual  report  and  also,  throughout 
the  year,  in  the  form  of special  communications 
whenever this  is  deemed necessary  or prescribed by 
law. 
The Audit Office also examines the draft budgets and 
reports its views  to Parliament. The report is  passed 
to  the  Finance  Committee  (sub-committee)  whicQ 
examines  it and discusses  it  in the presence of two 
members  of the  Audit  Office  and  officials  of the 
ministries concerned. 
Parliament  is  entitled  to  ask  the  Audit  Office  to 
enquire into certain matters,  but makes  use  of this 
privilege only on very rare occasions. 
There  is  no  permanent  dialogue.  In  principle,  the 
sub-committee  is  convened  immediately  after  the 
publication  of the  summary  report.  It can  also  be 
convened during the course of the year in connection 
with special communications, but this does not happen 
frequently. 
Mr Schafer (Germany) said that, as is  often pointed 
out, the German Audit Office  occupies  the difficult 
ground between the executive and the legislature. It is 
not an agency of  the Bundestag, with which, however, 
it collaborates, assisting, it in giving discharge to the 
executive. This is  an area in which the Bundestag is 
at the moment displaying a certain lack of urgency. 
It has not yet given a discharge for the 1967 financial 
year, nor for the year 1968/69, despite the fact that the 
Federal Audit Office  submitted its  reports  on these 
3.  Is there a permanent dialogue between the relevant 
parliamentary committees and the Audit Offices, 
or does the dialogue begin only when the budgetary 
accounts for a financial year are closed? 
4.  What are the obligations and duties of the Audit 
Offices  arising  from  their  cooperation  with  the 
national parliaments? 
financial years some time ago,  and is just concluding 
its report on the 1970 financial year. The role of the 
Federal Audit Office does not consist merely in exam-
ining the accounts,  but also  in advising the Federal 
Government and Parliament. Paragraph 88, sub-para- · 
graph 2,  of the new  budgetary  regulations  of 1969 
states expressly that the Audit Office may advise the 
government and the ministries, as well as the Bundes-
rat and Bundestag,  on the basis  of the information 
brought to light by its investigations. This activity is 
just as important as its control functions. 
The Bundestag and Bundesrat,  and indeed  also  the 
Federal  Government,  may  ask  the  Audit  Office  to 
examine certain material facts and at its discretion, to 
comment on them. These bodies may not, however, 
give  it instructions, since  the members of the Audit 
Office  are independent and subject only to the law. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Audit Office  as  a rule acts 
upon  the  wishes  expressed  by  Parliament  or  the 
Government. The Audit Office's partner is Parliament 
as a whole; its principal contacts are with the Budget 
Committee and the Audit Committee. The former is 
a  large  body consisting  of 33  members;  the latter, 
whose particular function is to examine the reports of 
the Audit  Office  is  a  sub-committee of the  Budget 
Committee. The major disadvantage of  this is that the 
same  members  sit  on both;  furthermore,  since  the 
Budget  Committee  meets  virtually  without  inter-
ruption,  the Audit Committee is  unable to meet  as 
often as  it should.  The Audit Office  is  permanently 
represented on the Budget Committee by an official. 
The latter is  present whenever any individual project 
presented by. the  Ministers  is  discussed.  This proce-
dure  was  formulated  at  the  express  wish  of  the 
Committee. 
Mr  Maul  explained  that  in  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxembourg  the  members  of the  Audit  Office  are 
appointed after nomination by Parliament and cannot 
be removed from office  without the latter's consent. 
The Audit Office supervises the implementation of the 
budget on behalf of Parliament, to whom it submits 
an  annual  report,  together  with  critical  comments 
where appropriate.  Moreover, the Audit Office  may 
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course of the year.  This right  is  seldom  exercised. 
However,  when  the  budget  is  being  prepared, the 
Audit Office reports to Parliament on any  shortcomings 
which it notes in drafting and presentation. 
There is  no permanent dialogue between the parlia-
mentary committees and the Audit Office.  However, 
the  Finance  Committee  cooperates  with  the  Audit 
Office in examining the annual accounts and discussing 
any criticisms made by the latter. The Finance Com-
mittee-or the rapporteur on the budget-also con-
tacts  the Audit Office  to obtain all  the information 
needed  for  the  presentation  and  discussion  of the 
budget. 
The law makes no express provision for Parliament to 
request the Audit Office to conduct enquiries and it 
would be difficult for Parliament to do so. 
Mr Di Stefano (Italy) said that the responsibilities of 
the Audit Office are laid down in the constitution and 
that it is independent both of  the legislature and of  the 
executive. The findings of the audit are submitted in 
annual reports. 
The reports are submitted to Parliament and form the 
basis  for  parliamentary  control  of  the  executive. 
Parliament cannot order the Audit Office to carry out 
enquiries into specific cases. However, under the rules 
of the two Chambers, parliamentary committees may 
request the Presidents of the two Chambers to invite 
the Audit Office to furnish explanations and informa-
tion, provided that they respect the independence of 
the Audit Office and do not exceed the powers con-
ferred on them by law. 
Since  the  Dutch proposals  concerning internal  and 
external audits have not been discussed, and since they 
constitute an appreciable departure from the situation 
prevailing  in  other  Member  States,  Mr  Peschar 
recommended that they be put in writing for informa-
tion. 
A  similar proposal was made concerning the memo-
randa drafted by the various  Audit Offices  for  the 
meeting in Paris at the end of October. The Dutch 
Audit Office agreed with this proposal. 
When a  new member is  to be appointed, the Audit 
Office  has  the  right  to  submit  a  recommendation. 
Parliament is  entitled to add other names to the list 
of  candidates and has a decisive say in the f!.ppointment. 
In The Netherlands,  the Audit  Office  approves  the 
national budget and transmits it to Parliament. The 
Audit Office issues an annual report which it submits 
to the Queen and, some weeks later, to Parliament, 
via  the  Government.  Under  the  terms  of the  new 
legislation now in the drafting stage, the report will 
be  submitted  to  the  Government  and  Parliament 
simultaneously. In fact, the Dutch Audit Office plays 
an extremely useful role as a source of parliamentary 
information. 
162 
The report prepared by the Audit Office is passed to 
the Committee on Public Expenditure. After careful 
scrutiny, the committee submits written questions to 
the various ministries.  In the Netherlands, both the 
questions and the replies given by the ministries are 
always published. As a rule, the final discussion of  the 
report takes place at a plenary sitting of Parliament. 
Under the new legislation in preparation, Parliament, 
i.e. the two Chambers of the States-General, will have 
the  right  to  request  the  Audit  Office  to  conduct 
certain enquiries. 
The Dutch Audit Office  is  reasonably satisfied with 
the  practical  results  of its  activities.  Its  report  is 
carefully considered by Parliament. It  would probably 
be most useful if the experts in Parliament could also, 
as part of  their duties, examine the matters dealt with 
in the report, instead of leaving this entirely to the 
members of the Finance Committee. 
The Audit Offices  should bear in mind that even an 
Audit Office should not be content with its constitu-
tional role, even when this is based on sound rules of 
procedure; it must also seek to encourage interest in 
its  activities.  Its  reports  must  be  readable  and  the 
Press must be kept informed, so that the Government, 
Parliament and the public in general are made aware 
of the issues  involved.  Discussion  of certain obser-
vations  or criticisms  that are  generally  accepted  as 
well-founded  can easily  drag on for  three,  four,  or 
even five years in committee without a decision being 
taken. The decision comes eventually after five  or six 
years. In these circumstances it may be relevant to ask 
whether  slightly  greater  efficiency  might  not  be 
possible. 
Mr  Jacoud  (France).  Relations  between  the  Audit 
Office and Parliament are governed by an article in the 
Constitution which  provides  that the  French Audit 
Office shall assist Parliament and the Government in 
supervising the implementation of  financial legislation. 
Three reports are submitted to Parliament each year. 
The first of these is presented by the Audit Office and 
deals  with  the implementation of the  Finance  Act. 
In France, the draft of  the final budget statement must 
be submitted to Parliament before the end of the year 
following  that  to  which  it  refers.  Since  1959  this 
statement has been accompanied by a lengthy report 
from the Audit Office. This is an important report but 
it makes very heavy reading, and I fear that it rather 
tends to discourage parliamentarians. Nevertheless it 
does contain two interesting items: first there are the 
Audit Office's comments on the implementation of  the 
budget for  the financial  year in  question,  including 
observations on the accounts and Treasury operations. 
Part two of  the document contains observations on the 
management or utilization  of appropriations.  Com-
ments are made, for instance, on cases where funds 
have been improperly transferred or carried over, or 
where appropriations have been exceeded. 
In short, the report offers a whole series of observa-
tions intended to clarify the situation for Parliament and help  it  in  its  annual  task of making  a  critical 
assessment of the implementation of the budget. 
The  second  periodic  communication  is  the  Audit 
Office's  annual  report,  which  is  published  in  the 
French Official  Journal, and which  is  thus  open to 
public  inspection. It is  of course first  submitted to 
Parliament and the Government. It contains all  the 
most  important  observations  made  by  the  Audit 
Office in the course of the year. 
The Public Enterprise Audit Committee, which con-
trols  all  the public enterprises and public establish-
ments  of a  commercial  or  industrial  nature,  also 
presents an annual report to Parliament. 
In France,  there is  no permanent dialogue  between 
Parliament-i.e.  the  Finance  Committee-and  the 
Audit Office.  Nevertheless, the rules of procedure of 
the Audit Office specify that Parliament may request 
the Office to conduct enquiries into the management of 
the departments or services subject to its control. This 
right has seldom been exercised, but when it has, major 
issues  have  been  involved.  Between  1946  and  1971 
the Audit Office received 100 such requests. 
Finally, the rules also provide that the first president 
may inform Parliament of the Audit Office's findings 
and comments. 
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